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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction and Background 
1. This paper reports on an exploratory study into the ‘Impact of the Introduction of 
Fixed Payments into Summary Legal Aid’ commissioned by the Scottish Executive and 
carried out by a team of independent academic researchers from the University of 
Strathclyde1.   
2. Fixed payments for summary criminal legal aid were prescribed in the Criminal 
Legal Aid Fixed Payments (Scotland) Regulations 1999 as amended by the Criminal 
Legal Aid (Fixed Payments) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2002.  They were 
implemented from 1st April 1999.  In the decade prior to the introduction of fixed fees the 
total cost of summary legal aid had risen by 65% in real terms.   
3. The introduction of fixed payments was seen by its proponents as a way to “give a 
fair level of remuneration to the legal profession while at the same time ensuring that the 
taxpayer in Scotland receives value for money from the criminal legal aid system”2.  At 
the time of the announcement and introduction of fixed payments it was argued by 
representatives of the legal profession that fixed fees would lead to diminished and 
fluctuating incomes for solicitors providing criminal defence services and, in the long 
run, to a reduction in the number of solicitors providing these services.  The Scottish 
Parliament’s Justice 1 Committee recommended that the impact of the introduction of 
fixed payments should be monitored. 
4. The system of fixed payments replaced the ‘proportional’ or ‘time and line’ 
system in which solicitors had been required to submit accounts to SLAB for work 
carried out. A key principle underpinning the justification for fixed payments is made in 
terms of ‘swings and roundabouts’. Typically, it was expected  that what a solicitor 
would lose on the ‘roundabouts’ s/he would gain on the ‘swings’. In other words, it was 
expected that every so often solicitors would have to deal with relatively complex or 
unusual cases, which required greater attention and time. Such cases, under a (basically 
flat) fixed payment system, would be less well paid for the work done. However, these 
would be cancelled out by the vast majority of cases which were regarded as run-of-the-
mill and relatively simple in nature, thus requiring much less work by the solicitor. So 
although on a case-by-case basis the system of payment was not proportional to the work 
done, over the longer run gains and losses would cancel each other out.  It was expected 
that solicitors would make the appropriate professional judgement as to the amount of 
preparatory work required by any particular case.  However, the level at which the Fixed 
Payments were set implied a 20% decrease in the average legal aid cost per summary 
case. 
                                                 
1 Since the completion of the project Frank Stephen has moved to the School of Law, The University of 
Manchester. 
2 October 1998, the then Chief Executive of the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB), SLAB online press 
release: http://www.slab.org.uk/contents/resources/pressreleases/13_10_98.htm 
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Methodology 
Quantitative and qualitative methods   
5. The general approach in this research has been one of ‘triangulation’: both 
quantitative and qualitative methods are used to uncover the likely impact of fixed 
payments on different parts of the system and on different actors in the system. Opinions 
of observers and experiences of actors in the system are brought together with statistical 
analyses of ‘outcomes’ of the behaviour of actors in the system. The conclusions drawn 
using one research instrument are corroborated (or otherwise) by the conclusions drawn 
using another research instrument. 
6. Thirteen face-to-face interviews were conducted with ‘stakeholders’ (ie with 
persons who are representatives of professional organizations or agencies and/or 
responsible for the making of summary criminal justice policy or attempts to influence 
the making of summary criminal justice policy). These stakeholder interviews helped to 
inform and focus subsequent investigation, as well as help to interpret findings from other 
methods of research.   
7. Partly informed by the face-to-face semi-structured stakeholder interviews, a 
postal questionnaire survey was issued to non-stakeholder defence solicitors. The 
Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB) provided the research team with the register of 
summary criminal legal aid defence practitioners. From this list a random sample of 300 
was drawn, which was sufficiently large to ensure reasonable geographical 
representation. The postal questionnaire contained 13 questions seeking basic information 
about the respondent and his/her firm. 
8. The completion of the postal questionnaires led to a smaller but more in-depth 
telephone survey and telephone interviews of non-stakeholder defence solicitors. Sixty-
two telephone interviews with defence solicitors, who were active in summary criminal 
legal aid, were conducted. The telephone survey consisted of both closed questions and 
semi-structured questions. Following the telephone survey of defence solicitors we 
conducted 6 follow-up face-to-face interviews with ‘non-stakeholder’ defence solicitors.  
9. In addition to the face-to-face stakeholder interviews with senior members of the 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS), 17 depute fiscals (‘non-
stakeholders’), from a range of different areas of the country, were interviewed by 
telephone. 
10. Statistical analysis of 5 years of data (1997/8 –2001/2) was conducted using data 
from the Scottish Legal Aid Board. This allowed for investigation of income of firms and 
expenditure by SLAB. Data from Crown Office was analysed up to 2003 which allowed 
for investigation of the patterns of case trajectories.  
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11. In several instances the analysis of SLAB data reported by this research differs 
somewhat from those reported by SLAB’s Annual Reports.  One reason is that the figures 
presented by SLAB’s Annual Reports on payments-made allocates such payments and 
the case statistics relating to those payments to the financial year in which the payments 
are made.  However, the data analysed in this report relate expenditures to the financial 
year in which the application was made.  This is more appropriate to the purpose of this 
research project since it will relate the data to the payment regime applying at the time 
the decision to apply for legal aid was made.  In addition, this research conducts a much 
more sophisticated and controlled analysis of SLAB’s disaggregated data – thus allowing 
for an analysis by solicitor, by firm and by court.  
12. This exploratory study points to a number of tentative conclusions on the impact 
of the introduction of fixed payments and suggests some areas for further investigation. 
 
Findings 
Legal Aid Payments 
13. By setting the fixed payment for legally-aided summary cases below the average 
payment made in the years immediately prior to their introduction,  the average payment 
of Summary Legal Aid in such cases has fallen with the introduction of fixed payments.  
Had there been no change in the number of legally-aided summary cases this would have 
led inevitably to a reduction in legal aid expenditure.  However, after the introduction of 
fixed payments the number of legally-aided cases rose. 
14. In the financial years 1999/2000 the number of legally-aided summary cases in 
the Sheriff summary courts rose even though the absolute number of complaints initiated 
fell.  In 2000/01 and 2001/02 the number of complaints initiated rose but the number of 
legally-aided cases rose more rapidly.  As a consequence, the ratio of legally-aided cases 
to complaints initiated by the prosecution increased in the three years following the 
introduction of Fixed Payments.  Consequently by 2001/02 total fees paid to solicitors for 
legally-aided summary cases was higher than it had been in 1997/98.  The present study 
was not commissioned to estimate what the likely expenditure on Summary Criminal 
Legal Aid would have been had fixed payments not been introduced.  This could be the 
subject of a future research project. 
15. The reasons for this rise in the ratio are not immediately apparent from this 
exploratory research.   However, the report discusses two possible hypotheses for which 
there appears to be some evidence: changes in billing practice among solicitors and the 
incidence of accused person who fail to appear. 
16. The statistical analysis and interview evidence suggest that a further consequence 
of the introduction of fixed payments was that the number of intimations of Criminal 
Advice & Assistance rose.  Many of the defence solicitors interviewed observed that, as a 
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consequence of the impact of fixed payments, there was now a tendency to claim for all 
work done under Advice & Assistance. 
 
Impact on firm incomes 
17. The statistical analysis of fee payments to solicitors firms suggests that, on 
average, they were not significantly different after the introduction of fixed payments 
from before their introduction for generalist and non-specialist firms.  However, on 
average, specialist firms suffered a reduction of income from summary legal aid in each 
of the first two years after the introduction of fixed payments. By 2001/02 the average 
income of specialist firms had returned to its pre-fixed payment level.  The number of 
legally-aided cases undertaken by this group of firms rose. 
18. When the increased number of legally-aided summary cases undertaken, on 
average, by this group of firms is taken together with the increased number of intimations 
of Criminal Advice & Assistance the statistical analysis reveals that specialist firms had, 
on average, higher incomes from these activities combined in 2001/02 than in either of 
the two years preceding the introduction of fixed payments. 
 
Impact on case management 
19. Fixed payments were perceived to have led to an overall decline in the level of 
client contact. In response to closed survey questions, most defence solicitors said that 
their own levels of client contact had remained the same, but a large minority reported 
that their own levels of client contact had declined as a consequence of the impact of 
fixed payments (and only one reported that there had been an increase). In response to a 
question on their observations of other defence solicitors, most observed that other 
defence solicitors’ client contact levels had declined. This question of the impact of fixed 
payments on client contact was followed up in telephone and face-to-face interviews. In 
response to these more open questions there was a stronger indication among solicitors 
that there had been an overall decline in their own levels of client contact as a 
consequence of the introduction of fixed payments.  Some defence solicitors expressed 
reservations about this decline, while SLAB officials and other practitioners were more 
sanguine.  
20. The system of fixed payments appears to have led to a sharp drop in the use of 
precognitions. While many defence solicitors reported in face-to-face and phone 
interviews that they were now more selective about when precognitions were necessary, a 
few others appeared to suggest that, as a direct consequence of the impact of fixed 
payments, they did not now precognosce witnesses.  
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21. It was widely reported that as a result of the sharp decline in the use of 
precognitions, there tended to be much greater reliance by the defence on prosecution 
summaries of evidence. While some interviewees felt that this led to greater efficiency 
some defence solicitors, procurators fiscal and depute fiscals expressed concerns about 
the need to scrutinise the prosecution evidence. 
22. It was widely observed that fixed payments had led to an overall change in case 
management, especially among specialist firms. In general, it was said, more cases were 
being dealt with by solicitors and fixed payments meant with less time per case than 
under time-and-line. 
 
Impact on patterns of case trajectories 
23. A persistent criticism of the Scottish criminal justice system is that guilty pleas 
are made too late in the process. While the ultimate decision about how to plead rests 
with the client, previous research, (including that conducted recently in Scotland), shows 
that clients tend, on the whole, to be relatively passive; and that the advice of lawyers is 
crucial in shaping client expectations. In recent research in Scotland the method and 
structure of remuneration has been found to be one (among several) factors which affect 
the nature and timing of how cases plead. This report does not claim that dedicated and 
professional people, such as defence solicitors, abandon basic values for simple financial 
gain. Neither is it argued that commercial factors play no part at all. Rather it suggests (in 
line with previous research in Scotland) that modifications in behaviour will be greatest 
in instances of ‘ethical indeterminacy’; when there is a choice between two courses of 
action both of which have advantages and disadvantages, and where professionals are 
unsure about which is better.   
24. This research examined the stage of conclusion of cases using COPFS data up to 
2003. Following the introduction of Fixed Payments, the largest effect has been the 
increase in the proportion of cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet stage  (up 8 
percentage points after these were made mandatory and a further 3.5 percentage points 
after the introduction of fixed payments). The introduction of fixed payments has 
produced also a 1.5 percentage point increase in the number of cases concluding on the 
day of trial. The proportion of cases concluding at a trial fell by nearly 2 percentage 
points.  Furthermore there appears to have been a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the 
proportion of cases concluding at the Pleading Diet.  Consequently, 78% of the net 
increase in cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet is a result of the net reduction in the 
proportion concluding at the Pleading Diet. 
25. The telephone survey of defence solicitors showed that while most respondents 
said that they had not reduced contact with their clients, a majority observed that other 
defence agents had.  On the other hand, respondents, their firms and the other defence 
agents they observed had reduced their use of precognitions.  The survey also revealed 
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that while only a few respondents said that they had changed their pleading practices as a 
consequence of fixed payments, a majority observed that other defence agents had. 
26. In face-to-face and telephone interviews with practitioners it was widely observed 
that the introduction of fixed fees provided an incentive for cases to plead guilty at the 
intermediate diet. 
27. It is difficult to determine whether pleading guilty at the Intermediate Diet is 
invariably advantageous to clients or not. Previous recent research in Scotland showed 
that if a client was willing for the case to go to trial there was around a 47% chance of no 
conviction at all. On the other hand, recent developments in case law on guilty plea 
discounting may provide some incentive in terms of the penalty. However, some 
procurators fiscal, and defence solicitors remarked that perceived inconsistency in 
sentencing between sheriffs had a tendency to undermine the effectiveness of such 
discounting practices.  These perceived inconsistencies were also said to be a factor in the 
failures of accused persons to appear. 
28. A range of views was expressed as to whether fixed payments had impacted on 
the overall effectiveness of defence work. Most of the depute fiscals we surveyed thought 
it had led to some decline in preparation by defence solicitors. Some defence solicitors 
felt it had made little difference; but most felt it had led to a decline in the overall 
effectiveness of defence work; and a few appeared to suggest quite explicitly that their 
own work was less effective than it had been under time-and-line. Almost no 
practitioners or officials suggested that fixed payments had led to an increase in the 
effectiveness of defence work. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
 
1. This paper reports on an exploratory study into the ‘Impact of the Introduction of 
Fixed Payments3 into Summary Legal Aid’ commissioned by the Scottish Executive and 
carried out by a team of independent academic researchers from the University of 
Strathclyde.  The study ran from December 2003 to January 2005. 
2. Fixed payments for summary criminal legal aid were prescribed in the Criminal 
Legal Aid Fixed Payments (Scotland) Regulations 1999 as amended by the Criminal Aid 
(Fixed Payments) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2002.  They were implemented from 
1st April 1999.   
3. In the decade prior to the introduction of fixed fees the total cost of summary legal 
aid had risen by 65% in real terms.  The growing cost of criminal legal aid in Scotland 
during this period has been analysed by Goriely, Tata and Paterson (1997); Stephen (1998); 
and, Tata (1999).  
4. It may be useful to readers unfamiliar with the Scottish system of legal aid, to 
provide a very brief introduction to the system of legal aid in summary criminal 
proceedings.4 Appendix C provides a simplified flow chart of typical case trajectories in 
summary proceedings – highlighting the primary path of a not guilty plea case. In Scotland, 
there are six basic types of legal aid assistance in summary criminal proceedings.  
 The primary form is summary legal aid, which is only available after an initial not 
guilty plea has been tendered. Solicitors must normally lodge an application with the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB) within 14 days of a not guilty plea. SLAB is required to 
administer (or refuse) grants of legal aid by taking into account both financial factors (a 
means test) and a merits test (that it is in the ‘interests of justice’ for legal aid to be 
granted).5 The most important, at least in terms of overall case volume, of these ‘interests 
of justice’ tests, is that which requires SLAB to anticipate the likely sentence to be passed 
in the event of conviction: ‘whether an offence is likely to deprive the accused person of 
his liberty or lead to the loss of his livelihood.’ Much of the discussion about summary 
legal aid has concentrated on its cost6: during the 1980s and 1990s average case costs rose 
rapidly.  
                                                 
3 Although the term ‘Fixed Payments’ is generally used in the commentary of this report, it is synonymous 
with the term ‘Fixed Fees’ which was widely used by interviewees.  
4  This brief overview is not intended to be wholly comprehensive. It describes the system which has been in 
place during the period sample time frame of this study (19997-2002) though most of these features remain 
unchanged at the time of writing (2005). For a more detailed and contemporaneous account see 
www.slab.org.uk and Scottish Legal Aid Board (2004) Proposals for the Review of Summary Legal 
Assistance 
5 Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 s24(3). For recent discussion of these tests see Scottish Legal Aid Board 
(2004) Proposals for the Review of Summary Legal Assistance 
6 See Goriely et al (2001), Goriely, Tata and Paterson (1997) Scottish Office (1993), Scottish Office (1996), 
Stephen (1998), Stephen (2001), SLAB (2004), Tata (1999), Tata et al (2004)  
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 Accused persons have otherwise to rely on the general scheme of Advice and 
Assistance (A&A), which provides initial advice. This may include help after arrest has 
been made or initial consultations at the solicitor’s office or at court. It may be used to 
provide advice about a means inquiry, breach of non-custodial sentence, or about an 
appeal. Importantly, it does not include representation at court.  
 Representation at court, both at pleading diet7 and, where the accused person pleads 
guilty, at sentencing diet/s are dealt with by three smaller schemes. Advice by way of 
representation (ABWOR) is for representation for cited cases. It covers the diet at which 
the plea of guilty is entered and any subsequent diet. 
 The duty scheme (including the duty follow-up scheme) is meant to be the first 
point of help for those appearing before court from custody. The duty scheme covers the 
accused up to the pleading diet. If the accused pleads not guilty s/he is then eligible for the 
summary legal aid scheme. If, however, the accused person chooses to plead guilty and the 
case is then adjourned for sentencing, the duty solicitor can be paid (up to a capped 
maximum) for subsequent work.  
 Section 23(1)(b) of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 allows the court to grant 
legal aid for those deemed to be at risk of receiving a first custodial sentence.  
 Finally, a few cases originate under petition before being transferred to summary 
procedure. They were eligible for solemn legal aid. 
5. The rising cost of summary legal aid and the reasons for that rise have generated 
considerable debate. Until April 1999 summary legal aid was paid to lawyers according to 
a ‘proportional’ or ‘time-and-line’ system. The Scottish Legal Aid Board paid bills by 
taking account both of the time taken to work on a case and associated costs (such as 
written and telephone correspondence, precognitions).  
6. From 1st April 1999, the time-and-line system was replaced by a system of ‘fixed 
payments’ (also known as ‘fixed fees’). Under this new system, solicitors receive a basic 
payment of £300 (plus VAT) per case in the District Court and £500 (plus VAT) per case 
in the Sheriff Court. These sums were expected to cover all work up until trial or proof 
(‘plea’) in mitigation. After the first 30 minutes of the trial further payments are available, 
as well as, inter alia, for bail appeals and deferred sentences. Solicitors could no longer 
claim additional payments for costs associated in preparing the case (including 
precognitions), although there are a few exceptions (eg medical reports) which can be 
claimed in addition to the basic fixed fee. In June 2002 this simple system of fixed 
payments was amended to allow for unusually complex and difficult cases (known as 
“exceptional cases”) to receive payment under time and line. The determination of what 
constitutes an ‘exceptional case’ is made by SLAB, which reported in 2004 that it granted 
only 28 applications out of a mere 158 applications for time and line on the basis of an 
“exceptional case”.8 
                                                 
7 Initial court appearance / first hearing 
8 SLAB (2004) Proposals for the Review of Summary Criminal Legal Assistance 
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7. The system of fixed payments replaced the ‘proportional’ or ‘time and line’ system 
in which solicitors had been required to submit accounts to SLAB for work carried out. A 
summary of the details of the structure of fixed payments is provided in Appendix F. 
Below we provide a simplified table to summarise some of the most important elements in 
the structure of the payments.9  
Table 1 
Simplified table of the basics of the structure of fixed payments 
 
All work up to and including District court Sheriff/stipendiary courts 
1.(i) any diet at which a plea of 
guilty is made and accepted or 
plea in mitigation is made; 
(ii) the first 30 minutes of 
conducting a proof in mitigation  
other than in the circumstances 
where paragraph (2) below 
applies; 
and 
(iii) the first 30 minutes of 
conducting any trial together 
with any subsequent or 
additional work  
 
£300 £500 
2. All work done in connection 
with a grant of legal aid under 
section 23(1)(b) of the Act 
including the first 30 
minutes of conducting a proof in 
mitigation 
£25 £50 
3. Conducting a trial or proof in 
mitigation for the first day 
(after the first 30 minutes). 
£50 £100 
4. Conducting a trial or proof in 
mitigation for the second 
day. 
 
£50 £200 
5. Conducting a trial or proof in 
mitigation for the third and 
subsequent days (per day). 
 
£100 £400 
6. Representation in court at a 
diet of deferred sentence. 
 
£25 £50 
7. All work done where the 
accused is in custody and has 
tendered a plea of not guilty until 
determination of the 
application for legal aid. 
 
£25 £25 
                                                 
9  Readers should note that this table is not intended to be a comprehensive or definitive outline, but rather a 
simple introductory guide. Readers who wish further details should turn to Appendix F or SLAB website.  
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8. All work done by virtue of 
section 24(7) of the Act until 
determination of the application 
for legal aid 
£25 £25 
9. All work done in connection 
with a bail appeal under 
section 32 of the 1995 Act. 
 
£50 £50 
 
8. The introduction of fixed payments was seen by its proponents as a way to “give a 
fair level of remuneration to the legal profession while at the same time ensuring that the 
taxpayer in Scotland receives value for money from the criminal legal aid system”10.  At 
the time of the announcement and introduction of fixed payments, it was argued by 
representatives of the legal profession that fixed fees would lead to diminished and 
fluctuating incomes for solicitors providing criminal defence services and, in the long run, 
to a reduction in the number of solicitors providing these services (e.g. Law Society of 
Scotland press release, 28th Oct 1998).  The Scottish Parliament’s Justice 1 Committee in 
its 8th Report, 2001 recommended that the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB) “monitor the 
impact of fixed fees on the availability of solicitors willing to undertake criminal legal aid 
throughout Scotland…” (paragraph 74). 
9. In contrast to the previous ‘time-and-line’ (or ‘proportional’) payment system, a 
system of fixed payments might be criticised for not paying solicitors for the work done in 
different cases.  However, those in favour of fixed payments tended to argue that this was a 
case of ‘swings and roundabouts’: typically what a solicitor would lose on the roundabouts 
s/he would gain on the swings. In other words, it was expected that every so often solicitors 
would have to deal with relatively more difficult or unusual cases, which required greater 
attention and time. Such cases, under a basically flat fee system, would be less well paid 
for the work done. However, these would be cancelled out by the vast majority of standard 
cases which were regarded as run-of-the-mill and relatively simple in nature, thus requiring 
much less work by the solicitor. So although on a case-by-case basis the system of payment 
was not proportional to the work done, over the longer run gains and losses would cancel 
each other out. 
When commenting on the proposals for the introduction of fixed payments into criminal 
legal aid in October 1998, Minister of State for Home Affairs at the Scottish Office, Henry 
McLeish, said that “there will be some element of swings and roundabouts, but I am 
satisfied that taking their caseload as a whole, solicitors will be able to provide a quality 
service for the payments that are on offer”. The thinking was that solicitors would make the 
appropriate professional judgement as to the amount of preparatory work required by any 
particular case.   
10. In the course of this research, SLAB officials further explained this ‘swings and  
roundabouts’ principle: 
                                                 
10 October 1998, the then Chief Executive of the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB), SLAB online press 
release: http://www.slab.org.uk/contents/resources/pressreleases/13_10_98.htm 
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“Most cases – they are overpaid in terms of the likely cost of the 
case, if you take the many district [court] cases and even sheriff 
court cases the amount of work that solicitors will  have to do will 
not come to £500.” [Face-to-face stakeholder interview 4, SLAB 
official]. 
“The whole principle of fixed payments is that it remunerates 
adequately for the average case. So anything that involves more 
than the average in terms of preparation, precognitions, or, 
preparation for trial etc will require more input from the solicitor 
and therefore will be less profitable for them. But then they will be 
balanced by the other cases, which are more straightforward, which 
perhaps plead at an earlier stage; which have fewer precognitions; 
which don’t go to trial and those cases you would expect the 
solicitor to be, if anything, over-remunerated for the work they’ve 
actually done. And over the whole we expect that to balance out.” 
[Face-to-face stakeholder interview 4, SLAB official]. 
 
Methodology 
11. The research reported here sought to explore the impact of fixed payments using a 
range of quantitative and qualitative research instruments.  These included: in-depth face-
to-face interviews with various ‘stakeholders’11 in the legal aid and summary justice 
systems; postal and telephone surveys of non-‘stakeholder’ solicitors supplying defence 
services under summary legal aid and depute Procurators Fiscal; the statistical analysis of 
disaggregated data supplied to the research team by the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB) 
and the statistical analysis of disaggregated data supplied by the Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS).  The in-depth face-to-face and telephone interviews 
were designed to elicit the perceptions and experiences of personnel in the legal aid and 
criminal justice systems on the impact of fixed payments, whilst the statistical analysis was 
designed to quantify the impacts and to test hypotheses suggested by both participants and 
previous research. 
12. The independent research was explicitly commissioned as an exploratory study in 
the expectation that it would throw up issues, which would require further investigation.  
The limited timescale, resources and scope of the project was not such as could be 
reasonably expected to address every issue that might arise from the introduction of fixed 
payments. The research commenced on 1st December 2003 and was to run for 11 months.12 
13. The disaggregated SLAB data which this research analysed relates to financial 
years 1997/98 to 2001/02. The disaggregated COPFS data related to 1991/2 -2002/3. As is 
the case in any research study, this report concentrates on the time-frame which is under 
                                                 
11 In this context, the term ‘stakeholder’ refers to persons who are representatives of professional 
organizations or agencies and/or responsible for the making of summary criminal justice policy or attempts to 
influence the making of summary criminal justice policy. 
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analysis. As with all research, this represents analysis of a snap-shot in time and therefore 
cannot, of course, provide an analysis which is wholly contemporaneous at the time of 
publication, or, indeed subsequent reading.  
14. A Research Advisory Group was established by the Scottish Executive Justice 
Department to oversee and advise the research. The group was chaired by a senior official 
in the Justice Department and consisted of representatives of: the Justice Department, the 
academic research team, SLAB, COPFS, representatives of the Law Society, 
representatives of some of Scotland’s (defence) bar associations, the judiciary; and, two 
independent academic experts who are highly experienced in the conduct of the kind of 
research which was to be undertaken.13 From the outset and throughout the study, members 
of this Research Advisory Group commented on the structure and process of the research, 
including on earlier drafts of this report; as well as on specific tools of the research (such as 
interview and survey schedules).  
15. The detailed results of the research carried out are reported in five Appendices 
accompanying this Report and a sixth Appendix summarises the fixed payment structure: 
Appendix A: Themes from face-to-face Stakeholder Interviews 
Appendix B: Analysis of SLAB Disaggregated Data 
Appendix C: Analysis of Crown Office Disaggregated Data 
Appendix D: Postal survey and Telephone Survey and interviews of ‘non-stakeholder’ 
   Defence Agents’; and follow-up face to face interviews 
Appendix E: Telephone Survey of Opinions and Experiences of Depute Procurators 
   Fiscal of the Impact of the Introduction of Fixed Payments 
Appendix F: Summary of Fixed Payment Structure and interests of justice tests 
16. The general approach in this research was one of ‘triangulation’: both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are used to uncover the likely impact of fixed payments on 
different parts of the system and on different actors in the system; opinions of observers of 
and actors in the system are contrasted with statistical analyses of ‘outcomes’ of the 
behaviour of actors in the system.  The reliability of the conclusions drawn using one 
research instrument is corroborated (or otherwise) by the conclusions drawn using another 
research instrument.  
17. One of the earliest tasks of the study was to elicit the views and experiences of a 
range of ‘stakeholders’ in the Scottish summary criminal legal aid system. This helped to 
inform and focus subsequent investigation, as well as help to interpret results from other 
methods of investigation. In this context, the term ‘stakeholders’ refers to persons who are 
representatives of professional organizations or agencies and/or responsible for the making 
of summary criminal justice legal aid policy, or, attempts to influence the making of 
summary criminal justice legal aid policy. Thirteen face-to-face stakeholder interviews 
were conducted. These were based on a semi-structured interview schedule, conducted 
                                                                                                                                              
12 Due to extensive delays in receiving data  from SLAB and COPFS and a late revision to the data provided 
by SLAB the project was extended by several months.  
13 Professor Peter Duff (Professor of Criminal Justice at Aberdeen Law School); and Professor Roger Bowles 
(Professor of Economics and Co-Director of the Centre for Criminal Justice Economics and Psychology at 
York University) 
  7
face-to-face.14 These face-to-face stakeholder interviews lasted between one and 2 ½ hours. 
The composition of these interviews with senior stakeholders was: one sheriff15; one 
interviewee from a client organization; 4 senior prosecutors; 2 from SLAB; 5 defence 
agents/solicitors. Such interviews are therefore referred to by this report as, ‘face-to-face 
stakeholder interview’. 
18. Partly informed by the face-to-face semi-structured stakeholder interviews, a postal 
questionnaire survey was issued to non-stakeholder defence solicitors (see Appendix D). 
SLAB provided the research team with the register of summary criminal legal aid defence 
practitioners. From this list a random sample of 300 was drawn, which was sufficiently 
large to ensure reasonable geographical representation. The postal questionnaire contained 
13 questions seeking basic information about the respondent and his/her firm. It also asked 
respondents to indicate if they would be willing to be interviewed by telephone. Results 
from this postal survey are therefore referred to by this document as ‘non-stakeholder 
defence solicitor postal survey’. 
19. The completion of the postal questionnaires led to a smaller but more in-depth 
telephone survey and telephone interviews of non-stakeholder defence solicitors (see 
Appendix D). Sixty two telephone interviews with defence solicitors, who were active in 
summary criminal legal aid, were conducted. The telephone survey consisted of both 
closed questions (which could be analysed quantitatively) and more open semi-structured 
questions (which could be analysed qualitatively). This telephone survey/interviews are 
referred to by the report as, ‘non-stakeholder defence solicitor telephone 
survey/interviews’. Following the telephone survey of defence solicitors we conducted six 
follow-up face-to-face interviews with ‘non-stakeholder’ defence solicitors. Such face-to-
face interviews allowed for exploration in greater depth and at greater length of some of the 
frequently raised issues in the telephone survey allowed; and these non-stakeholder face-to-
face interviews with defence solicitors covered a wide geographical area. These follow-up 
interviews with non-stakeholder defence solicitors lasted between one and two hours. The 
aim was to help to understand some of the more frequently mentioned matters raised by 
defence telephone interviewees. These face-to-face interviews are referred to by the report 
as, ‘face-to-face non-stakeholder defence solicitor follow-up interviews’ 
20. In addition to the face-to-face stakeholder interviews with senior members of 
COPFS, 17 depute fiscals (‘non-stakeholders’), from a range of different areas of the 
country, were interviewed by telephone.16 These interviews are referred to in this report as, 
‘non-stakeholder depute procurators fiscal telephone survey’ These interviews contained 
both closed questions and more open semi-structured questions (see Appendix E). In 
                                                 
14  The topic guide which was sent to stakeholder interviewees is provided in Appendix A. An earlier draft of 
the topic guide was circulated to members of the Research Advisory Group for comment.  
15 It was originally intended to interview two sheriffs. In line with Scottish Executive protocols, two sheriffs 
were, after some delay, selected for the research team. One sheriff was interviewed. That interview, was 
relatively brief and the sheriff expressed the view that s/he did not feel well-placed to comment on the impact 
of fixed payments.  The other sheriff who had been selected was not, despite strenuous efforts, contactable. 
This research has, nonetheless, benefited from the thoughts and advice of several sheriffs with whom the 
academic researchers have contact. Furthermore, a senior sheriff, who has long held a particular interest in 
summary criminal process and legal aid policy, provided the researchers with very detailed thoughts and 
suggestions on an earlier draft of this report. We are grateful to all the sheriffs who assisted the research.   
16 Access to depute fiscals was provided through COPFS. 
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addition, one follow-up face-to-face interview was conducted with a depute procurator 
fiscal.17  Together with the stakeholder COPFS interviews and the telephone interviews of 
depute fiscals this exploratory study provides a useful insight into the views and 
experiences of the prosecution of the impact of fixed payments.  
21. All interviews (whether conducted face-to-face or by telephone) were, with the 
consent of interviewees, tape-recorded. The recordings were transcribed and any 
appearance in this report of names and locations has been anonymised. Requests to 
interview were made on the explicit basis that the interviews would be recorded and that 
such anonymised material would be drawn upon in subsequent publication/s.   
22. This research was not commissioned to seek the views and experiences of summary 
legal aid clients. Before the commencement of research, the question of client experience 
was raised by the research team at the first Research Advisory Group meeting. It was 
agreed by the Group that the practical feasibility of studying clients’ perceptions of the 
impact of fixed payments would be beyond the limited resources of the project. 
Furthermore, it was felt a useful insight into how fixed payments had (or had not) impacted 
on client experiences would not be practicable.  This is not to say that knowledge about 
client experiences and perspectives was unimportant to this research. The research was able 
to draw on the existing research literature into client experiences and perspectives. 
23. The research was informed by the international literature on client experience of the 
legal process including that on lawyer client relations. This international literature is 
referred to throughout the report. In addition, the recent major independent study of the 
public defence solicitors’ office (PDSO) provides, (as a by-product), the most systematic 
and in-depth evidence of client experiences (Goriely et al 2001) in the Scottish summary 
criminal process. Indeed the period examined in that research was concurrent with the time 
period examined by this research.18 The Goriely et al (2001) research shed further light on  
how clients make assessments of their defence solicitor; what they feel capable of judging; 
their experiences of plea decision-making; factors influencing plea decision-making; levels 
of overall satisfaction; and lawyer client-relations. Thus the fixed payments research 
reported here drew not only on the international literature on client experiences but more 
especially on that recent Scottish research, which covered the period of the introduction of 
fixed payments. 
24. Partly informed by the issues emerging from the analysis of face-to-face 
stakeholder interviews; postal and telephone surveys; and follow-up face-to-face interviews 
with non-stakeholders, the research team conducted statistical analyses of SLAB data of 
legal aid in summary proceedings for firm legal aid income and case volumes. The 
methods used to conduct the statistical analysis are explained in much more detail by 
Chapter 2 and Appendix B. However, it is important to note at this point that, due to the 
different techniques used, the results reported in this research will differ from those 
reported in SLAB’s Annual Reports. Furthermore, the statistical analysis performed in this 
                                                 
17  Due to delays in receiving clearance from COPFS; and a number of depute fiscals who had been suggested 
by COPFS being unavailable, it was not possible to conduct further follow-up face-to-face interviews with 
non-stakeholder depute fiscals.  
18 Further one of the main authors of this research team studying fixed payments (Cyrus Tata) had been an 
author of the study of the PDSO. 
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research used disaggregated data provided by SLAB. This allows a much more 
sophisticated controlled examination than is possible in SLAB annual reports etc which use 
aggregated data for Scotland as a whole. By using disaggregated data we have also been 
able to isolate the effects of different variables so as to pinpoint the effects of fixed fees 
alone. The SLAB data we used includes an indicator for the solicitor through whom the 
application for legal aid was made; an indicator for the solicitor’s firm; and the court in 
which the case was due to be heard. These permitted three ways for individual cases to be 
aggregated: by characteristics of individual solicitors, by the characteristics of different 
firms; and by different courts. The data was amenable also to ‘fixed-effects regression 
analysis’, which separates the characteristics associated with either the solicitor, firm, or, 
court, from time effects. Thus, using this method of analysis, it was possible to determine 
whether there have been behavioural changes over the time-period 1997-2003, i.e. pre and 
post the introduction of fixed payments.19  
25. Whilst the analysis of disaggregated SLAB data allows detailed examination of 
income and expenditure, an important limitation of the SLAB data is that there is no case 
outcome data (e.g. stage of resolution). However, data supplied by COPFS (see Chapter 4 
and Appendix C) allowed the proportions of cases terminating at each of four main stages 
to be identified. In line with previous work, the termination of cases was assigned to four 
broad stages: at the pleading diet (all cases terminating at or before the first plea was 
tendered); at the intermediate diet; before the trial has begun (including where a trial diet 
was held but before evidence was led); and at trial (i.e. after evidence was led). 
26. Each of the different techniques used in this research (face-to-face stakeholder 
interviews; postal survey; telephone survey / interviews with follow-up face-to-face 
interviews; statistical analysis of SLAB and COPFS data) are, in themselves, inevitably, 
limited. However, each technique was used to try to inform other parts of the research and 
assist in the interpretation of results for an exploratory study such as this, as well as the 
generation of reasonably robust hypotheses. As well as using these complimentary 
techniques, future research could also, (subject to the availability of necessary resources 
and access), collect targeted samples of data from court records and/or indeed from court 
observation to examine the impact of changes in legal aid payment regimes.  
27. The rest of this chapter briefly provides further context and background to 
introduction of fixed payments.  The report then moves on in Chapter 2 to consider the 
impact of fixed fees on legal aid expenditure; and solicitor firm income. Chapter 3 
examines the impact on the management of cases by solicitors. Chapter 4 analyses the 
impact of fixed payments on case trajectories; and views about the overall effectiveness of 
defence work. Chapter 5 provides some overall conclusions on the findings of the research. 
 
                                                 
19 See Chapter 2 for more detailed explanation. 
  10
Context and background 
28. There was widespread agreement among stakeholder interviewees that the time and 
line system was open to excessive exploitation. For example: 
 
“it does seem to me that people were to an extent milking the 
system, and the others weren’t but there seemed to be ways to an 
extent that they were given a blank cheque in respect of summary 
trials, whether that was accurate or not I’m not sure but there was 
certainly that perception. So if the accused was appearing by 
themselves without representation the matter could be dealt with 
very quickly.  Sometimes as soon as they got a solicitor involved it 
was going off and off and off again. And at the end of the day it ends 
up in a plea and you wonder well what was all that about?” [Face-
to-face stakeholder interview 13, COPFS]. 
 
29. However, opinion was divided about both how widespread such excessive 
exploitation was and whether fixed payments were necessary to address it:  
“So I think the average was hiked up by some firms whose practices 
were perhaps questionable and rather than the Legal Aid Board 
using the powers that they could’ve used to tackle that or not paid 
them, which they could also have done :due regard to  economy and 
all the other tests. They decided to cap it using fixed fees to do 
that.” [Face-to-face stakeholder interview 2, defence solicitor]. 
 
Summary legal aid expenditure 
30. In order to put the data analysed in this report into context this sub-section presents 
descriptive data on Summary Legal Aid for a number of years prior to the introduction of 
fixed payments.  Chart 1 presents data on expenditure on summary legal aid from 1994/95 
to 2003/04 based on data published in SLAB Annual Reports and supplied to the 
researchers by SLAB.   
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Chart 1 
 
 
31. As this chart shows expenditure on summary legal aid reached a peak of over £53m 
in 1996/97.  Thereafter it declined until 2000/01 since when it has risen.  The chart also 
illustrates that most of the growth during this period was for Sheriff Court Summary cases.  
However, it should be noted that prior to 2001/02 SLAB aggregated the Stipendiary 
Magistrate Court expenditure with District Court expenditure, but after that year  it was 
aggregated with Sheriff Summary Court expenditure.  Thus, Chart 1 slightly exaggerates 
the growth in Sheriff Summary Court expenditure from that year20.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20  This problem does not arise with the detailed statistical analysis discussed later in this report. 
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Chart 2 
Summary Legal Aid Expenditure and Number of Cases
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Chart 3  
 
32. Chart 2 plots the expenditure data together with the number of legally aided cases 
for each year.  This shows that both the decline in expenditure before the introduction of 
fixed payments and its rise shortly thereafter is related to the number of legally aided cases.  
Chart 3 reveals that over both periods the average cost per case was also declining. 
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33. As shown in Chart 3 average expenditure per case rose for Sheriff Summary cases 
until 1997/98 when it reached over £891.  It has declined since then but most rapidly with 
the introduction of fixed payments in 1999/2000.  For District Court cases the average 
payment reached a peak of almost £672 in 1997/98.  A more detailed discussion of the 
increase in Criminal Legal Aid Expenditure in the 1980s and 1990s is given in Stephen 
(1998). 
 
Summary 
 In 1999 a new system of remuneration was introduced to replace the ‘proportional’ 
or ‘time-and-line’ system. Its proponents argued that a system of fixed payments would 
ensure value for money while giving a fair level of remuneration to defence solicitors. This 
document reports on research exploring the impact of the introduction of the new system of 
fixed payments.  
 The system of fixed payments is said to operate on a ‘swings and roundabouts’ 
principle.  
 The research concentrated on the years 1997/98-2002/3: as with all research this is 
a ‘snapshot’ in time.  
 A variety of qualitative and quantitative methods which were mutually informative 
and complimentary were used. 
 One hundred interviews were conducted: 20 semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
(13 of these were with ‘stakeholder’ representatives); 80 telephone survey interviews 
which consisted of a mix of closed and open questions. A postal survey of defence 
solicitors was also conducted. 
 Partly informed by the issues emerging from the analysis of face-to-face interviews; 
and telephone surveys/interviews, we conducted statistical analysis of SLAB data of legal 
aid in summary proceedings for firm income and SLAB expenditure. The statistical 
analysis performed in this research was performed on disaggregated SLAB data. This 
allows a much more sophisticated statistical examination than is possible in SLAB annual 
reports etc, which use aggregated data. Using disaggregated data means that the effects of 
different factors can be isolated so as to pinpoint the effects of fixed fees alone. This was 
done by use of fixed-effects regression analysis, which separates the characteristics 
associated with the solicitor, firm, or, court, from time. Thus, using this multivariate 
statistical analysis, it was possible to determine whether there have been behavioural 
changes over the time period 1997/98-2002/3 i.e., pre and post the introduction of fixed 
payments. 
 An important limitation of the SLAB data which we received is that there is no case 
outcome data (e.g. stage of resolution). However, we were able to make use of COPFS 
data. We analysed the proportions of cases terminating at four main stages: at the pleading 
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diet (all cases terminating at or before the first plea was tendered); at the intermediate diet; 
before the trial has begun (including where a trial diet was held but before evidence was 
led); and at trial (i.e. after evidence was led). 
 Each of the different techniques used by this research (face-to-face and telephone 
interviews; telephone and postal surveys; controlled statistical analysis of SLAB and 
COPFS data) are, in themselves inherently and inevitably, limited. However, each 
technique was used to try to inform other parts of the analysis and assist in the 
interpretation of results for an exploratory study such as this, as well as the generation of 
reasonably robust hypotheses.  
 During the 1980s and 1990s there has been concern about the rise in expenditure on 
criminal legal aid, which reached a peak in 1996-7. 
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CHAPTER TWO ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY LEGAL AID 
EXPENDITURE AND INCOME 
 
34. SLAB provided the university researchers with data files on all Summary Legal Aid 
cases for which applications were received from September 1996 until February 2003.  The 
data analysed in this Report is that covering the financial years 1997/98 to 2001/02 and a 
total of 305,992 cases.  This allows the analysis of two years prior to the introduction of 
fixed payments and three years when fixed payments were applied.  Defining the data in 
terms of the date the application, was received (rather than the date of payment), means 
that each financial year covered in the analysis will be one in which either fixed payments 
applied or did not apply.   
35. The information provided on each case covers: legal aid reference number, date 
application received, calendar year in which application was received, financial year in 
which application was received, month and year in which application was received, court 
type, court location, main charge crime/offence category, Annual Report crime/offence 
category, firm code, branch code, solicitor code, date first payment made, total solicitors 
fees excluding VAT, total outlays excluding VAT, total payments to counsel excluding 
VAT, total payments to solicitor/advocate excluding VAT, total paid excluding VAT, 
account type. The keys to the solicitor and firms codes were not requested by nor provided 
to the university research team (thus ensuring anonymity of both solicitors and firms).   
 
Differences from SLAB’s annual reports 
 
36. It should be noted that the results reported here in terms of number of cases and 
payments made will differ from those reported in SLAB’s Annual Reports.  SLAB’s 
Annual Report figures on payments made allocates such payments and the case statistics 
relating to payments to the financial year in which the payments are made.  However, the 
data analysed in this report relate expenditures to the financial year in which the application 
was made.  This is more appropriate to the purpose of this research project since it will 
relate the data to the payment regime applying at the time the decision to apply for legal aid 
was made.  The decision to apply will thus reflect the willingness of the solicitor to accept 
the case under the payments regime applying at the time of application. 
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37. It should be noted that an important limitation of the SLAB data we received is that 
there is no measure of the actual work done by the solicitor for either the years before or 
after the introduction of fixed payments.  This, of course, means that any impact of the 
change in the payment regime on the work actually done by solicitors on legally-aided 
cases cannot be analysed quantitatively.  Similarly, no outcome data (e.g. final plea, stage 
of resolution etc) was provided by SLAB, however, use of COPFS data was made to 
account for case trajectories. 
 
 
Statistical method 
38. The SLAB data include an indicator for the solicitor through whom the application 
for legal aid was made, an indicator for the solicitors firm concerned and the court in which 
the case was due to be heard.  This permits three ways for the individual case data to be 
aggregated for analysis (in addition to the global total for Scotland):  by the solicitor, by the 
firm, and by the court.  Such alternative aggregations do not merely represent ways of 
describing the data, they allow for a more sophisticated analysis.  Carrying out the 
statistical analysis at the level of the solicitor (firm, court) rather than in aggregate has the 
advantage of being quite a strong test of whether there has been a change over time.  Any 
effect has to be statistically significant over very large numbers of solicitors (firms, courts) 
rather than over a single aggregate measure, which can mask particular patterns within that 
single aggregate measure. 
39. Furthermore, the data provided to the researchers by SLAB constitute a panel with 
pooled cross-section and time-series characteristics, and as such, are amenable to a fixed-
effects regression analysis. This separates the characteristics of cases attributable to the 
solicitor, or firm or court from those attributable to the year in which it was granted legal 
aid.  This allows the separation of patterns of behaviour attributable to the solicitor 
involved, the firm involved and the court in which cases were heard from the year in which 
the legal aid application was made.  These patterns are referred to below as: solicitor fixed 
effects, firm fixed effects, court fixed effects and time effects respectively.  Consequently, 
a more accurate estimate of the time effects is made possible.  These time effects then 
represent the pattern across the system in general after account has been taken of the effects 
of specific solicitors (firms, courts). 
40. Without estimating the solicitor (firm, court) fixed effects the behaviour over time 
of solicitors (firms, courts) handling large numbers of legally aided cases would dominate 
that of those handling small numbers of cases which may be very different.  This would not 
be a problem if we simply wanted to measure aggregate expenditure on Summary Legal 
Aid over time but that is not the purpose of this research.  What we focus on here is testing 
whether there have been behavioural changes over time.  The time dimension of the fixed 
effects analysis estimates how, on average, solicitors (firms, courts) are affected over time.  
In this way, we can test whether there is a statistically significant change over time at the 
level of individual solicitors, firms and courts which may differ from that observed in the 
aggregated data.  
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41. The statistical analyses reported below and in Appendices B and C also have the 
characteristics of an Event Study.  This is an approach widely used in finance and in policy 
analysis.  Statistical methods are used to identify whether an ‘event’ changed the 
relationship between observed variables.   
42. In this study the ‘event’ is the introduction of the fixed payment regime.  Basically 
we test whether, on average, the income received by solicitors and firms from Summary 
Legal Aid changes over time as a consequence of the introduction of fixed payments.  We, 
also, test whether, on average, the number of Summary Legal Aid cases undertaken by a 
solicitor or firm changes as a consequence of the introduction of fixed payments.  Both of 
these are done by examining the pattern of the variable of interest over time and 
statistically testing whether significant changes in the pattern coincide with identifiable 
‘policy events’.   
43. Account must be taken of other ‘policy events’ over the relevant period.  Such 
events, in the present context, could include: the commencement of any legislation; 
changes in COPFS policy advice to prosecutors which are likely to affect the treatment of 
cases; changes in criminal procedure which are likely to effect the number of cases in the 
summary justice system which give rise to legal aid payments or any factor likely to affect 
the willingness of solicitors to undertake defence work on summary cases.  Information 
was provided by staff of the Crown Office, SLAB and the Justice Department on such 
potential events.  These are discussed in Appendices B and C and in the text of this Report 
as appropriate. 
44. As far as the years covered in the analysis of the detailed data supplied by SLAB 
are concerned there are four ‘events’ other than the introduction of fixed payments which 
occur in the relevant time period: the extension of the use of fiscal fines in July 1998; a 
change in COPFS policy with respect to the prosecution of cases involving a racial 
motivation or aggravation from April 1999; the introduction by SLAB of the code of 
practice and registration for criminal defence agents from October 1998; the 
implementation of human rights legislation in 1999. 
45. The extension of the use of fiscal fines can only have affected cases in the District 
Courts.  The vast majority of legally aided cases in Summary Courts are in the Sheriff 
Courts which are thus unaffected by the extension of the use of fiscal fines.  Below when 
we examine the increase in the ratio of legally aided cases to persons proceeded against we 
will distinguish between the situations in Sheriff Summary and District (including 
Stipendiary magistrate) Courts.  This phenomenon cannot explain, in any case, the 
observed rise in the absolute number of legally aided cases in the Sheriff Summary Courts. 
46. A second change in COPFS policy/practice identified as taking place during the 
period covered by the fixed payments research is that there should be a presumption that 
the public interest should be in favour of a prosecution in cases involving a racial 
motivation or aggravation.  This instruction was issued to procurators fiscal on 6th April 
1999.  Thus it coincides with the introduction of fixed payments in summary cases.  It 
should also be noted that the statutory offences of racially aggravated harassment and 
racially aggravated behaviour came into force on 30th September 1998. 
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47. The number of cases involving a racial motivation or harassment has clearly grown 
over the years covered by the research.  The evidence on the likely impact of this on the 
number of legally aided summary cases is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.  It is 
based on two specific studies and the COPFS Annual Report for 2000/01.   These suggest 
that if the annual increase in prosecutions for racially motivated or aggravated offences 
dealt with in Sheriff summary courts all gave rise to legal aid it would only account for 
about 10% of the gross increase in legally aided cases in these courts.  Thus the changes in 
behaviour identified in this report cannot be explained by the change in policy with respect 
to the prosecution of this type of case. 
48. SLAB introduced its Code of Practice and the registration of defence solicitors from 
October 1998 just 6 months before the introduction of fixed payments for summary legal 
aid.  It is clear that the number of solicitors firms (700) who registered in October 1998 was 
less than the number who successfully applied for summary legal aid in 1997/98 (791) and 
1998/99 (749).  According to the SLAB Annual Report for 1999/2000 the number of firms 
registered rose to 714 whilst the number of firms successfully applying fell to 699.  By 30th 
September 2000 (SLAB evidence to Justice 1 Committee of the Scottish parliament) the 
number of firms registered had fallen to 707 while the number successfully applying for 
summary legal aid in 2000/01 fell to 691.  There was no data available for the number of 
firms registered in 2001/02.  Over the first two years of the register the number of firms 
registered rose whilst the number of firms successfully applying fell.  The number of firms 
successfully applying fell again in 2001/02 to 660.  At 31st March 2004 the number of 
firms registered had fallen to 665.  
 
49. The Use of Human Rights Legislation in Scottish Courts (Greenhill et al, 2004), has 
identified the number of criminal cases in the period from May 1999 to the end of 2003 
where a human rights issue was raised.  Approximately 290 summary cases per annum 
were involved.  This represents 0.3% of the average annual number of legally aided 
summary cases in this period.  However, in the first 2 years these ran at a much higher level 
equivalent to 640 per annum or slightly less than the number of cases involving racial 
motivation or aggravation.  In subsequent years the level is much smaller.  This certainly 
can go no way to explain the continued increase in the number of legally-aided summary 
cases.   
50. When the number of criminal cases raising human rights issues is added to the 
number of cases involving racial issues for 1999/2000 and 2000/01 they can, at the very 
most, account for 20% of the gross increase in legally aided Sheriff Summary Court cases.  
Thus the other identified events do not appear to account for the change in behaviour 
identified around the time of the introduction of fixed payments for summary legal aid.  
This Report now turns to the statistical analysis which identifies such a change in 
behaviour. 
51. Before discussing the results of the detailed statistical analysis the next sub-section 
presents some of the overall trends exhibited in the data provided by SLAB. 
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Overall trends 
52. Chart 4 shows the total payments (net of VAT) made to solicitors and the number 
of cases covered by these payments for the 5 years studied.  The level of payments is 
indicated by the vertical bars, the scale for which is shown on the left of the chart.  The 
number of cases for each year are shown by the broken line, the scale for which is shown 
on the right of the chart.  The chart distinguishes between cases set down for the District & 
Stipendiary Magistrate Courts and those for the Sheriff Summary Courts.  It is clear that 
after the introduction of fixed payments expenditure rose broadly in line with the number 
of cases.  This is confirmed by the virtually static average payment to solicitors illustrated 
in Chart 5. 
53. The fall in the mean (average) cost of summary cases between the pre- and post-
fixed payment periods is a direct consequence of the fact that the fixed payment in each 
type of court was set below the average payment made under the previous ‘time and line’ 
system in the years immediately preceding the introduction of fixed payments.  It is thus a 
matter of logic that for a given number of legally aided cases in the years following the 
introduction of fixed payments total expenditure on Summary Legal Aid should be 
expected to be lower than it would have been had fixed payments not been introduced.  
What the research reported below is concerned with is any impact which the change of 
payment system had on defence agents, their case management strategies, case trajectories, 
other elements of the legal aid system and the number of cases for which Summary Legal 
Aid payments are made. 
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54. Chart 6 shows a comparison of the number of legally aided summary court cases 
and the number of complaints initiated in the Sheriff Summary Courts for the years covered 
by the SLAB data.  The latter figures are from the Scottish Courts Service.  They provide a 
measure of the business passing through these courts.  
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55. Chart 7 shows the number of legally-aided Sheriff Court cases as a percentage of 
complaints initiated for each of the years covered by this study.  The ratio rises after the 
introduction of fixed payments.21  
                                                 
21 This analysis presumes that the data for the two years prior to the introduction of fixed payments which 
were provided to the research team by SLAB are representative of the pre-fixed payments system. 
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Chart 7 
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56. The figures illustrated in Charts 1–7 are aggregates for all of Scotland and as such 
are an indicator of how the system has reacted nationally to the introduction of fixed 
payments.  No allowance is made for the change in the system to have impacted differently 
on different parts of the country, on different firms or on different solicitors. The analysis 
in this report takes these possibilities into account to provide a more detailed and 
sophisticated analysis. Appendix B reports in detail on our analysis of this data which seeks 
to produce a more focused analysis of the impact of fixed payments on the fee income 
received by solicitors and their firms.   
 
Legally-aided cases in summary courts 
 
57. Table 8 of Appendix B reports the results of a statistical test of whether the ratio of 
legally-aided cases to total number of cases changed in Sheriff Summary Courts during the 
5 years covered by the SLAB data.  This analysis involves a (court) fixed effects regression 
where the dependent variable is the ratio of legally aided summary cases in each court to 
the number of complaints initiated in that court for the same financial year. The general 
nature of a fixed effects regression was discussed above at paragraphs 38-41.  The 
regression reported in Table 8 of the Appendix has a court fixed effect.  Thus the unit of 
observation is each Sheriff Summary Court.  The fixed effects control for the 
characteristics of each particular court.  The fixed effects are not reported in the table.   
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Chart 8 
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58. The changes in the ratio over time identified by the regression analysis for Sheriff 
Summary Courts are displayed graphically in Chart 8.  The chart shows the statistical 
estimate of the change in the ratio for each year after the introduction of fixed payments as 
compared to those for the two years prior to their introduction together with the 95% 
Confidence Interval around that estimate.  This confidence interval is the range between the 
‘Upper Bound’ and ‘Lower Bound’.  We can be highly confident that the ‘true’ change in 
the ratio lies within that range.  If the range includes zero we cannot reject the conclusion 
that there has been no change. 
59. The results illustrated in Chart 8 mean that the estimated increases in 1999/2000, 
2000/01 and 2001/02 cannot be rejected.  Thus we conclude, on the basis of this (court) 
fixed effects regression analysis, that on average, across all Sheriff Summary Courts in 
Scotland the ratio of legally aided cases to the number of complaints initiated has risen 
since the introduction of fixed payments. The rise is found to be statistically significant. It 
should be noted that the increase in the ratio in the first year after the introduction of fixed 
payments is lower than in the two subsequent years.  As discussed in paragraphs 43-52 
other identifiable events do not appear to be of such a magnitude as to be responsible for 
this change in the ratio.  
60. The foregoing analysis clearly suggests that for Sheriff Summary Courts there has 
been a significant change in the relationship between legally aided cases and complaints 
initiated in the three years since the introduction of fixed payments.  More than 75% of 
legally-aided summary cases are in the Sheriff Summary Courts. 
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61. It is not possible for this exploratory study to determine conclusively what has 
caused this increase in the ratio. However, it is possible to explore some of the possible 
causes. As we saw above, and is further explained in more detail in Appendix B, this 
increase in the ratio in the Sheriff Courts does not appear to be explained by the 
introduction of racial aggravation and motivated offences; increases in diversion (such as 
the increased use of fiscal fines); nor by a shift in cases from District to Sheriff Court.   
62. From the data available in this exploratory study it is difficult to determine with 
certainty the cause/s of the rise in the ratio. Here we raise two possible hypotheses for 
which there is some evidence, and which subsequent research might further investigate. 
These are not necessarily conflicting alternative explanations to each other: together they 
may help to provide at least part of the explanation for the rise in the ratio. Nonetheless, 
what follows should not be seen as a wholly definitive or exhaustive examination of the 
cause/s of the rise in the ratio.  
63. The first possible factor which may help to explain the increase in the ratio may be 
the incidence of accused persons who fail to appear at court.22 There are various reasons 
why an accused may fail to appear which are discussed throughout this report, most of 
which long predate the introduction of fixed payments.23 A decline in the level of client 
contact24, (which we explore in more detail in chapter three: paragraphs 67-71), might be 
one factor which may help to explain a rise in the incidence of the accused failing to 
appear.   
64. A second possible factor for the rise in the ratio may lie in another apparent 
consequence of fixed payments. This relates to the way in which solicitors bill for cases 
and indeed how ‘a case’ is defined under the new system of incentives of fixed payment as 
opposed to a ‘proportionate’ (or time-and-line) system. 
65. Gray, Fenn and Rickman (1999) suggest that there was evidence of case splitting 
when Standard Fees were introduced for legally-aided cases in magistrates’ courts in 
England & Wales in 1993.25  Thus, the advent of fixed payments in Scotland may have led 
solicitors to begin to adjust their billing behaviour in relation to work which might 
previously have been regarded as ancillary to the main case, or, where solicitors might 
simply have absorbed the costs of this ancillary work in the ‘main’ case26. Under a time 
                                                 
22 We were unable to obtain from COPFS full national data on failures to appear. However, in their research 
(which covered a very similar time frame to this research), Goriely et al found that the incidence of failures to 
appear in Edinburgh Sheriff Court was around 20%.  
23 According to COPFS, there was been no change in COPFS policy over the relevant period of study (1998-
2003) on failures to appear. The incidence of accused persons failing to appear was one of the concerns of the 
report by the Sentencing Commission for Scotland on the use of bail and remand published in 2005. This was 
published well after the period of study of the impact of fixed payments reported here. 
24 Client contact refers to a whole range of contact between defence solicitors and clients including not only 
face-to-face meetings, but also written correspondence, telephone conversations, etc. 
 
25 In an unpublished paper Bridges (2001) critiques the assumptions upon which the case splitting hypothesis is 
based.  
26 For example, failures to appear, or, where the prosecution deserts the charges on a case on a technicality only 
to restart.  
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and line (‘proportionate’) remuneration system, most solicitors may have included such 
ancillary work as part of the main case. Often such cases may have only involved a few 
minutes of extra work or advocacy and may not have been felt worth making an additional 
application for. 27 Under the old ‘proportionate’ or ‘time-and-line’ system, many solicitors 
might not have bothered to apply separately for ancillary work. Under fixed payments there 
is a much greater incentive to ensure that a second application is made. 
66. A SLAB official explained:  
“We have been paying quite significant sums of money for failures 
to appear cases, now under the old system they just did that as part 
of the certificate. Under the current system because the failure to 
appear is not a function of the original incident – it’s a separate 
offence – they’re perfectly at liberty to apply for it and the failure to 
appear can carry a greater risk of imprisonment than the original 
offence and that’s one of the criteria set down in our legislation that 
must be taken into account for granting legal aid, so we’ve been 
paying out quite large amounts of money.  Shortly there’ll be 
regulations put in place to deem the failure to appear as being part 
of the original offence.” [Face-to-face stakeholder interview 4, 
SLAB official] 
SLAB regulations have changed since the period covered in this research such that 
payments in failure to appear cases are treated as part of the original grant of legal aid and 
thus covered by the original fixed payment. 
Similarly, a stakeholder defence solicitors suggested that ‘failures to appear’ meant that 
cases could be treated separately: 
 
“There are obviously other ways in which the thing can be 
exploited. Adding additional fixed fees to one case by getting 
separate certificates for failure to appear complaints, for example, 
is an obvious one that people are well aware of.” [Face-to-face 
stakeholder interview 9, defence solicitor] 
67. This could be seen as a form of de-facto ‘case splitting’ encouraged by the 
introduction of fixed payments which would lead to an increase in the ratio of legally-aided 
cases to complaints initiated.  With the introduction of fixed payments, the definition of a 
legal aid ‘case’ became crucial to solicitors’ incomes.  Thus it may be that one explanation 
for the rise in the ratio is because solicitors have tended to become more careful to ensure 
that each case receives a separate summary legal aid certificate.  
68. We should emphasise that we do not seek to suggest that there would necessarily be 
anything improper if it is the case that solicitors are now, as a consequence of the 
introduction of fixed payments, making such additional claims. Indeed, one could argue 
                                                 
27 Goriely et al’s study of the PDSO (2001) provides some limited evidence that solicitors were beginning to 
respond to the introduction of fixed payments in this way. 
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that the use of additional applications is more correct and transparent than the previous 
practice of absorbing such work into the main case.28  
 
Impact on firms 
69. The preceding analysis of court level data suggests that for Sheriff Summary Court 
cases (which since the introduction of fixed payments have been more than 75% of legally-
aided summary cases) there has been an increase in the ratio of legally-aided cases to 
complaints initiated since the introduction of fixed payments.  We now turn to the way in 
which this has impacted on solicitors’ firms.  A more detailed discussion of this is provided 
in Appendix B where the impact on individual solicitors is also analysed. 
 
Table 2 
 Pre-Fixed Payments Post-Fixed Payments 
 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 
Active Firms 791 749 699 691 660 
Cases per Firm 74.61 76.13 83.24 90.23 105.20 
Fee Income per Firm £47,451 £42,572 £48,587 £53,837 £58,269 
 
 
70. As mentioned briefly above, the number of firms of solicitors successfully applying 
for Summary Legal Aid has gone down since the introduction of fixed payments.  The 
initial drop is probably due to the introduction of registration and the SLAB code of 
practice.  The number of firms conducting legally-aided work in the Summary Courts for 
the period covered by the SLAB data is shown in Table 2.  The table also shows that the 
average number of Summary Legal Aid cases has risen since the introduction of fixed 
payments.  In 2001/02 it was 38% higher than in the year preceding the introduction of 
fixed payments.  Over the same period average fee income per firm had risen by 37%. 
71. The average figures in Table 2 obscure large differences between firms, because of 
the varying degree of involvement of different firms in summary legal aid.  In Appendix B, 
we have grouped together those firms which specialise in summary legal aid; those which 
can be described as ‘generalists’ and those which are ‘non-specialists’.  This distinction is 
based on where a firm lies in the distribution of cases per solicitor.  Specialists are defined 
as those where the number of cases per solicitor involved in Summary Legal Aid is in the 
top quartile (top 25%).  Specialists accounted for just over 80% of legally-aided summary 
cases in 1997/98 and received 81% of the fees paid for such cases.  By 2001/02 both their 
share of the number of cases and of fees had fallen to 77%. Non-specialists are those whose 
                                                 
28 The term ‘case-splitting’ may be open to pejorative connotations: it might be thought to imply that 
solicitors ‘create’ or invent ‘additional’ cases. This would be both inaccurate and less than fair: fixed 
payments may encourage solicitors to be more assiduous, which is entirely legitimate (also see Bridges 2001) 
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cases per solicitor are in the bottom quartile, whilst generalists lie between the top and 
bottom quartiles. 
72. In Appendix B a firm fixed-effects regression was used to estimate the change in 
firms’ incomes over the period covered by the SLAB data (Table 5 of Appendix B).  This 
reveals that although the average income of non-specialist and generalist firms fluctuated 
over the period studied, none of the fluctuations was statistically significant.  However, the 
incomes of specialist firms fell by a statistically significant amount below the pre-fixed 
payment level in the first two years after the introduction of fixed payments.  The fall was 
less in 2000/01 than in 1999/2000.  By 2001/02 the average income of specialist firms had 
risen above the 1997/98 level although not by a statistically significant amount.  The results 
for the specialist firms including the 95% confidence intervals are shown in Chart 10. 
73. The statistical significance of the differences for 1999/2000 and 2000/01 is 
indicated by the fact that the whole of the area between the upper and lower bounds lies 
below zero change.  For 2001/02 the area between the upper and lower bounds includes 
zero indicating that the difference is not statistically significant. 
74. The recovery in the average fee income of these specialist firms after the 
introduction of fixed payments is explained by the increase in the average number of 
legally-aided summary cases which they undertook in 2000/01 and 2001/02.  Chart 11 
illustrates the changes in the average number of cases based on the fixed effect regression 
reported in Appendix B (Table 6).   
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Chart 10 
Chart 11 
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75. In our face-to-face interviews with, and telephone surveys of defence solicitors, and 
depute procurators fiscal, it was very widely reported that many defence firms (especially 
larger, specialist firms) had adjusted to the new payment regime by taking on more cases:  
 
“what’s happened is you are now getting larger firms chasing and 
specialising in the business and churning them through like a 
sausage machine and you have other practitioners who do not have 
a lot of criminal business have virtually given up doing what 
business they had.” [Face-to-face non-stakeholder interview 3,  
defence solicitor] 
 
“Well the more you do, the more efficient the firm is and therefore 
the more economically you can deal with fixed fees.  Yep.  So the 
more you have, the more attractive fixed fees are likely to be 
because you’re maybe there for ten five minute appearances and 
you’ve got ten fixed fees at the end of the day.” [Face-to-face 
stakeholder interview 3, defence solicitor] 
 
76. The increase in the average number of cases undertaken by specialist firms is 
consistent with the increase in the ratio of legally-aided cases to complaints initiated for 
Sheriff Summary Courts discussed in paragraphs 43-47 above.  
 
Impact on Criminal Advice & Assistance 
77. It is not unreasonable to expect that in a period when summary legal aid fees are 
subject to limitation that solicitors firms carrying out legally aided work would be likely to 
ensure that they received payment for all aspects of legal advice.  It was suggested by some 
defence solicitors that in the past some solicitors did not claim everything under Advice & 
Assistance to which they were entitled.  In particular, when their client’s application for 
summary legal aid was successful they did not submit a claim for Advice & Assistance.  
Under a regime of fixed payments for summary legal aid solicitors might be more likely to 
claim for Advice & Assistance (‘A&A’).  Gray, Fenn & Rickman (1999) found this to be 
the case when standard fees were introduced for magistrates’ court cases in England & 
Wales. According to Gray et al, after the introduction of standard fees in 1993, billing 
behaviour altered: solicitors in England and Wales tended to reduce the amount of ‘core’ 
work they performed where it would not lead to a higher fee; and ‘claim-splitting’ where 
solicitors claimed for work outside the standard fee (eg under A&A), so that they could 
make two claims. One of the SLAB stakeholder interviewees suggested that this had 
happened but not by as much as might have been expected: 
 
“Obviously they sat down and said well is there any work that we 
can push into A&A.  And it’s quite clear that in the early days my 
staff had a position where they would say well you’re not getting it, 
they would try to put precognitions in and we’d say no that’s part of 
your core fee and things like that.  But that’s settled down and 
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there’s been some growth in criminal A&A but not as much as it 
might have been.”  [Stakeholder interview 4, SLAB official] 
 
78. Some defence solicitors who were interviewed as part of this research confirmed 
that, as a result of the impact of fixed payments, they were now more assiduous in their use 
of A&A: 
 
“Because of the fixed fee system I am careful in granting advice and 
assistance because there are certain things that are not covered by 
the fixed fee that were perhaps covered by the old system so you 
have to think about what you won’t get under the fixed fee that you 
might get under advice and assistance but clearly you have to do so 
within the regulations.” [Telephone survey, non-stakeholder 
defence solicitor 981566] 
 
“Anecdotally, there are a lot of people who tend to chance their arm 
with Advice and Assistance: to try and fill out for example their £80 
limit, or, to automatically increase files to try and get as much 
money as they can out of an advice and assistance account. 
Absolutely, because you’re paid on a time and line basis so it is 
easier to make money.” [Telephone survey, defence solicitor 
981366] 
 
“I think there are trends and patterns from different parts of the 
country in the way that [A&A] is utilised.  I don’t think it is utilised 
to any extent through in the east as it is in Glasgow apparently.  But 
in every area presumably people know how to get the most out of it 
and if you have an open ended system there is always the danger 
that people will do that. So then it comes back to well, the Board 
have the powers to say well I’m not paying that, but they’ve never 
utilised them.” [Non-stakeholder interview 2, defence solicitor] 
 
“I would imagine that most firms are using advice and assistance to 
plug gaps where gaps can be plugged by that method.” [Telephone 
survey, defence solicitor 981384] 
 
 
79. SLAB provided the researchers with details on Criminal Advice & Assistance 
(A&A) intimations for the two years before and the first three years after the introduction 
of fixed payments.  Table 14 in Appendix B reports the results of a firm fixed-effects 
regression on the number of Criminal A & A intimations.  The only statistically significant 
changes were for specialist firms29.  These estimated changes in the number of intimations 
(together with the 95% confidence intervals) for specialist firms are shown for each year in 
Chart 12.  Intimations of A&A by Specialists increased by statistically significant amounts 
after the introduction of fixed payments.  Specialists accounted for 90.5% of A&A 
intimations in 1997/98 but 93.6% in 2001/02.  This increase in share as well as the increase 
                                                 
29  Here specialisation calculated in terms of Criminal Advice & Assistance. 
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in absolute numbers of intimations is consistent with specialists being more assiduous in 
claiming for A&A since the introduction of fixed payments.  
 
Chart 12 
Advice & Assistance Intimations by Specialist Firms
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1998/99     1999/2000  2000/01 2001/02
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
In
ti
m
at
io
n
s 
fr
o
m
 1
99
7/
98
Estimated Change Lower Bound Upper Bound
 
  32
Chart 13 
Change in Advice & Assistance Income of Specialist Firms
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80. This increase in Advice & Assistance intimations by specialist firms can be seen 
feeding through to income from criminal A & A in Chart 13 which is derived from Table 
15 in Appendix B.  Income from A&A increased by statistically significant amounts after 
the introduction of fixed payments.  In 1997/98 specialists accounted for 87.8% of A&A 
payments but by 2001/02 this had risen to 93.4%. 
 
Solemn legal aid 
81. It might be expected that, when faced with the new fixed payments regime for 
summary work, firms would try to increase their involvement in solemn legally-aided 
work.  Appendix B reports firm fixed effect regressions on solemn legal aid for firms 
involved in Summary Legal Aid.  Although this reveals an increase in involvement in 
solemn work this began before the introduction of fixed payments for summary work and 
thus cannot be unambiguously attributed to the introduction of fixed payments. 
 
Impact on total legal aid income of firms 
82. As reported above, the analysis in Appendix B suggests that for some firms, at 
least, there appears to have been an adjustment in behaviour which is related to the 
introduction of fixed payments.  This has not only involved Summary Legal Aid but also 
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Criminal Advice & Assistance.  Table 18 in Appendix B reports a firm fixed effect 
regression on combined average income from Summary Legal Aid and Criminal Advice & 
Assistance.  The only statistically significant changes in average income after the 
introduction of fixed payments were for specialist firms, where specialisation is defined in 
terms of legally-aided summary work.  Chart 14 illustrates the results for these firms.  It 
shows that specialist firms’ incomes, on average, initially fell by a statistically significant 
amount, then rose back to a level not significantly different from 1997/99 and by 2001/02 
were significantly higher than in 1997/98.  
 
Chart 14 
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83. The analysis of legal aid expenditure and income clearly demonstrate that fixed fees 
appear to have impacted in a number of important ways.  As mentioned above, major 
limitation of SLAB data is lack of information on how cases are handled by solicitors.  The 
next chapter uses information gathered from the face to face, postal and telephone 
interviews reported in Appendices A, D and E on how solicitors have been handling cases 
under the fixed payments system.  The subsequent chapter uses our analysis of data 
supplied to the research team by the Crown Office on stage of termination to examine case 
trajectories. 
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Summary 
 The statistical analysis of the data supplied to the university researchers by SLAB 
suggests that a change in behaviour with respect to legal aid for summary cases began in 
1999/2000.  This coincides with the introduction of fixed payments.  No other events which 
have been identified appear to be of sufficient magnitude to explain these changes in 
behaviour.  Interviews with various participants in the summary justice system suggest that 
many solicitors and their firms changed their behaviour in the response to the introduction 
of fixed payments.   
 The statistical analysis of the data supplied by SLAB is indicative of firms who 
specialise in legally-aided summary court work having increased their involvement in 
Criminal Advice & Assistance and Summary Legal Aid.  The latter increase however did 
not emerge significantly until one year after the introduction of fixed payments.  A 
consequence of this increased involvement in Criminal Advice & Assistance and Summary 
Legal Aid is that specialist firms, on average, had higher incomes from these activities in 
2001/02 than in either of the two years prior to the introduction of fixed payments. 
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CHAPTER THREE FIXED PAYMENTS AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
84. This chapter addresses the question of the impact of the introduction of fixed 
payments on the ways in which defence solicitors manage their caseloads. In particular, 
this chapter examines the impact on: solicitor-client contact; and preparation (especially the 
use of precognitions and, more generally the examination of the case against the accused).  
 
 
Client contact 
 
85. We explored the question of whether fixed payments had impacted on client contact 
in a number of ways: using closed questions in the telephone survey about solicitors’ own 
levels of client contact; their perceptions of other solicitors’ levels of client contact; and 
through more open questions in telephone and face-to-face interviews.  
 
86. In our telephone survey of non-stakeholder defence solicitors, respondents were 
asked through closed questioning whether, as a result of the introduction of fixed 
payments, their overall amount of client contact had increased, decreased or remained the 
same. The majority (39) believed that it had remained the same. A substantial minority (18) 
believed that it had decreased, with only one respondent believing it had increased. Four 
respondents either did not answer the question or were unsure. We then asked whether they 
observed that the overall level of client contact had increased, decreased, or remained the 
same among other defence solicitors as a result of the impact of fixed payments.  In this 
case the most frequent response was that others’ client contact had decreased.  Chart 15 
shows these results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  36
 
Chart 15 
 
87. In face-to-face interviews with both ‘stakeholder’ and non-stakeholder defence 
solicitors; as well as the telephone interviews, we pursued the question of client contact in 
greater depth. We asked whether, as a result of the introduction of fixed payments, the level 
of client contact had been affected. In response to these more open interview questions, 
defence solicitors tended to be clearer that there had been a sharp decline in their own 
levels of client contact. For example: 
 
“Decreased, I think there would be no doubt about. In order to do 
summary cases you must have a big volume otherwise it’s just not 
profitable.  So if you have a big volume obviously you can manage it 
easier but normally contact would be down to perhaps two or three 
meetings, two normally, first the initial consultation where they 
come to you with perhaps a copy of a complaint you take their full 
instructions, complete legal aid forms and thereafter the only 
contact you would have in an office is usually when I obtain the 
statements or a summary of the evidence. I write out to them and ask 
them if they can make an appointment with me to discuss this and to 
take their further instructions. So normally and unless they 
desperately phone this office and make an appointment to speak to 
me that’s the only contact I would have with them.” [Telephone 
interview, defence solicitor 981494] 
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88. Some solicitors expressed concerns that, due to the impact of fixed payments, some 
clients did not have the level of client care which would be suitable: 
 
“Oh God, lots of them.  I mean, there are cases where a client needs 
a particular amount to get our attention.  Here’s a lady who [pause] 
It’s just a straightforward assault on a child.  Striking him on his 
head, face, body, and punching him as he was… pouring water over 
him as he was lying in his bed or something, but she has mental 
health problems.  She has bi polar disorder, manic depressive, and 
as a result, all these green forms are forms with meetings or phone 
calls I have with her, none of which are paid.” [Face-to-face 
stakeholder interview 3, defence solicitor]  
 
“I think it has made it less effective from what I have seen in that 
there are just so many financial constraints that it has an impact on 
what you can and cannot do; and based on finances because if 
perhaps a client wants to come in and see you maybe 3, 4 or 5 times 
because they are very upset and very concerned some people 
haven’t been in to trouble, in any sort of trouble with the police or 
anything but yet have this matter, they are obviously very 
concerned, they want to come in and discuss it with you and they 
think things are very important, they want to spend time telling you 
whereas the clock is ticking and you do not have time to do that and 
it then becomes a case which you make no profit out of at all.” 
[Telephone survey, defence solicitor 981494] 
 
89. In our interviews with them about the impact of fixed payments, senior SLAB 
officials said that they thought that client contact had decreased. It was suggested that one 
impact of fixed fees has been a reduction in the number of meetings between solicitor and 
clients and a reduction in the use of letters to clients.  Making a distinction between what is 
necessary to progress the case as opposed to client-care, one SLAB interviewee noted: 
 
“There might be things like prison visits, or, you know, the fact that 
there may be more onus on the solicitor to try and manage the client 
relationship to ensure that they only do what is necessary to 
progress the case.  Whereas previously, (although obviously we 
always had the standard ‘necessary due to economy’), there would 
be things that they could certainly argue that they could legitimately 
do as part of the case. But that would probably fall more into sort of 
client care, that sort of stuff which they might be able to take a more 
stringent approach to given that they are the one that will sort of 
lose out from it.” [Stakeholder interview 5, SLAB official]  
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90. In face-to-face interviews, defence solicitors frequently mentioned that there may 
have been a general reduction in contact with clients to explain and discuss evidence and 
the case against the accused person as well as to explain the procedure which the client 
faces.30 Some stakeholder interviewees expressed concern that the fixed payment structures 
effectively discouraged client support and care: 
 
“Frankly, it shouldn’t make any difference and I suspect anyone 
sitting here talking to you would say it doesn’t make any difference.  
But in reality I am sure that it probably does.” [Follow-up face-to-
face non-stakeholder interview 2, defence solicitor] 
 
“But those are the sort of cases where you lose out.  Where the 
client needs extra care.  And you would think in a way that’s where 
you should be getting paid more because she’s more difficult to deal 
with, and custody of her children depended on the outcome of that 
case.  And she also had a father in the background who’s also a 
manic depressive who was causing all sorts of trouble with bail 
orders and things.  It was a nightmare of a case. And you know 
that's… You get quite a few like that.” [Stakeholder interview 3, 
defence solicitor]  
 
 
Effects of reductions in client contact and pleading at the pleading diet 
91. In its Proposals for the Review of Summary Criminal Legal Assistance (2004), it 
was argued by SLAB that the requirement to make an application to the Board within 14 
days of the not guilty plea being tendered is too short a time scale. This 14 day deadline, 
the Review argued, may be an important factor in explaining why most cases are resolved 
by way of a change of plea. It was suggested that “the application for summary criminal 
legal aid was in some cases submitted too early in the proceedings, and certainly before any 
meaningful investigations into the circumstances of the case were concluded.” (SLAB 
2004: 4.13)31 Be this as it may, the introduction of Fixed Payments may also appear to 
have had a postponing impact: by having the effect of discouraging contact with clients.32   
92. Most stakeholder interviewees also observed that there was, all else being equal, a 
direct relationship between the level of client contact and delay. Less contact between 
solicitors and clients tended to make it more likely that clients would fail to appear: 
 
                                                 
30 ‘Client contact’ refers not only to face-to-face meetings, but also written correspondence, telephone 
correspondence, etc. 
31 It should be noted that the Review stated more than once that it was not able to examine the impact of the 
introduction of fixed payments because this was the subject of independent research commissioned by the 
Scottish Executive. 
32 In this regard, see also the evidence in chapter 2 (paragraphs 56-67) showing an increase in the ratio of 
legally aided persons complaints initiated), which also suggests that another impact of fixed payments may 
have been to apply for additional certificates to cover work which is ancillary to the main case. 
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“a lot of them you know, the only time a lawyer sees them is 
actually on the day that there is some sort of court hearing. Now 
that results in cases being put off because if they then kind of say to 
them something, well they’re not quite prepared at that stage or 
whatever.” [Stakeholder interview 12, COPFS] 
 
93. SLAB officials tended to regard this “unforeseen” [sic] effect as a loophole which 
could be easily exploited by defence solicitors: 
 
“We have been paying quite significant sums of money for failures 
to appear cases, now under the old system they just did that as part 
of the certificate. Under the current system because the failure to 
appear is not a function of the original incident – it’s a separate 
offence – they’re perfectly at liberty to apply for it and the failure to 
appear can carry a greater risk of imprisonment than the original 
offence and that’s one of the criteria set down in our legislation that 
must be taken into account for granting legal aid, so we’ve been 
paying out quite large amounts of money.  Shortly there’ll be 
regulations put in place to deem the failure to appear as being part 
of the original offence.  And we’ve wanted that for some time… 
Because there’s virtually no work, they might write the odd letter 
saying you know the person was at the doctor, or, more commonly, 
that they were in jail somewhere else and for us that’s just a waste 
of money.” [Stakeholder interview 4, SLAB official] 33  
 
 
Impact on the use of precognitions 
94. Before reporting results of the research exploring the impact of fixed payments on 
precognitions, it may be useful to readers who are unfamiliar with Scottish criminal 
procedure to provide some very brief background on precognitions.  
95. In contrast to many English-speaking jurisdictions, in Scotland there is no formal 
systematic provision for advance disclosure by the prosecution.34 Rather, a unique feature 
of Scottish criminal procedure is that the prosecution provides a list of prosecution 
witnesses to the defence solicitor who then normally arranges for them to be interviewed 
                                                 
33 In relation to this, it appears to have been established that the Criminal Legal Aid (Fixed Payments) 
(Scotland) Amendment Number 3 Regulations 2004 SSI 263 was not contrary to Article 6(3) the European 
Convention on Human Rights. (See 4th May 2005 GWD 22-395 where their lordships held that a breach of 
Article 6(3) would depend on whether it could be shown that no effective legal assistance was available) 
34 Since the completion of this study there has been a shift in case law towards disclosure. In November 2004 
the Lord Advocate circulated a memorandum to his staff (General Minute No 10/04) which said that the 
prosecution should normally supply the defence with all witness statements in High Court cases (ie solemn 
cases only). However, a major change relating to both solemn and summary procedure has been brought 
about, (since the completion of the research study and submission of this report), by two recent decisions of 
the Privy Council: Sinclair v HM Advocate 2005 SLT 563; Holland v HM Advocate 2005 SLT 553. Whether 
the implications of these judgements have been fully and consistently realised should not be assumed. For 
further discussion see Tata and Stephen (2006). 
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and statements taken.35 In this way, the defence is made aware of the strength of the 
prosecution case and can advise the client accordingly. Earlier research by Christie and 
Moody (1998) showed that precognitions were widely regarded by defence solicitors as 
vital to the preparation of a case for trial and conducting a trial itself. However, that 
research also highlighted that, under time and line, the payment for precognitions work was 
open to abuse.36 
96. The new system of fixed payments expressly required that the taking and review of 
precognitions be covered by the fixed payment. It was widely reported that there had been 
a sharp decline in the use of precognitions as a direct result of the introduction of fixed 
payments. We asked defence solicitors whether, as a result of the impact of fixed 
payments, they believed that: they, their firm and other defence solicitors made more, less, 
or the same use of precognitions. 
97. It was very widely reported that there had been a sharp drop in the use of 
precognitions. We surveyed defence solicitors and depute procurators fiscal on this 
question using both postal and telephone survey methods. First of all we address briefly the 
level of use of precognition agents. 
98. In our survey of defence agents, 32 respondents believed that, as a consequence of 
the impact of fixed payments, there were now fewer agents, 21 that there had been no 
change and only four that there were now more employed in their firm; the remainder did 
not know or declined to say. Responses were less clear-cut when asked about whether 
firms’ methods of employing and paying precognition agents had changed.  Twenty-three 
respondents believed that it had changed, while 31 believed that it had not. Four believed it 
remained the same.  
 
Level of use of precognitions 
99. Chart 16 shows that 61% of defence solicitors believed that they were making less 
use of precognitions as a result of the impact of the introduction of fixed payments; 35% 
said that they were making the same use; and only 2% said that they were making greater 
use of precognitions as a result of fixed payments.  The chart also shows responses of 
defence solicitors surveyed in relation to their observations of their firm’s level of use of 
precognitions and of other defence solicitors as a consequence of fixed payments.  Among 
the depute procurators fiscal we surveyed, all but one said that they believed that fixed 
payments had led to a drop in the use of precognitions. None of the seventeen depute 
fiscals surveyed by telephone thought that it had led to an increase in precognitions; 3 
                                                 
35 A precognition differs from a witness statement in that a precognition cannot be put to the witness in a trail. 
“Whereas a witness statement is essentially an account of what the witness has said, a precognition is a 
precognoscer’s account of the witness’s evidence.” (Chirstie and Moody 1998,p9) 
36 For the taking and review of precognitions solicitors could claim £21 per hour from SLAB. The going rate 
for precognition agents (routinely employed by firms to take witness precognitions) was around £8 per hour. 
Our interviews with defence solicitors suggested that while it was recognised that this was open to abuse by a 
small minority, the vast majority of solicitors spent considerable time preparing precognition agents to take 
accounts; reading those accounts; and weighing them up in the client’s interest.. 
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believed the level was the same as before, thirteen believed it was less and one respondent 
did not know.  
 
Chart 16 
 
100. Defence solicitors explained how they believed fixed payments had led to this 
decline in the use of precognitions: 
 
“The system as regards to precognitions is under the old system 
your precognitions would be incorporated into your account and it 
was a demand led system whereby subject to careful auditing you 
would be paid for the work reasonably undertaken and therefore 
you would precognosce witnesses that required to be precognosed 
in the knowledge that you would be paid for doing it because it’s 
your time.  Under this system again with a block fee clearly your 
perception is that if you get that fee regardless of anything that you 
do then it doesn’t make a lot of economic sense, we do run 
businesses, we do employ people, we do have major bills to pay, it 
doesn’t make a lot of sense to be carrying out exhaustive 
investigations in cases.” [Telephone survey, defence solicitor 
981498]  
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101. Many of the defence solicitors we spoke to said that the fixed payments had altered 
the manner in which they took precognitions – in particular by letter and phone rather than 
through agents and a much greater reliance upon summaries of evidence provided by the 
prosecution.  This was confirmed by phone interviews with depute fiscals and in face-to-
face interviews with procurators fiscal: 
 
“I suppose it became more competitive for precognition offers and 
you would obviously seek to have the cheapest precognition possible 
but gradually it became a case that I would do them myself or 
obtain a copy of the summary of police evidence.” [Telephone 
interview, defence solicitor 981566] 
“What has happened, I think, is that there is a much greater use of 
the Fiscal’s office when civilian witnesses don’t become co-
operative.  Whereas under the old system, you would actually go out 
to make sure the witnesses were precognosed now, because that’s 
uneconomical, you can say, well, the witnesses have all been written 
to, they haven’t replied, can I please have an outline of their 
evidence?  Which is not the way the system was between from the 
late 19th Century and the coming into force of fixed fees, and it’s 
one of the differences.” [Face-to-face non-stakeholder interview 6, 
defence solicitor] 
102. Face-to-face interviews amplified and explained this perceived change more fully. 
A stakeholder defence solicitor confirmed the strong impression that precognitions had 
been cut and that firms had to be more ‘selective’. One solicitor recalled that under time 
and line: 
“There were some solicitors who used to precognosce cases 
themselves but I suspect that the reason was twofold.  One, they got 
a very early idea of what the evidence is but secondly they get paid 
more for doing it.  And if they’ve nothing else to do, which I think 
would be sad, but if they’ve nothing else to do then I can understand 
why it would make sense for them to go and precognosce it but I 
can’t imagine any solicitor precognosing in a fixed fee case.  It’s 
just not [pause]  doesn’t make any economical sense.  What some of 
them are doing are sending out questionnaires to clients, and 
relying entirely on what comes back from that and not taking that 
any further.”  [Stakeholder interview 3, defence solicitor] 
 
 
103. In interviews, SLAB officials argued that fixed fees were encouraging defence 
solicitors to be more careful in their use of precognitions. Under time-and-line, it was 
argued, defence solicitors had over-used precognitions: 
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“Of course, though, we can’t tell [pause]. I don’t think that’s 
terribly common and I think  [pause]  Well, for many criminal cases 
I can see why there’s no need – because there’s either evidence or 
there’s not, so they will need to take a judgment as to whether or not 
it’s necessary.” [Stakeholder interview 4, SLAB official] 
 
104. Indeed, it was widely acknowledged by stake-holder lawyers that, as a result of 
fixed payments, some defence solicitors were much more selective in the deployment of 
precognitions:  
“…that is not an automatic process, which it might have been 
before. There’s much more selectivity about what witnesses you 
would precognosce.” [Stakeholder interview 2, defence solicitor] 
“Fair to say that when you were on a time and line basis you 
probably didn’t think quite as carefully about what needed to be 
precognosed as we do now.” [Telephone interview, defence solicitor  
981343] 
 
“I think it’s a general trend that’s being followed that one looks 
more carefully at which witnesses require to be precognosed and 
one speaks to the fiscal more often to fill in background gaps or 
matters of routine evidence.” [Telephone interview, defence 
solicitor 981389] 
 
“We used to precognosce summary cases when we were being paid 
for it but now that we’re not we tend not to unless it’s a case that we 
think specifically requires it, we are more selective in what we 
precognosce.” [Telephone interview, defence solicitor 981332] 
 
105. However, what an appropriate ‘selection’ meant was felt to be less straightforward: 
 
“For sure it’s definitely affected the way people behave.  Instead of 
making a profit, preparation costs for a private practitioner…if 
you’re a good private practitioner, you’re doing the job right, you’ll 
still do what preparation is necessary, but you will very much only 
do what is necessary.  So that, you know, very good, proper firms 
will possibly be selective about who they precognosce: that’s 
common sense. Those who are less ethically proper will cut corners, 
because it’s costing them money, and they’ll cut a lot of 
precognition. It’s not for me to suggest who does what and where 
the line is. I think there are probably differences from solicitor to 
solicitor, firm to firm. And I think there are also differences, you’ll 
find, from city to city.” [Stakeholder interview 9, defence solicitor] 
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106. Some defence solicitors suggested that from the client’s perspective it may not be 
entirely satisfactory to assume that a case requires no investigation: without investigating 
the case one cannot know:  
 
“If you don’t know what a case involves you don’t know what you 
have to look at, what the issues are, how complicated it is, what 
work you have to do and the system brought in is just a flat 
payment, the system is fundamentally flawed.” [Telephone survey,  
defence solicitor 981498] 
 
“It changed because we were unable to precognosce entire cases 
after the introduction of the fixed fee and the reason behind that is 
because if there were numerous witnesses in a summary case and 
we had to precognosce the case entirely we could only tender advice 
after precognitions were received as to whether or not the client 
should be thinking of pleading guilty or continuing to trial.  
Frequently what would happen is that if there was quite a number of 
witnesses and we had obtained those precognitions it might become 
apparent that the defence wasn’t really good and our advice 
perhaps to the accused person would be to plead guilty but when we 
would do that we would then receive the fixed payment which would 
after payment of the precognition officers concerned would leave 
very little left over for ourselves in payment of our fee…” 
[Telephone survey, defence solicitor  981460] 
 
107. There was widespread impression among lawyer stake-holder interviewees that 
there may be firms which are choosing, as a matter of routine, not to precognosce or hardly 
at all.   Respondents noted nonetheless the duty of defence solicitors as professionals and 
the implications of the Anderson judgement37; obligations to the Law Society; and audits 
by SLAB. Asked whether s/he was suggesting that some firms may not be hardly 
precognosing at all, one stakeholder defence solicitor said: 
 
“They to may well do, I don’t know. It’s not something they would 
be likely broadcast, I would imagine, as I say we’ve got certain 
professional responsibilities in terms of the Law Society and the 
Criminal Legal Assistance Register, so you know people from SLAB 
come round to audit your firm.  There could be an argument - but - 
there could be an argument they are providing an inadequate 
professional service.  But again I’m not aware of anyone who has 
actually been prosecuted for such a matter at the Law Society.  But 
yes, you hear these things, whether it’s true or not I don’t know.”  
[Stakeholder interview 7,  defence solicitor] 
 
                                                 
37 Anderson v HMA 1996 S.L.T. 155 which examined the question of defective representation (specifically 
where the client’s instructions were not followed). See also Buchannan v McLean 2000 SCCR 682; and 
Vickers v Buchanan 2002 SCCR 637.  
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108. Indeed, many of the lawyers we spoke to said that they were aware of rumours that 
some firms had stopped precognosing altogether but that they were reluctant to confirm or 
deny such reports definitively: 
 
“There are stories of some firms that don’t precognosce at all and 
simply rely on the Fiscal’s office if they can get notes of evidence.” 
[Stakeholder interview 2, defence solicitor] 
“I’ve heard that some solicitors are doing very little to earn their 
fixed fee. I think the majority of responsible firms are still preparing 
the cases they used to do, but I’ve heard some people are not even 
bothering to obtain precognitions and they just approach the Crown 
or just turn up at the Intermediate Diet and have a look at the 
statements from the fiscal, I’ve seen that and I think it’s shocking: 
you still have a duty to your client whether you get paid or not.” 
[Telephone interview, defence solicitor 981452] 
“Well, I know of the odd one or two firms where they are under the 
impression that if it’s fixed fee summary criminal stuff you’re not 
allowed to interview, or, precognosce people. They just don’t do it.” 
[Face-to-face non-stakeholder interview 1,  defence solicitor] 
 
“The general feeling that I get is that a lot of firms do without 
precognitions now if the witnesses are unco-operative: that there is 
much less reliance on precognitions than there was before.” 
[Telephone survey,  defence solicitor 981384] 
 
“There is anecdotal evidence of firms that do no preparation at all 
in fixed fee cases.  I’ve not seen any direct evidence of it, but I’ve 
been told of firms that simply submit the legal aid application and 
leave the file completely until the intermediate diet and do nothing, 
in which case obviously they make a fair amount of money because 
they’re doing no admin preparatory work whatsoever.” [Face-to-
face non-stakeholder interview 6,  defence solicitor] 
 
 
109. Others interviewees were less guarded: 
 
“No incentive to continue to chase a witness because all you are 
doing is cutting into what little profit margin there is.” [Telephone 
interview, defence solicitor 981421] 
 
“I don’t do any more work, I don’t think I do any less work but 
rather than precognosce I’ll speak to the fiscal.” [Telephone 
interview, defence solicitor 981332] 
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“What’s happened is that fixed fees is a very cynical, bludgeoned 
budget cut. It was brought in to cut costs and that cynicism has 
rippled all the way down through the system.  Before you would get 
enthusiasm to investigate, to come up with things, now the attitude 
is: ‘what’s the point?’” [Telephone interview 9,  defence solicitor 
981498] 
 
“As far as summary cases are concerned fixed fee cases, what you 
used to do was, you used to instruct a precognitions agent to obtain 
statements from civilians and generally speaking you would get 
copies of the police statements and that still is the case.  Nowadays 
certain firms do still instruct precognition agents, a lot don’t.  I did 
for the first 4 cases on a fixed fee basis and got 4 bills from the 
precognition agents and then said ‘well, I’m not doing that 
anymore’.  So I stopped it.” [Face-to-face non-stakeholder 
interview 2,  defence solicitor]  
 
 
110. Procurators fiscal and their deputes tended, however, to suggest that defence 
solicitors were now less well prepared as a result of the impact of fixed payments than they 
were under the time and line payment regime: 
 
“If they’re trying to get the most profit, they can’t precognosce 
witnesses so they just don’t.” [Procurator fiscal depute, face-to-face 
interview following up phone survey with depute fiscals] 
 
“They haven’t been precognosing. And they’ve been keeping the 
£500 or whatever it is, I can’t remember if it’s £500. They just keep 
it all without any of it going on precognitions.  I mean I can 
understand why they do it I mean they’ve got their own costs, their 
own overheads and if precognition’s not a necessary part of it as far 
as they can see… In any particular case they may feel they can get 
by without precognitions then some of them will do that.” [Face-to-
face stakeholder interview 14, COPFS] 
 
“I do notice now… that defence agents are not as prepared as they 
used to be and they’re relying heavily on the Crown to provide them 
with the information they need to defend their client’s case and 
because we don’t want cases to be adjourned continuously, we on 
most occasions would agree to give them what they’re looking for, 
so that we can get the case to court.” [Follow-up face-to-face 
interview depute fiscal] 
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Cost displacement of the decrease in the use of precognitions to COPFS 
 
111. In face-to-face interviews and in telephone interviews it was widely suggested that 
defence lawyers are now relying more on summaries of evidence prepared by the fiscal’s 
office than they did under time and line:  
 
“What has happened, I think, is that there is a much greater use of 
the Fiscal’s office when civilian witnesses don’t become co-
operative.  Whereas under the old system, you would actually go out 
to make sure the witnesses were precognosed now, because that’s 
uneconomical, you can say well, the witnesses have all been written 
to, they haven’t replied, can I please have an outline of their 
evidence?”  (Stake-holder interview 6,  defence solicitor) 
 
“Myself and other practitioners will now often obtain, if we can, a 
summary of the police evidence from the fiscal’s office, which you 
can get sometimes near trial for photocopying costs because clearly 
you have in mind that you are not going to recover the cost of 
precognitions and I also do a lot of my own precognitions which 
eats into my own time and it’s not something that I think is desirable 
when you are then cross-examining those witnesses in a trial. But as 
a practitioner in a small office you have to be aware of costs that 
you are not going to recover.” [Telephone interview, defence 
solicitor 981566] 
 
 
 
Disclosure 
112. Procurators fiscal and their deputes reported that, as a result of fixed fees, it was 
more common for defence solicitors to rely on the prosecution witness statements and that 
this was tantamount to a form of ‘informal disclosure’38 of prosecution evidence: 
 
“…from the prosecution perspective… what we sometimes see 
happening is defence agents go through an intermediate diet and 
say we are fully prepared and ready to proceed to trial.  But on the 
day of the trial they will come up, they will sidle up to you and say, 
‘Gie us a look at your statements because I don’t have any’, which 
basically means that they haven’t been in a position where they 
wanted to go to trial.  They haven’t been precognosing.” 
[Stakeholder interview 14, COPFS]  
 
                                                 
38 Since the completion of this study and the submission of the report to the Scottish Executive there has been 
a shift in case law towards formal disclosure: Sinclair v HM Advocate 2005 SLT 563; Holland v HM 
Advocate 2005 SLT 553. See also Tata and Stephen (2006) 
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113. Although informal and ad hoc disclosure may take place more often as a result of 
the introduction of fixed fees, some stakeholder defence solicitors tended to argue strongly 
for early and full disclosure of evidence. There were two grounds for this. First, on the 
grounds of natural justice in an adversarial system it was argued to be matter of ‘equality of 
arms’ or a ‘level playing field’, so that prosecution evidence could be put to the test: 
 
“There should… be full disclosure by… the Crown and the Legal 
Aid Board, I know, are very interested in that.  We are too, we are 
at a disadvantage… we’re given some statements occasionally and 
we’re told we’re not supposed to use them… and a lot of the time 
the fiscals office will give us a summary of the evidence, which isn’t 
terribly helpful.  And the summaries are very often prepared by 
police officers. And we’ve come across examples recently of police 
officers lying. For example, in a case we had a couple of weeks ago, 
a police officer who said in his statement: ‘I looked at the video and 
I could see the accused stealing the item from the shop’.  We looked 
at the video and you couldn’t see that at all.  Now if we were 
advising on the basis of [the statement alone]… then we would be 
saying to the client – who might, or, might not remember and who 
was a regular shoplifter – well you need to plead guilty to that, the 
policeman says he saw you doing it on the tape.  So when you see 
things like that you know you’ve still got to keep a proper check and 
you can’t always just trust the police.” [sic]  [Stakeholder interview 
2, defence solicitor] 
 
“If you are having difficulties, the fiscals- if you can get hold of 
them – will always be prepared to open up the file and say, ‘here’s 
what happened’, if not just pass you the blinkin’ statements that they 
have from the police. What problems does it cause?  Well, it causes 
problems because the police are not very good at reporting 
accurately what civilians have said.”  [Face-to-face non-
stakeholder interview 3,  defence solicitor]. 
 
114. Indeed, the concern that police-gathered evidence needed to be tested was also 
made by some of the senior stakeholder prosecutors:  
 
“In the Fiscal Service [we are] saying to the police ‘well you better 
improve the quality of the statements you give us.’  Because you 
know they’re not signed by so and so but now they come down by 
email so they’re not physically signed, I know you get electronic 
signatures.  But every police statement seems to end with the 
immortal words, ‘I can positively identify the accused.’  You speak 
to the witness and they’ll say, ‘I never said that.’  And they didn’t.”  
[Stakeholder interview 11, COPFS] 
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115. A second argument in favour of full and early disclosure was made in terms of the 
reduction of delay. It would help to expedite the resolution of many cases by allowing 
defence solicitors to advise their clients to plead guilty at the first opportunity if it was 
clearly appropriate in light of prosecution evidence:  
 
“where the client told you the position was basically a not guilty 
and without the evidence to say to them, well hang on a second that 
doesn’t make any sense.  Sometimes clients who are under the 
influence of drink or drugs and have managed to come up with a 
memory of it that is totally at odds with what happened but I don’t 
have any statements so I can’t confront them with them.  If they 
plead not guilty and I get the statements, then at the intermediate 
diet I can sit them down and say ‘see what you told me before, that’s 
just complete rubbish.  Here’s what the statements are’ and at that 
point they may very well agree to change the plea…”  [Stakeholder 
interview 2,  defence solicitor] 
 
“So you know, if they see the statement they can say look there’s the 
statement from the complainer, he can identify your client… So they 
may go back to the client and say you’re done in the park, see the 
Fiscal statement… So we want to be able to get to a situation where 
everyone is happy, that’s to say that the prosecution and the defence 
are happy with the quality of the information that we’re all sharing. 
And once we get to that stage, I envisage that you might or SLAB or 
the Executive or whatever - might want to move to a position where 
they say you can only precognosce at the public expense on cause 
shown.  So if you’ve got a good reason for saying, I really want to 
see this particular witness.” [Face-to-face stakeholder interview 11, 
COPFS] 
 
116. That the lack of early and full disclosure legitimately inhibits a guilty plea in cases 
where there is likely to be a conviction was also recognised by prosecutors: 
 
“If your client wasn’t giving you any clear instructions to plead 
guilty and there was an element of doubt in his story, but you were 
almost there, you were almost… you knew that he’d been involved, 
you knew that in all probability he was guilty but his clear 
instructions were not to plead guilty and he was looking for further 
advice, sometimes you felt inhibited because you didn’t have the full 
story. You don’t have any of the papers that the Crown have got. 
You’re just hearing his side of it and it’s very very easy to say just 
well lets reserve your position we’ll put in a not guilty plea at the 
moment. And then we’ll investigate it and once it’s been 
investigated we’ll be in a position to advise you of what the evidence 
is against you and that’ll inform your instructions to us. But that’s 
far too easy because under time and line and under fixed fee legal 
aid there’s also the added bonus to the defence agent that he gets 
paid. Then if that is the situation it would almost be silly not to 
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advise your clients to hold off if he’s not 100 percent sure.” 
[Stakeholder interview 14,  COPFS] 
 
117. Other interviewees also noted that the introduction of Fixed Fees and the 
subsequent sharp reduction in the use of precognitions has displaced some costs to the 
Crown through for example the increased use of requests from the defence for summaries 
of the Crown’s evidence. Full disclosure, therefore, was felt to raise major resource 
implications for COPFS: 
 
“from our point of view the resource implications are enormous.” 
[sic] [Stakeholder interview 13, COPFS] 
 
118. It was argued that some might feel that a logical implication of full and early 
disclosure would be to reduce the level of fixed payments to defence agents: 
 
“Now at the end of the day it has to be considered, if the solicitors 
are being paid this flat fee which is supposed to incorporate money 
towards precognosing witnesses and they’re not doing it, and at the 
end of the day our resources are being spent on that – there’s a 
massive issue there about who at the end of the day is paying…  If 
we are going to be carrying out this work, and the courts at the end 
of the day say we have to disclose this, then it’s not just the physical 
paper and the photo copying, it’s a member of staff who’s taking 
over the additional duties to do this task.  So while we can always 
charge them a fee you know, what realistically is that fee to be?  I 
mean you’re talking about - it could be a member of staff full time 
doing work of that nature.  So it’s a big issue. And I think at the end 
of the day, fair enough, they don’t want to do that work - then take 
away part of their fee. I don’t think they should get as much if 
they’re not going to do it and I think if they’re going down that 
road…  If we have got to go down the road of disclosure then it’s 
going to have to be taken away from them. And they’re gonna have 
to say if they particularly want to see a witness, then justify it, why 
they need to precognosce them?”  [Stakeholder interview 13, 
COPFS] 
 
119. Similarly, another COPFS interviewee argued: 
 
“if we are going to go down the route of full disclosure, or partial 
disclosure even from the crown to the defence then that should be 
taken away from the fixed fee, that should be factored out. But at the 
moment I think it’s been factored in but [precognitions are] not 
being done or it’s being done to varying degrees.” [sic]  
[Stakeholder interview 14,  COPFS] 
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120. It was also suggested that the desire for disclosure would be financially counter-
productive for defence agents: 
 
“And I said to defence agents here that they were shooting 
themselves in the foot.  I think that they were because they always 
could have obtained a summary from us but they went down the 
road of asking for the police statements. And it could end up at the 
end of the day, well, who knows? But if the fixed fee is cut then it’s 
stupid. They have lost a way of obtaining income for themselves.” 
[Stakeholder interview 13, COPFS] 
 
121. A stake-holder defence solicitor also foresaw the potential argument that the fixed 
fee could be reduced if there was full and early disclosure of prosecution evidence: 
 
“So as a foundation then there really should be full disclosure by 
the Crown.  But they’re not keen on it and they certainly aren’t keen 
on any of the potential penalties.  And I know what will happen – if 
there is full disclosure then the fixed fee will just be reduced but 
that’s another fight for another day.” [Stakeholder interview 7, 
defence solicitor] 
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Summary 
 
Fixed payments were widely reported to have led to changes in case management: 
 
 It was suggested that there had been a reduction in client contact. In the telephone 
survey of defence solicitors around one third believed that their own levels of client contact 
had declined as a result of the impact of fixed payments; and around two thirds said that the 
levels of client contact of other solicitors had declined as a result of fixed payments. These 
findings were confirmed and further explained by telephone and face-to-face interviews. 
 There was some suggestion that the reduction in client contact might mean that 
clients were more likely to fail to appear. 
 It was also suggested that a reduction in early client contact meant it was often 
unfeasible for the defence solicitor to advise the accused to plead guilty at the pleading 
diet. 
 A reduction in the use of precognitions was very widely reported. Around two 
thirds of defence solicitors reported that their levels of precognitions had decreased as a 
result of fixed payments.  
 A few defence solicitors appeared to suggest that, as a consequence of fixed 
payments, they had stopped precognosing altogether. 
 Partly as a consequence of the reduction in the use of precognitions, there appears 
to have been a greater reliance on the provision of summaries of evidence from the 
prosecution, which some procurators fiscal and their deputes felt was tantamount to a form 
of informal disclosure, with its own knock-on costs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  IMPACT ON CASE TRAJECTORIES 
 
122. A persistent criticism of Scottish summary process is that guilty pleas should be 
made earlier in the criminal process – thus saving public money and reducing delay. Much 
of the policy debate has focused on the question of whether defence practitioners can (and 
should) be incentivised to encourage earlier pleas of guilty, and if so how this can be 
achieved most effectively. Research by Samuel (1996); by Goriely et al (2001) and Tata et 
al (2004) has described key pressures on clients and solicitors which combine to produce 
very high rates of not guilty pleas at the first (or ‘pleading’) diet which later changed to 
guilty pleas. At custody diets, solicitors work under tremendous time constraints, often 
exacerbated by delays in prosecution serving papers on accused. Prosecutors are often 
themselves in no position to negotiate because they know little about the case. Cases where 
the accused is in custody tend to generate a higher proportion of not guilty pleas than at the 
pleading diet. Not surprisingly, for most of those accused persons who are remanded into 
custody their first and most immediate priority is release. Where bail is not opposed, a not 
guilty plea ensures immediate release from remand. Regardless of fixed fees, these are 
some of the factors, which encourage not guilty pleas at the pleading diet and are as 
significant in explaining the very high initial not guilty plea rate as remuneration regimes. 
123. However, while system-drivers are crucial in determining case trajectories, the 
structure of legal aid payments, nonetheless, appears to play a part also in most 
jurisdictions including Scotland (e.g. Goriely et al 2001; Tata et al 2004). The switch from 
a ‘proportional’ (time and line) system to virtually fixed system of payment represents a 
major shift in financial incentives.  
 
Pleading decisions and client perspectives 
124. It was widely observed that the ultimate decision as to how to plead rests with the 
client. Several interviewees emphasised the situation where a client clearly and 
categorically expressed the wish to plead not guilty and to go to trial:  
 
“If somebody was wanting to go to trial they would be going to trial 
whether there was a fixed fee or not.” [Telephone survey, defence 
solicitor 981366] 
 
“But the fact is that it doesn’t entirely rest with the solicitor to time 
the plea, however hard the solicitor works, however diligent the 
preparation.  The ultimate decision rests with the client. And if the 
client has a reason for pleading at a particular stage, then that’s a 
matter for the client.” [Stakeholder interview 10, sheriff]   
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“You can’t wrestle your client to the ground and say, look you’re 
being prosecuted, therefore you must have done it and you must 
plead guilty.  That flies in the face of any idea of what a defence 
agent’s job should be.  You take your client at face value initially.  If 
evidence comes out that shows what your client told you initially is 
not the case, then you present it to the client for an explanation.  If 
the client’s explanation is consistent with the plea already tendered, 
go to trial.  If the client then decides, well, on the basis of that, I’m 
better off pleading guilty.  OK.  The client’s choice.” [Face-to-face 
non-stakeholder interview 7,  defence solicitor] 
 
125. Although this particular research study was not commissioned to examine client 
impressions of the impact of fixed payments, the research and this report has been 
informed by previous research into client perspectives of the criminal process, including 
lawyer-client dynamics. The empirical literature on the relationship between criminal 
defence lawyers and their clients around the English-speaking world has consistently 
highlighted the relative passivity of most clients (Blumberg 1967, Bottoms and McLean 
1976, McConville et al 1994; Goriely et al 2001; Pleasence and Quirk 2001). Carlen (1976) 
for example described the tendency of most clients to be, in effect, “dummy players” in 
their own case. Ericson and Baraneck (1982) described defendants as “dependants” in the 
criminal process. This relationship of relative dependence is not unique to the criminal 
process. Similar dynamics, including where clients’ expectations of outcome and decision-
making are largely formed by their adviser, have been found in the relationship between 
civil lawyers and their (non-corporate) clients (Rosenthal 1974; Sarat and Felstner 1995;  
Smart 1984);  and indeed between lay people and a variety of professional advisers  (e.g. 
Travers 1994).   
126. However, the relatively weak social and economic resources of most clients in 
summary proceedings coupled with the immediate stress and anxiety which the criminal 
process brings means that clients tend to be in a particularly poor position to take firm 
command of their defence. In Scotland, recent research by Goriely et al (2001) 
investigated, through surveys and face-to-face interviews with clients, their subjective 
experiences; interpretations; and evaluations of the criminal process (including of their 
defence lawyers). In line with research from other countries, that research showed that 
many clients tended to have some difficulty accurately explaining the charges against them 
(or indeed those amended charges which they chose to plead guilty to). Furthermore, many 
clients tended to conflate legal culpability with a wider view of moral culpability. Most 
clients were willing to place their trust in their defence solicitor and to take his/her advice. 
Even among more experienced clients who professed initial confidence, when pressed to 
provide clear explanations, most clients admitted that they had a fairly vague idea of the 
procedure in their case. 
127. In contrast to the supposition that client satisfaction is almost entirely outcome-
orientated, in their interviews and surveys of clients, Goriely et al found that most clients 
accepted that they were not in a position to judge the solicitor’s command of law, or overall 
advice. They did, however, feel able to judge their defence lawyer on process issues (such 
as listening, being kept informed; being treated with dignity; being stood up for; feeling 
  55
that the lawyer wanted to see them; remembering the case; etc).  Very much in line with the 
empirical literature on summary justice worldwide39, these recent findings from Scotland 
suggest that a simple market-style consumer model of client satisfaction and decision-
making is open to question. As we have seen, most summary accused persons readily admit 
that they cannot make valid evaluations of their lawyers beyond process factors.40   
 
128. Recent research into summary defence work in Scotland examined, among other 
matters, the pleading practices in large samples of like cases by private firm defence 
solicitors and solicitors directly employed by SLAB (i.e. ‘public defence solicitors’ : 
PDSO) (Goriely et al 2001; Tata et al 2004). Controlling for intrinsic case factors, the 
research found a small but statistically significant difference between the two groups: 
public defence solicitor cases tended to plead guilty earlier than private firm solicitors and 
because of high rates of case attrition this meant that the conviction rate (for at least one 
charge) was 88% for PDSO cases compared with 83% for private firm solicitor cases. 
Aside from the specific comparison between PDSO and private firm solicitors, there is a 
broader and more relevant point to the research into fixed payments. The pertinent point to 
this fixed payments research is that the research by Goriely et al showed clear evidence that 
the practical financial arrangement under which defence solicitors work does make some 
difference to the overall patterns of the pleading practices of cases. It is important to 
emphasise that this does not mean that in every single individual case remuneration 
arrangements are the/a crucial determining factor, but it does mean that overall 
remuneration arrangements are one of the factors (among several) which makes a 
demonstrable difference to the overall patterns of pleading. 
 
129. This report does not claim that dedicated and professional people, such as defence 
solicitors, abandon basic values for simple financial gain. Neither is it argued that 
commercial factors play no part at all.  Rather it suggests (in line with Goriely et al 2001; 
Tata et al 2004) that modifications in behaviour “will be greatest in areas of what they 
called ‘ethical indeterminacy’: where there is a choice between 2 courses of action, both of 
which have advantages and disadvantages”, and where professionals are unsure about 
which is better. “In making difficult and evenly balanced judgements, greater weight is 
placed on advantages that flow from one course of action that is in one’s own interests. 
Less weight is placed on those that flow from actions that run contrary to one’s interests.” 
(Goriely et al 2001: 68-69).  
130. Ethical indeterminacy is further affected by the fact that clients are, for a variety of 
reasons, often unable to give their defence solicitors clear instructions as to how they wish 
to plead. All interviewees tended to highlight that where a client gave a clear instruction 
this would be followed and that the ultimate decision rested with the client. However, the 
ability of many clients to fully comprehend the case against them was questioned. It was 
                                                 
39 And indeed, to a large extent, found also in relation  to individual clients in civil cases. See for example 
Moorhead et al (2003) 
40 Sherr, Moorhead and Paterson, for example, succinctly put it: “[T]he client’s views on quality are 
invaluable but inherently limited.” (Sherr, Moorhead, Paterson 1994).   
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widely observed that many clients can easily become confused and are relatively passive, 
displaying a weak grasp of the case against them: 
   
“their physical and mental health is so poor sometimes that they are 
just not aware of why they are in prison and for what, what they’ve 
done etc.  The whole process just happens round about them, 
they’re not engaged in it you know…  I don’t think they understand 
[how to instruct lawyers] at all.” [Stakeholder interview 8, client 
support organisation] 
 
131. Thus the concept of ‘ethical indeterminacy’ entirely accepts that where a person 
clearly expresses that s/he wishes to go to trial that wish is taken as a clear instruction. 
However, while the concept of ethical indeterminacy accepts that the client’s clear choice 
is taken as an instruction, it also suggests that in many other instances the simple 
distinction between ‘instructions’ and ‘advice’ is less clear-cut than these terms suggest. 
 
 
Effects on pleading practices 
132. The introduction of fixed payments in 1999 was preceded three years earlier by 
mandatory intermediate diets.41 This change was intended to reduce the incidence of trials 
cancelled during or on or shortly before the date of trial because the accused had changed 
his or her plea from not guilty to guilty.42 We conducted analyses which measure any 
effects of the impact of fixed payments in itself and the effects of mandatory intermediate 
diets. 
133. SLAB officials viewed the introduction of fixed payments as a way of encouraging 
earlier guilty pleas, especially at the intermediate diet: 
 
“Under time and line system there was no encouragement to plead 
early if there was indeed going to be a plea, so there was no reason 
to do it other than on the day of  trial.  So one of the things we were 
hoping for by stacking the payments the way we did was to 
encourage earlier pleas at intermediate diet because we recognised 
there were actually savings – not for summary legal aid - but there 
were savings elsewhere in the system in terms of court time, 
inconvenience to witnesses etc.” [Stakeholder interview 5, SLAB 
official]    
 
 
                                                 
41 Intermediate diets were made mandatory (rather than optional) by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 
1995. See See P. Duff and F. McCallum (2000) Intermediate Diets, First Diets and Agreement of Evidence in 
Criminal Cases: An Evaluation (Scottish Exceutive); F.Leverick and P.Duff (2001) Adjournments of 
Summary Criminal Cases in the Sheriff Courts (Scottish Executive) 
 
42 Scottish Office 1993 Review of Criminal Evidence and Procedure. See also Duff and McCallum 2000 
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134. SLAB officials expressed doubt, however, as to whether there had been much of a 
trend towards pleading guilty earlier (i.e. at the intermediate diet): 
 
“I don’t know if we’ll have seen as big a movement towards 
intermediate diet as we might have expected.  And I don’t know why 
that is.” [Stakeholder interview 5,  SLAB official]   
 
“You know they’re not doing any more work for their client and 
that’s why originally it was thought it was going to encourage pleas 
at the intermediate diet.  It doesn’t do that, there’s been precious 
little change and if you look at the figures you’ll see that.”  
[Stakeholder interview 4,  SLAB official]   
 
135. Has the introduction of fixed payments had an impact on the ways in which cases 
proceed through court? We focus primarily on the stage at which cases concluded. We 
have treated cases as being resolved or concluded43 only when the latest charge was 
resolved. In line with previous research (Goriely et al 2001), we have assigned the 
‘conclusion’ (i.e. including ‘termination’/ ‘resolution’/ ‘disposal’) of cases to 4 broad 
stages:  
 at the pleading diet (all cases concluding at or before the first plea was tendered). It 
includes all cases resolved at the pleading diet or at a diet continued without plea 
 at the intermediate diet. This covers all cases resolved after the first plea but before 
the trial diet  
 before trial has begun (including where a trial diet was held, but which terminated 
before evidence was led);  
 at trial (i.e. after evidence has been led).44 
136. Using data supplied by the Crown Office, a test was first carried out to see whether 
there had been any major trends in the proportions of cases set by the prosecution for the 
District Courts or for the Sheriff Courts. On the whole there were found to be no major 
statistically significant effects.45  
137. We investigated whether there were major changes over time in the proportions of 
cases which concluded at each of the 4 stages. In Charts 17 – 20 (which replicate Figures 
                                                 
43  For the purposes of discussion of these findings the use of the terms conclude to include ‘termination’, 
‘resolution’, ‘disposal’ – for these purposes these terms are used interchangably. By ‘terminate’ we do not 
mean only cases which are ‘dropped’ by the prosecution. By ‘resolve’ we do not only mean those cases where 
agreement between prosecution was reached. Similarly, the term ‘disposal’ in this context does not refer to 
sentencing disposals but again to the completion/termination/resolution of a case. 
44 Readers who are unfamiliar with Scottish summary process may wish to refer to the simplified case 
trajectory map in Appendix C.  
45 Appendix C explains the method used for these calculations and provides our more detailed findings on this 
point. 
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4A, 4B, 4C, 4D in Appendix C we have plotted the coefficients and their corresponding 
confidence intervals. These figures present interesting evidence. Firstly, Chart 18 shows 
that the proportion of cases which concluded at the intermediate diet stage increased stably 
over the whole period.  However, a sharper ‘spike’ corresponds to the fiscal year 1996/97 
when these diets were made mandatory, but an increase above average (above the constant) 
occurs in each year post 1994/95.  A second interesting point is that after 1998/1999 the 
number of cases which concluded at the pleading diet has decreased.  Correspondingly, the 
proportion of cases which concluded on the day of trial (these cases resolved before 
evidence is led and generally with a guilty plea) has increased.   
 
 
Chart 17 
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Chart 18 
 
Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Concluding At Intermediate Diet 
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Chart 19 
 
 
Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Concluding On Day of Trial
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Chart 20 
 
 
Chart 21 
 
 
138. Chart 21 (Figure 5 in Appendix C) shows, as a sub-section, the post 1998/99 
observations from Charts 17 and 19.  Three important points can be observed from figure 
5.  Firstly, it underlines how these two effects (a decrease in the proportion of cases 
resolved at the pleading diet and an increase in the proportion resolving on the day of trial) 
have been almost contemporaneous. Secondly, it also appears to show that the reduction in 
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the proportion of cases which resolved at the pleading diet is greater than the increase in 
the proportion of cases which resolved at the day of trial.  A third piece of important 
evidence is that there has been a decrease in the proportion of cases which resolved at trial 
(after evidence is led).  
139. However, are these changes the result of mandatory intermediate diets or of the 
introduction of fixed payments? For example, a defence practitioner suggested that 
intermediate diets probably had a more significant effect on case trajectories than fixed 
payments: 
 
“`In my own experience there would be more pleas at Intermediate 
Diets. Intermediate Diets are 5 years old so it’s difficult to gauge: 
you didn’t have the capability to plead at an intermediate diet 5 
years ago. That’s probably more significant than fixed fees.” 
[Telephone interview, defence solicitor  981497] 
 
140. To examine this question, we isolated the impact of fixed payments from 
mandatory intermediate diets and measured any impact of fixed payments in addition to the 
effects of mandatory intermediate diets for the years after the introduction of fixed 
payments.46 Table 3 in Appendix C presents the results of these regressions for each of the 
four stages in summary Sheriff Court cases. The results show unambiguously that the 
introduction of intermediate diets has led to a large reduction in the proportion of cases 
concluding at any of the other three stages. Interestingly, this policy has not only reduced 
the proportion of cases which proceeded beyond the intermediate diet (i.e. the intended 
scope of the policy), but also the proportion of cases concluding prior to the intermediate 
diet.  
141. While it was expected that introduction of mandatory intermediate diets would 
affect the stage at which cases conclude (see also Duff 1998; Duff and McCallum 2000), 
we would only expect the introduction of fixed payments to produce an effect if lawyer 
pleading advice has a tendency to adapt to new  remunerative arrangements. The results in 
Table 3 of Appendix C allow us to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, the 
introduction of fixed fees has had a significant impact on the way cases are handled 
through the four stages.  In addition to the effect of the introduction of mandatory 
intermediate diets, the new payment scheme has led to an increase in the proportion of 
cases proceeding beyond the pleading diet. Interestingly, however, a smaller proportion of 
cases conclude after a trial.47 
142. However, as pointed out in Appendix C, paragraph 25, the effect of fixed payments 
on the proportion of cases concluding at the pleading diet only becomes apparent from 
fiscal year 2000/01. 
                                                 
46 This is done by creating a variable which takes the value one for courts and years where Intermediate Diets 
were mandatory and zero for those where they were not.  The second takes the value of one for the years 
when fixed payments applied and zero for all other years.   
47 There was a suggestion from two stakeholder interviewees that there had been exploitation of the fixed 
payments system through the use of ‘part-heard/notional’ trials.  This does not appear to be borne out by the 
statistical analysis or in other interviews and surveys. 
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Chart 22 
Effect of Intermediate Diets and Fixed Fees
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143. Chart 22 shows the proportions of cases concluding at each stage. It shows that 
following the introduction of fixed fees, the largest effect has been the increase in the 
proportion of cases concluding at the intermediate diet stage (up 8 percentage points after 
these were made mandatory and a further 3.5  percentage points after the introduction of 
fixed payments). The introduction of fixed payments has produced also a 1.5 percentage 
point increase in the proportion of cases concluding on the day of trial, but before evidence 
is led. The proportion of cases concluding at a trial (i.e. after evidence has been led) has 
fallen by nearly 2 percentage points.  Cases concluding at the pleading diet fell by 2.83 
percentage points.  Thus 78% of the net increase in the proportion of cases concluding at 
the intermediate diet is accounted for by the net decrease in the proportion of cases 
concluding at the pleading diet. 
  
144. That the share of cases concluding on the day of trial (but before evidence is led) 
increased by 1.5 percentage points is, perhaps, a surprising finding. The structure of fixed 
payments is such that it would appear to offer strong financial incentives (in cases of 
ethical indeterminacy) to resolve the case at the intermediate diet and not continue the case 
to the day of trial. So it might have been expected that there would have been a substantial 
fall in the proportion of cases resolving on the day of trial but before evidence has been led. 
Why has there not been any decrease in the proportion of cases concluding on the day of 
trial but instead a slight increase48? One potential explanation relates to the reduced amount 
                                                 
48 As we saw earlier in Charts 19 and 20, neither of the changes in proportions of cases terminating ‘on day of 
trial’ nor ‘at trial’ were statistically significant at the standard 95% level.   
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of time which some defence agents may now have to examine the case against the accused 
in time for the intermediate diet. If, at the time of the intermediate diet, the defence 
solicitor, through sheer pressure and volume of work49, feels s/he has not had sufficient 
time to examine the case or enough time to discuss it with the client50, it may be more 
likely that, in cases where the accused is unsure whether s/he should change his/her plea 
and evidence is not straightforward, for the solicitor to suggest to the client that it would be 
better to plead not guilty and wait and see how the prosecution responds.51 Moreover, the 
chance that the prosecution case may fold increases substantially if the case continues to 
the day of trial (Goriely et al 2001).  
145. We have seen how, under fixed payments, the share of cases which resolved at the 
pleading diet fell52. Chart 23 looks only at all cases which proceed beyond the pleading 
diet. This chart shows that, as a proportion of all cases which proceed beyond the pleading 
diet, the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets has produced a reduction in both the 
proportions of cases concluding on the first day of trial and those going to trial.  The 
introduction of fixed fees has increased, by a further 6%, the proportion of cases that 
conclude at the intermediate diet stage, and reduced by a similar size the proportion of 
cases which conclude at a trial.  However, as a share of all cases going beyond the first 
stage, the share of cases concluding on the day of trial is also reduced by a mere 0.25%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Chapters two and three of this report showed that one impact of fixed payments was to increase the volume 
of cases defence solicitors have to deal with. 
50 As we saw in Chapter 3, fixed fees were widely reported to have reduced the level of client contact. 
51 Note that these figures largely pre-date the new position of the Court of Criminal Appeal from October 
2003 onwards that sentencers should state openly whether or not they are giving a discount for an early guilty 
plea and the extent of any such discount. However, there is no clear evidence to show whether or not the case 
law has actually led to a more widespread practice of discounting for an early guilty plea than before, or, 
simply to a greater degree of transparency (see also paragraphs 155 - 158). 
52 This fall was statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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146. Pleading guilty at the intermediate diet was, however, widely recognised by 
stakeholder practitioners as the optimal economic management of fixed payments:  
 
“The most economic use of fixed fees is simply to plead everybody 
not guilty, apply for legal aid, get legal aid granted, then plead them 
all guilty in the intermediate diet.”  [Stakeholder interview 6,  
defence solicitor] 
 
“You are more keen to have a case resolved that will resolve at an 
intermediate diet as opposed to going to trial on it because there is 
no financial benefit as such in going to trial even if there was a 
legal benefit in going to trial and therefore if a resolution is to be 
reached it’s better to achieve a resolution at an intermediate diet 
instead of halfway through a trial or an hour or half an hour into a 
trial or the morning of the trial.” [Telephone interview, defence 
solicitor 981585] 
 
147. As suggested  by the concept of ‘ethical indeterminacy’ discussed earlier, pleading 
decisions were said to be shaped by a subtle interplay of factors, especially where clients 
were uncertain as to how to plead and failed to give clear instructions. For example; 
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“[Defence agents] want to get pleas sorted out sooner. They want 
pleas sorted out at intermediate diets.  It’s in no-one’s interest for 
cases to be [pause]   I’m not saying they were spun out before but it 
maybe focuses people’s attention – if something’s going to be a 
[guilty] plea, it should be a plea at the intermediate diet.  If it’s not 
going to be a plea then you continue onto trial, you go to trial.  All 
of that is driven by the client as well, you can’t force someone into 
pleading guilty at the intermediate diet just because that suits you 
financially. But you’re aware of how the plea is tendered.  So 
solicitors, from their point of view, they’d probably wish to have 
matters resolved sooner rather than later. But that’s always at the 
end of the day dictated by the client.  But certainly it’s in your mind, 
you know why bother pleading guilty at the trial – if it’s an adjusted 
plea you can adjust that plea at the intermediate diet – do it sooner, 
it’s only a few weeks but still.” [sic] [Stakeholder interview 7,  
defence solicitor] 
 
“I can see that, if you know that you are going to get £500 for a 
case that could be resolved at the beginning but equally it might be 
resolved with no worse position for the client - which I think a lot of 
the research previously showed-then obviously there is an incentive 
there.”  [Stakeholder interview 2, defence solicitor] 
 
148. Surveys of defence and prosecution practitioners and phone and face to face 
interviews strongly confirm the finding that fixed fees has led to a significant increase in 
cases concluding at the intermediate diet.  
 
Plea advice decision-making 
149. In our telephone survey of criminal defence solicitors, respondents were first asked 
to say whether their own pleading advice had changed as a result of the introduction of 
fixed payments. We also asked them whether they thought the pleading advice of other 
criminal defence solicitors had changed as a result of the introduction of fixed payments. 
Chart 24 shows the results. The large majority of  respondents said that the introduction of 
fixed payments had not altered their own pleading practice, but were considerably more 
likely to observe a change in the pleading practices of others.  Over 3 times as many 
respondents believed others had changed their pleading practices as had changed 
themselves.  
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Chart 24 
Thinking about the overall workload, has the introduction of fixed payments had 
an impact on pleading advice to clients? 
 
 
 
150. Those who believed practices had changed were asked to explain why. By far the 
most common explanation was that the fixed payments system provided an incentive to 
plead not guilty initially but to change the plea to guilty at the intermediate diet: 
 
“I think people are more likely to try to resolve things prior to trial. 
In one view it is in a solicitor’s interests that a fixed payment be 
resolved prior to trial. There is no incentive for someone to take the 
matter to trial.” [Telephone survey defence solicitor  981366] 
 
“It depends what your [pause]  how you personally feel you should 
do the work.  I could say to a lot of them, yeah plead guilty at the 
intermediate diet, I’ve got my legal aid certificate and I’ll get the 
money so that’s not a problem, I wouldn’t tell the client that but 
people  [pause] you can see that people think that.”  [Face-to-face 
non-stakeholder interview 1,  defence solicitor] 
 
“At the moment if you’ve got a client who appears from custody 
charged with various offences…if he pleads guilty you’ll probably 
earn a maximum of £25, which is the minimum fee for appearing.  If 
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not being represented, or he’s being represented by amateurs 
because the guy’s representing him for fun ‘coz he’s not doing it for 
money.  If you want professional representation, you have to plead 
not guilty.” [Face-to-face non-stakeholder interview 4, defence 
solicitor]53 
 
“There is a much greater tendency to plead not guilty at the outset 
and thereafter either plead at the intermediate diet or in a lot of 
circumstances plead at trial.” [Telephone survey , defence solicitor 
 981585] 
 
“If you plead at the intermediate diet or you resolve the case one 
way or other you get your £500.  If you continue for a further 2 
weeks to the trial, it then resolves or pleads or whatever you get 
your £500.  If it goes to trial you get an extra £100 for the first day, 
£200 for the second and then £400 but that doesn’t happen very 
often.  So in reality what they’re saying is, you’ll get an extra £100 
if you go to trial… so in my view it doesn’t pay to go trial.” [Face-
to-face non-stakeholder interview 2,  defence solicitor] 
 
151. In addition to telephone and postal surveys with ‘non-stakeholder’ defence 
solicitors we conducted a small telephone survey of depute fiscals (this was in addition to 
the face-to-face interviews with senior prosecutors). Seventeen depute fiscal interviewees54 
were asked whether they thought the introduction of fixed payments had impacted on 
defence agents’ pleading practices. Ten believed that it had, 5 believed that it had not and 2 
did not know. Those who believed that it had an impact were asked a free-text question as 
to why they believed that to be the case. The most frequently made point was that the fixed 
payment system provided an incentive to defence solicitors to advise their clients to plead 
not guilty at the pleading diet, but to change that plea at the intermediate diet. It was felt 
that there was little financial incentive for the solicitor to continue the case to trial:  
 
“there’s more pleas at the intermediate diet or at the trial diet… I 
mean it used to be the sky was the limit for them wasn’t it?…  
They’d have been quite happy to sit about in court until half past 
three, four o’clock because they were getting paid for it.  Now 
they’re not, they want to be out doing other things, so they’re more 
inclined to plead now.” [Procurator fiscal depute, follow-up 
interview] 
 
 
                                                 
53 We are grateful to an experienced sheriff who privately made the point that (all else being equal) a 
very early plea may be worth more of a discount, but this has to be balanced against the need to have 
time to check the evidence against the accused.  
54 All but two of these depute fiscals had practised as either defence solicitors or prosecutors prior to the 
introduction of fixed payments. 
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Individual court and sheriffdom effects on case trajectories 
152. The analysis so far has controlled for variables at the level of individual sheriff 
courts, which can be said to include the effects of local ‘court cultures’. However, an 
alternative assumption might be that an analysis according to sheriffdom would be more 
pertinent. We investigated whether individual court fixed effects (including local practices 
and court cultures) are statistically stronger than sheriffdom effects. Table 6 in Analysis C 
sets out the results. It shows that sheriffdom effects have only slight impact and leave the 
estimated effects of mandatory intermediate diets and fixed payments largely unaffected.  
153. However, one striking difference between sheriffdoms is the proportion of cases 
which conclude at the pleading diet – in particular between the two extremes: 45.5% in 
Glasgow and Strathkelvin and 69.2% in Grampian and the Highlands. There were no real 
differences between sheriffdoms in the proportion of cases concluding at the intermediate 
diet. The differences in the proportions of cases concluding on the day of trial or after a 
trial has begun reflect differences between the proportions going beyond the pleading diet. 
154. The relatively low proportion of cases which conclude at the pleading diet in the 
sheriffdom of Glasgow and Strathkelvin was discussed by practitioners in telephone and 
face-to-face interviews and also by SLAB officials who suggested that Glasgow defence 
solicitors faced a particularly difficult situation: 
 
“But the system just became so easy to operate for us and solicitors. 
And with the exception of Glasgow because Glasgow has a problem 
because of the inefficiency of the courts and how the fiscal service 
works… [The] Glasgow Bar Association… are scathing of the fiscal 
service because it affects them.” [Face-to-face stakeholder 
interview 4, SLAB official] 
 
 
Early guilty pleas and client contact55 
 
155. While there was a feeling that the fee structure was intended to encourage earlier 
guilty pleas in cases where an accused may have otherwise pled guilty either shortly before 
or on the day of trial or after evidence had been led, there was also perceived to be a 
decrease in guilty plea rates at the pleading diet: 
 
“The other oddity of the system was that… you’ve got to get, you’ve 
got to plead not guilty initially to get into the fixed payment.  It 
means that the intermediate diet, as well as focusing back from the 
trial you are also looking forward from the pleading diet, and so 
that’s really a flaw in the system that encourages you to get at least 
as far as the intermediate diet, rather than encouraging you to 
actually take a frank look at the case at the outset.” [Stakeholder 
interview 5,  SLAB official] 
 
                                                 
55  See also chapter three, paragraphs 86-93. 
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156. Similarly, defence solicitors noted that there was no particular incentive to 
encourage a guilty plea at the first (pleading) diet: 
 
“I can identify certain solicitors who - every client that appears 
from custody pleads not guilty.  It can’t be because they are all not 
guilty it must be because they are wanting their £500.  I have had 
discussions with other lawyers who say that if there was more of an 
incentive in terms of finance to plead guilty at an early stage then 
they might well do that.  That’s not my practice.  If a client of mine 
from custody tells me he’s guilty then he pleads guilty but I know of 
other firms where that is not the case.  It probably has had an 
impact in that people are pleading, for example if you’ve got 
somebody appearing from custody and there are 5 charges on the 
complaint and the client says I plead to three of them but not to the 
other two a lot of people will say well we’ll just put not guilty and 
we’ll sort it out later. But if there was some incentive to say, well, I 
can go and speak to the fiscal see if we can get this sorted out today, 
some financial incentive to do that then you might well do that but 
not if you’re only going to get £25.” [Telephone survey, defence 
solicitor 981332] 
    
“They are still getting everyone to plead not guilty, that’s my big 
grouse.  We as a firm tend not to do that but there’s one particular 
firm who opened up down here, none of their clients plead guilty 
and there’s one lad, I’ve never seen him do it, I’ve done more trials 
than him, quite often when my trial pleads guilty at least they’ve 
gone some kind of stateable defence but I’ve never seem him do a 
trial in the two or three years he’s been down here, but every single 
one of his clients pleads not guilty [initially].” [sic] [Telephone 
survey,  defence solicitor 981435] 
 
  
157. On the other hand it was widely recognised by court practitioners and SLAB 
officials alike that defence solicitors are often not in a position to advise clients as to how 
to plead until after the pleading diet. It was accepted that it is often unrealistic to expect 
defence agents to be in a position to suggest that their clients plead guilty at the pleading 
diet. Ironically, attempts to encourage earlier guilty pleas at the pleading diet may have 
been thwarted by one of the effects of fixed payments, which was reported as discouraging 
client contact. As we saw earlier, fixed payments may have had the effect of discouraging 
client contact: 
 
“I think this business of them not having contact with their clients is 
a difficulty ‘coz they’re not in a position to say, I mean obviously 
it’s an instruction from their client.  So a lot of them say, ‘not 
guilty’.”  [Stakeholder interview 12,  COPFS] 
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“The whole legal aid system is geared up to the not guilty plea. And 
if they were to pay us properly for work that we do at the beginning 
of a case without pleading not guilty because sometimes we will go 
and investigate or take statements or try and take statements in 
cases before we plead not guilty but we don’t get paid for that, then 
if we do plead guilty at the pleading diet there is no appearance fee 
so you can understand that some solicitors would be tempted to get 
a not guilty plea one way or another on a technical defence or 
something that’s a little bit shaky so the system needs to be looked 
at from the point of view of guilty pleas.” [Telephone interview,  
defence solicitor 981575]  
 
158. Furthermore, another effect of fixed payments appears to have been an increase in 
the volume of cases handled by ‘specialists’ as was seen in Chapter 2.  This in turn may 
also militate against being able to advise clients to plead guilty at the intermediate diet.  
 
 
Guilty pleas and case outcomes 
 
159. We have seen that, at least in the period to 2003, the impact of the introduction of 
fixed payments appears to have led to a higher proportion of cases concluding at the 
intermediate diet. Previous investigations of rates of pleading guilty have tended to find 
that while the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets has reduced the number of last 
minute changes of plea it has not eliminated them (Duff and McCallum 2000). Goriely et al 
(2001) outline some of the factors which encourage changes of plea to be made at the trial 
diet rather than the intermediate diet. One of the most important is that defence solicitors 
found it easier to get hold of the depute fiscal to discuss the case at the trial. It was felt that, 
if the client was willing to hold out until trial, this would often be the best time to negotiate.  
160. A further finding was that, where an accused was prepared to continue to plead not  
guilty until the day of trial the chance of acquittal or the prosecution abandoning the case 
rose quite sharply. “[T]he longer a case proceeds the more the likely the fiscal service is to 
abandon it. Only 2% of cases were abandoned at the pleading diet, compared to 4-6% at the 
intermediate diet and 11-16% before trial [i.e. before evidence was led].” (Goriely et al 
2001: 97, [sic]). Forty-seven percent of cases resulted in a not guilty outcome56 after 
evidence was led. “Other things being equal, an accused’s best means of avoiding a 
conviction is to maintain a not guilty plea at least until the morning of the trial and 
preferably beyond. The chance that the prosecution case will fold is small but real, and 
contrasts with the certainty of conviction if one pleads guilty” (Goriely et al 2001: 97-98). 
The extent to which one is prepared to take the risk of pleading not guilty until trial and 
beyond is contingent on, inter alia, personal attitude to the perceived risk of conviction. 
While some accused persons are prepared to take the risk of going to trial others are keen 
to get a case over with, especially if they appear from police custody or have been on 
                                                 
56 ‘Not guilty outcomes’ included not guilty, not proven verdicts; cases dismissed after findings of no case to 
answer 
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remand, or if they believe it will earn credit in the form of a more lenient sentence than 
they would have received if they had held out until trial and been found guilty. 
161. Have there been any other incentives which encourage an accused person to plead 
guilty earlier? The most recent study of the question of sentence discounting for an early 
guilty plea in the summary courts found no widespread practice of discounting (Goriely et 
al 2001; Tata et al 2004).57 Discounting might have gone on, but it very much depended on 
the stage and circumstances of the plea. In any event (as in other countries) it might reduce 
the quantum of punishment but it was rarely believed to alter the character of a sentence 
(e.g. from a custodial to a non-custodial sentence) (Tata et al 2004). However, the same 
research also found that there appeared to be a widely held presumption among accused 
persons that they would be likely to receive some form of discounted sentence if they pled 
guilty rather than followed the case through to trial. In other words, accused persons tended 
to plead guilty in the expectation of a discounted sentence, even though that widely-held 
expectation did not seem to be entirely borne out by the data.   
162. Although our study examined data up to 2003, it is perhaps relevant to reflect on 
recent legal developments in the area of discounting. In Du Plooy v HMA 200358 the Court 
of Criminal Appeal took the opportunity to give guidance on the interpretation and 
application of section 196(1) of the 1995 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act. The court 
clarified that the section allowed for a discount to be given in terms of not only the 
quantum of punishment but also the character of the sentence. However, it did not argue for 
a systematic policy of presumptive sentence discounting. The court affirmed previous 
thinking of the court in Strawhorn v McLeod 1987 SCCR 413 that any such discount (or 
‘allowance’) may be given taking into account the stage at which and the circumstances in 
which the accused pleads guilty.59 The court did not change the essentially permissive 
approach to the matter: sentencers were not to be required to discount sentences for guilty 
pleas, but to take the plea into account and explain their reasons.60  
                                                 
57 Note that the data examined did not include cases after October 2003 (the date of the Du Plooy judgement), 
which we now discuss here. 
58  Du Plooy (Devonne) v HM Advocate (no1) 2003 SCCR 443. It should be noted that this took place after 
the cut-off point for the analysis of data in this research study.  
59 See also: RB v HM Advocate 2004 SCCR 443; Smith v HM Advocate SCCR 2004 521; McColm v HM 
Advocate Court of Criminal Appeal 27 January 2005; and Allison v P F Stranraer Court of Criminal Appeal 
17 March 2005 
60 See also McColm v HM Advocate Court of Criminal Appeal Court 27 January 2005 where the Appeal 
Court was critical of the sentencing judge who said he was making full allowance for a plea of guilty but 
failed to explain how. Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 was amended on October 4 
2004 by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 2004 section 20(3) to insert subsection 1(A). Thus, in passing 
sentence, the court has to state whether it has chosen to apply a discount for a guilty plea and if so how such a 
sentence would have differed in the absence of such a plea; and if not why not. Again the emphasis was on 
the need for ‘transparency’ through reason giving, but it does not alter the essentially permissive approach as 
to whether or not a discount is to be applied. 
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163. The main intention of the court in Du Plooy appears to have been to encourage 
greater transparency. If a sentencer decides to give an allowance for a guilty plea “it is 
desirable that…the sentencer should use a distinct discount in the process of arriving at the 
appropriate sentence, and should state in court the extent to which he or she has discounted 
the sentence…Those who represent accused persons should know, at least in general terms, 
the extent to which a sentence is likely to be reduced in the event of an early guilty plea, so 
that they can advise the accused accordingly.” The court did not favour the publication or 
the provision of an indication of what, if any, the discount might be.61 Rather, transparency 
was to be conveyed to the client by the defence lawyer, who would have built up a sense of 
what the likely discount would be. 
164. The 2004 McInnes Review of summary justice argued strongly in favour of a robust 
system of sentence discounting. It commented approvingly on the aim  of encouraging 
greater transparency so that accused persons know, through their lawyers, the nature of any 
discount they would be likely to receive for a guilty plea:  
 
“what matters is that there should be a consistent practice of giving 
a significant and, where merited, substantial discount for early 
[guilty] pleas, with greater discounts being given in the early stages 
of cases. We would expect that solicitors would routinely advise 
their clients of the availability of discounts. In its examination of 
consistency in sentencing in sentencing practice more generally the 
Sentencing Commission may wish to consider the emerging pattern 
of sentence discounting and whether it is consistent across the 
country.” (Summary Justice Review Committee 2004: 14.21) 
 
165. The combination of the introduction of fixed payments and the impact of Du Plooy 
would seem to provide incentives to both the accused and his/her representative to plead 
guilty earlier (at least at the intermediate diet) rather than shortly before trial, or soon after 
the trial has begun. The matter of sentence discounting arose frequently in our face-to-face 
and telephone interviews. It was widely observed that Du Plooy had seemed to encourage 
many sentencers to state more explicitly than they had before the extent of any discount 
and their reasons for applying a discount.  
 
166. It was also felt by many practitioners that the guidance was being applied 
differently by different sentencers. Further, some practitioners argued that inconsistency, 
(or at least its perception), led to the practice of ‘sheriff-shopping’ which undermined the 
spirit behind transparency in sentence discounting and was a further factor which led to 
delay.  A particularly important determinant of type and timing of plea was felt to be the 
likely sentence. Perceived inconsistency in sentencing practices between individual sheriffs 
was felt to encourage ‘sheriff-shopping’ among defence lawyers:  
 
“so the good lawyers will make sure that the client appears before a 
compassionate sheriff, rather than a rude, grumpy, heavy 
sentencing sheriff.  Sheriff shopping. But it does go on in every court 
                                                 
61  For example through a system of Sentence Indication Hearings. 
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where there’s more than one sheriff.” [sic] [Stakeholder interview 
11, COPFS]  
 
167. Moreover, some stakeholders believed that real or perceived inter-shrieval disparity 
in sentencing practice (especially in the application of Du Plooy) undermined the attempt 
to encourage earlier guilty pleas: 
 
“consistent with the legislation in the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995 that says, “sheriffs may” and I think that the 
Du Plooy case has maybe just clarified the legislation but as I say 
I’m not 100% sure of that.  But again this is something that McInnes 
has covered in his report, and basically we’re just talking about 
beefing up the legislation around intermediate diets to try and make 
them more effective and I think that would be a good idea because 
at the moment there’s no doubt that some sheriffs just see it as a 
tedious waste of time.  You go in with far too many cases to start 
with for there to be any sort of appropriate analysis of them and 
basically all you say is “ well we’ve got 5 out of the 7  citations 
back” the defence agents say “we’re tendering a plea of not guilty 
and are ready to proceed to trial” and it gets knocked on.  So the 
sheriffs don’t take any interest in it, it’s just “right fine” on it goes 
and then the next time it calls we’ve still only got 5  out of the 7, 
we’re missing two witnesses, the defence aren’t in a position to go 
to trial and so it’s not achieved anything.  But elsewhere I know 
some Sheriffs have been proactive and are saying “I am entitled to 
consider giving you a discount if you plead at this diet, and as you 
have done I’ll give you x” and it makes the accused aware that he 
has been given a discount and when defence agents hear that as 
well they’re more inclined because they want to keep their client so 
that the next time he does something wrong he comes back to them 
again.”  [Stakeholder interview 14,  COPFS]  
 
“Equally, now you’ve got Du Plooy where you get a benefit for an 
early plea, that’s making it harder, but that has to be a judgement 
on the client. And I think what we have to do, in my view, is to 
advise them that there is a discount available but the sheriff is X, 
and he or she is likely to do Y based on my experience…  There’s a 
wide variation in approaches and there always will be in a place 
like [name of court], where you’ve got the full spectrum of 
sentencers.” [sic] [Face-to-face non-stakeholder interview 2,  
defence solicitor] 
 
168. Individual shrieval reputations were regarded as central in plea decision making, 
especially the timing of guilty pleas. It was argued that these perceptions of inter-shrieval 
disparity tended to lead to delay:  
 
“I know there are instances where they wouldn’t plead guilty, or 
wouldn’t be encouraged to plead guilty say at the intermediate diet, 
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because I don’t know, their lawyers might have some knowledge 
about who the sheriff is going to be on the Bench at a particular 
time. Some of our clients, when they find out who the sheriff is, they 
don’t turn up.” [Stakeholder interview 8,  client support] 
 
“A lot of pleas are tendered at the intermediate diets. I mean one of 
the factors is whom the sheriff is. I mean there are days when every 
case will be continued to trial, and there are some days where the 
majority of cases will be a [guilty] plea simply because of local 
knowledge of who the sheriff is, and, what’s likely to happen that 
would be in the best interest of the client. I don’t make any excuse 
for that. I mean that’s your job: to get the best result for your 
client.”  [Face-to-face stakeholder interview 3, defence solicitor] 
 
“And that holds true also for intermediate diets where it may be 
appropriate to plead [guilty]. But frankly, if you’ve got the harshest 
sentencer in the jurisdiction in front of you, to my mind it’s 
inappropriate to say to the client, “listen, plead today”. That’s 
probably what you should do, but you know: “you take your 
chances in two weeks time and you might not go to jail.” There’s 
only one thing going to happen – he’s not going to plead.” [Face-
to-face non-stakeholder interview 2,  defence solicitor]. 
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Perceived impacts of fixed payments on the overall effectiveness of defence work 
 
169. In this section we turn to the experiences and perceptions of defence and 
prosecution lawyers, and SLAB officials on whether fixed payments have impacted on the 
overall effectiveness of defence work. 
 
170. As part of the telephone survey of them we asked depute procurators fiscal whether 
or not they believed the introduction of fixed payments had any impact on the overall 
effectiveness of defence work. Chart 25 shows the results. Eleven depute fiscals thought it 
had; 5 said it had not; and one did not know.   
 
 
Chart 25 
Has introduction of fixed payments had an impact on effectiveness of criminal 
defence work? 
 
 
171. In our telephone survey of ‘non-stakeholder’ depute fiscals, we asked depute fiscals 
to describe the impact or lack of impact they perceived. Among those who said that there 
had been no impact on overall effectiveness of defence work, the reason which was given 
was that defence agents now were able to rely on summaries of evidence produced by the 
Crown. For this reason, it was felt that although the nature and level of preparation had 
changed, the overall effectiveness of defence work had not been significantly altered. 
172. Amongst the majority of depute fiscals who said that there had been an impact, 
nearly all held the perception that, on the whole, defence agents were not as well prepared 
as they used to be before the introduction of fixed payments. Some procurators fiscal said 
that this perceived lower level of preparation led to delay. On the other hand, others 
claimed that only having Crown witness statements made trials shorter. 
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173. In our telephone survey and face-to-face interviews, we asked criminal defence 
solicitors about their perceptions of the impact (if any) of fixed payments on the overall 
effectiveness of defence work.  
174. Almost no defence solicitors suggested that overall quality had improved as a 
consequence of the introduction of fixed payments. In answer to closed survey questioning, 
two thirds (66%) of defence solicitors said that the introduction of fixed payments had 
affected the overall quality of criminal defence work, just over one quarter (27%) said that 
it had not impacted on overall effectiveness, and the remainder (7%) either declined to give 
an answer to this closed question or said they did not know (see Appendix D).    
175. In telephone and face-to-face interviews we followed up the question of the impact 
of fixed payments on the effectiveness of defence work.  Among those who said that there 
had been no change the most frequently made point was to argue for an increase in fee 
rates: 
 
“I think the most important aspect of fixed fees is that they haven’t 
increased.  It doesn’t matter whether we are paid on a time-and-line 
basis for what we do or on a fixed fee basis what matters is how 
much we are paid.  With the best will in the world there may be 
slight differences in the way we operate because of the way the 
payment structures made.  You can really only operate properly in 
the best interest of your client, or, you don’t; and if you are doing 
that how you get paid doesn’t make a great deal of difference.” 
[Telephone survey, defence solicitor 981343] 
  
176. Many others, however, suggested that there had been a general decline in 
effectiveness of defence work as a result of fixed payments: 
 
“It may have decreased slightly.” [Telephone survey, defence 
solicitor 981366] 
 
“yes… there would be less time spent on the preparation of cases.” 
[Telephone survey, defence solicitor 981497] 
 
“I think it has had a huge impact. It’s like going into a boxing 
match with your hands tied behind your back because you’re 
restricted, you have a limit and you cannot possibly prepare a case 
properly for £500 these days: it’s absurd.” [Telephone survey, 
defence solicitor 981452] 
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177. Some solicitors were more explicit in suggesting that the impact of fixed payments 
tended to discourage defence solicitors from advising their clients to take a case to trial 
(even where this might be in the client’s best interests) and encourage plea bargaining: 
 
“You sometimes think that there is no more money to be earned here 
so I might as well just advise the client to plead guilty; and 
eventually what you do is just plea bargaining: getting something 
lopped off, bargain it down a wee bit, rather than challenge it.  I 
can’t afford the time to challenge it: I’m not going to get paid, I’m 
being pressured by the office to go and do x, y and z and we are 
trying to run a business at the same time; and the interests of 
business are quite often being put before the interests of the client, 
which must be the same in most firms who are doing criminal 
summary stuff or otherwise.” [Telephone interview, defence 
solicitor 981327] 
 
“I think far more solicitors are ready to negotiate a plea rather than 
go to trial, I’m quite sure of it. And I think that’s straight commerce; 
and in many cases I think it’s to the disadvantage of the client.” 
[Face-to-face stakeholder interview 3, defence solicitor] 
 
178. Several defence solicitors suggested that there may have been a decline in the 
quality and effectiveness of defence work among some firms and solicitors specifically 
because fixed payments had the effect of discouraging time spent on preparation and 
encouraging a higher turnover of cases:  
 
“If you don’t get paid enough what happens is that instead of 
devoting an hour to doing a summary case you may only be able to 
devote half an hour because you are doing twice as many.” 
[Telephone survey, defence solicitor 981343] 
 
“I would say that if anything it discourages people from spending 
an awful lot of time on cases because if you’re going to have to 
precognosce personally every client you simply aren’t going to be 
able to offer the business or to keep the business.  I think it’s quite 
self evident as far as that’s concerned.”  [Telephone survey, defence 
solicitor 981440] 
 
“One is mindful of the fact that you don’t have the same freedom as 
you did before to do what is probably in your view in the client’s 
best interests at the time because you are constrained by cost 
factors, geographical factors etc…  There has been some kind of 
positive aspects to it, but there certainly is that negative aspect as 
well that if, for instance, you had wanted to make certain enquiries 
and get certain reports done it is not always as readily available to 
you under fixed fee as it was before.” [Telephone survey, defence 
solicitor 981566] 
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179. ‘Sausage machine’ was a term which came up frequently in interviews with some 
practitioners and SLAB officials to describe some of the firms which were said to produce 
considerable profit from the fixed payment regime by, as a near-automatic practice, 
encouraging clients to plead not guilty at the pleading diet and then guilty at the 
intermediate diet, without careful consideration of the case. There was a perception (and 
irritation among some defence solicitors) that fixed payments tend to reward a ‘sausage 
machine’ approach, whereas those who saw themselves as working more conscientiously 
were losing out financially: 
 
“There’s a lot of money to be made in fixed fees…  If you get your 
guy to plead not guilty, don’t do any preparation work and turn up 
on the Intermediate Diet and do a deal with the fiscal, or, just get 
him to plead guilty at that time you’re going to get £500 for doing 
nothing, which is wrong…  I just see it happening all the time, small 
firms like ours do trials on a fairly regular basis, not that often, and 
other firms whose clients never ever plead guilty on day one, never 
do a trial and they are always pleading it out on the day, getting the 
£500.”  [Telephone survey,  defence solicitor 981435]   
 
“I think there’s probably quite a lot of law firms that actually quite 
like fixed fees. There will be a lot of defence agents who have loads 
and loads of clients, who have got an area tied up and have got a 
good reputation amongst the accused and the accused’s associates- 
so they go to that lawyer. It doesn’t necessarily mean that he is the 
best lawyer; it means he gets on best with the accused. And, if he’s 
getting the numbers through the door and he’s not in every case 
required to do a lot of work then that lawyer is going to like fixed 
fees.  But there’s other lawyers who are good lawyers; very 
thorough lawyers, who won’t be taking on as much business 
because they can’t do as thorough a job, or alternatively, are not as 
popular with the accused for whatever reason.  So they won’t have 
the level of business: they’ll be the ones that struggle.” [Face-to-
face stakeholder interview 14, COPFS]. 
 
 
180. For others the effect of fixed fees was to discourage thorough research and 
preparation:  
 
“A lot of the time what you do find is that if the legal aid body says 
you have to do all the work done under a fixed fee basis you can 
find that there will not be as much work put into them so the quality 
of representation will drop.  Quite often I have to look at it myself 
but think I would like to do a, b and research this particular point 
quite thoroughly and present legal argument but at the same time I 
know that the more work I put into it doesn’t make any difference, 
I’m not going to get paid any more.  I’m still at the point where I’m 
enthusiastic enough to think well I’ll do it anyway, and I quite often 
do it in my own time and if I think there’s a legal argument in a case 
I can spend quite some time researching and quite some time 
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preparing for the case and yet we only get paid the same amount.  I 
think the more business constraints are placed on you and the more 
hassle you’ve got the less chance you’ve got to do that and the older 
and fatter and more fed up with it I get the less likely I am to do it as 
well.  And also I think it encourages people to encourage clients 
towards pleas or almost plea bargaining whereas there might be 
merits in fighting the thing out so I think although it makes it easier 
to apply for it really does reduce the quality of representation 
because you think I’m only going to get paid £400 or £300 if it’s 
District Court and it could be all day at a trial or it could be a lot of 
research needed and people are just not going to do it.” [Telephone 
survey, defence solicitor 981327] 
 
“The most economic use of fixed fees is simply to plead everyone 
not guilty; apply for legal aid; get legal aid granted; then plead 
them all guilty in the intermediate diet. The cynical view. That’s it. 
Do nothing. Do no preparation between times; make sure your 
client turns up at the Intermediate Diet and plead them all guilty 
then. That way you’re getting £500 for doing nothing.” [Face-to-
face non-stakeholder interview 6,  defence solicitor] 
 
 
181. For many defence solicitors there were strong concerns that fixed payments were 
putting standards at risk. For some a major worry was the impact that this would have on 
the profile and a concern that there was no ‘new blood’62 
 
“The thing about defence work is that, because there is no entry into 
it now from young people, what you have is a fairly experienced 
branch of the profession who have been doing the job for a very 
long time and know what they are doing, I think the standard of 
representation is good and experienced so there is a good service 
there but fixed fees have not helped that one bit.” [Telephone 
survey,  defence solicitor 981498]   
 
 
182. Others put it in starker terms: 
 
“No doubt whatsoever.  The general level of preparation is less than 
it was before.” [Telephone survey, non-stakeholder defence 
solicitor 981384] 
 
“The most efficient way of dealing with cases is not the proper way, 
and the difficulty is that you skip on preparation. What I see 
happening in practice is: people will be seen from custody; signed 
up; they’re not seen again until the Intermediate Diet; the solicitor 
                                                 
62 Note that this research study was not designed to address the question of traineeships etc. It is understood 
that SLAB and the Law Society of Scotland have been discussing the possibility of commissioning research 
into that area.  
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will get an idea of the case from the Fiscal on the day of the 
Intermediate Diet. Precious poor representation. That is how it is 
being maximized.” [Face-to-face non-stakeholder interview 3,  
defence solicitor] 
 
“Because defence agents are not as prepared.  Yes, I think it 
probably has gone down actually, I think it probably has.  I 
personally don’t think there’s anything to stop them providing the 
same quality service as they were before - they still have the money 
to do it - but they’re deciding ‘no, I’m not going to use that money - 
I’m going to keep that in my tail.” [Depute procurator fiscal face-
to-face interview following up fiscal telephone interviews] 
 
 
183. Senior SLAB officials tended to suggest that there had been no evidence of 
miscarriages of justice as a result of fixed fees. It was argued that there appeared to be no 
great increase in appeals against conviction as a result of fixed fees and that clients had not 
been complaining that their cases had been inadequately investigated: 
 
“I have never heard one claim: never once have I seen any claim 
that someone didn’t get their case handled properly by their 
solicitor never. Which is always the thing I thought: could that 
happen? But you know people change their solicitor and whatever, 
but it’s something I’ve never, ever seen any evidence of. So it seems 
to work.” [sic] [Stakeholder interview 4,  SLAB official] 
 
“If there were people who were having miscarriages of justice as a 
result of their representation being provided with fixed payment I’m 
quite sure that would have become very apparent by now and it 
really hasn’t.”  [Stakeholder interview 5,  SLAB official] 
 
184. However, lawyer stakeholder interviews (both prosecution and defence) were less 
sanguine. Most stakeholder lawyer respondents hinted or suggested that there was a greater 
risk of miscarriages of justice, though this was expressed in different ways. One reason was 
the drop in precognitions and greater reliance on prosecution evidence.  Some suggested 
that there may not be an increase in miscarriages of justice as a direct consequence of the 
introduction of fixed fees yet but that the concern was for the future – the concern being 
about the level of fee rather than the structuring of fees: 
 
“A lot of people were saying, “well this is it: there’s going to be a 
lot more miscarriages of justice” and I don’t think on it’s own the 
introduction of fixed fees has yet been responsible for that 
happening.  I think in particular when the rules were changed so 
that you could make an application in exceptional cases to go onto 
time and line, there’s not really any argument we can put forward 
anymore that we’re not going to be able to properly prepare a case 
because of the legal aid rules, but the concern is for the future. I 
mean if say it’s still £500 per trial in 10 years time, then I think it is 
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more likely to cause miscarriages and the warnings we were 
sounding back then will sound a bit more prophetic. But as things 
stand, I think a lot of the worst case examples people gave have not 
happened.” [sic] [Stakeholder interview 2,  defence solicitor] 
 
185. Another stake-holder defence solicitor suggested that preparation had been 
compromised but this did not necessarily have serious consequences as demonstrated by 
the lack of any cases on the quality of representation or any apparent increase in appeals 
against conviction: 
 
“I’m not aware of any cases having arisen as a result of, say, a lack 
of preparation or something that couldn’t be covered.  Equally, in 
virtually every trial that I’ve done where although I have a full note 
of evidence or sometimes the police statements – there’s always 
something that’s come up, that I think well, that would’ve been 
covered under the old system.  There’s always something that’s 
come up during the trial that under the old way of preparing might 
have been covered, but now although we’ve got the basics of the 
information you know maybe a lack of the finer detail, it becomes an 
issue at the trial. But that’s difficult - I don’t think there’s been an 
increase in appeals and such like because of it.” [Stakeholder 
interview 7,  defence solicitor]   
 
186. These accounts are broadly consistent with those given in SLAB interviews that 
there has been no major rise in appeals or complaints about the quality of representation:  
 
“Certainly the way that we now approach it, was that you got 
precognition agents to go out and speak to all the witnesses, now 
we’ll write to witnesses and ask for them to contact us, so I now end 
up spending half a day taking statements from witnesses, or take 
their phone numbers and never quite get round to phoning them 
back.  So undoubtedly it has affected how solicitors prepare cases – 
I can’t really say much more on that - because – if [pause] the 
Legal Aid Board audit firms and your professional responsibility is 
in terms of the Law Society. So I would like to think that there aren’t 
any abuses taking place out there.”  [Stakeholder interview 7, 
defence solicitor] 
 
187. Other defence solicitors questioned the argument that if there had been no rise in 
appeals (including Anderson63-type appeals) that it necessarily followed that there had been 
a deterioration in the effectiveness of defence work. Client satisfaction, or dissatisfaction 
could not in itself be taken as the valid measure of the quality of legal work: 
 
“…[T]here seems to be less awareness on behalf of the punters as 
to what does or doesn’t constitute good representation. It’s the 
                                                 
63 Anderson v HMA 1996 S.L.T. 155. See also Buchannan v McLean 2000 SCCR 682; and Vickers v 
Buchanan 2002 SCCR 637  
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perennial question isn’t it? What’s more important: to do a good 
job for the client, or, have the client believe that you’ve done a good 
job for them? Because the two aren’t always the same.” [Face-to-
face interview non-stakeholder interview 3,  defence solicitor] 
 
188. Other defence solicitors were less cautious: 
 
“The likelihood is that because corners are being cut, because the 
defence do not have the funding available to carry out full and 
thorough investigation, there may be a greater number of cases in 
which points are missed which result in advice being given to plead 
guilty where perhaps the better advice might have been to proceed 
to trial or that perhaps witnesses are not brought to trial and… 
there is likely to be a number of people convicted who would not 
otherwise have been convicted.”  [Interview 6,  defence solicitor] 
 
189. Another stakeholder defence solicitor suggested that it was inevitable that fixed fees 
would lead to some increase in the likelihood of miscarriages of justice: 
 
“From the point of view of conducting cases I think it can be 
restrictive because you tend to know that with a fixed fee you’re not 
going to get sanctioned for some of the things which you would 
normally want to get sanctioned for, and you may tend to try and 
deal with the case in some other way.  I hope I don’t but I’m aware 
that solicitors, again talking generally, will take a view on whether 
or not a step which may or may not be taken should be taken 
because of the restriction of the fixed fee, so whether or not it results 
in miscarriages of justice I don’t know.  I suppose there may be 
occasions where if somebody restricts the work they’re doing 
because of the amount of money that may be paid for it, and 
something is missed….  In fact I’m sure it will happen.” 
[Stakeholder interview 3,  defence solicitor] 
 
190. The extent of this increased risk of miscarriages is, by its nature, perceived by all 
stakeholder lawyers to be very difficult to quantify:  
 
“Difficult to know.  You might never know because it’s what you’ve 
not done…  I mean there are cases where the police will come to 
you and say, ‘the witness, Joe Smith, said that he was looking out 
the window and he saw the accused commit the crime.’  And if you 
take that on face value you’ll maybe say to [the accused], ‘look, 
people saw you.’  If you then go and precognosce the person who 
actually did the seeing, they might say, ‘I don’t know what they’re 
talking about, I never gave a statement to the police.’…  So without 
going that extra step, you don’t know whether or not you’re going to 
do your client injustice or not.  So I suspect yes, there will have been 
miscarriages of justice in that matters will not have been 
discovered, and will never be discovered which otherwise would 
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have benefited the client.  But I think it’s impossible to calculate.” 
[Stakeholder interview 3, defence solicitor] 
 
191. The drop in the use of precognitions by the defence was highlighted as a key source 
of an increased risk of miscarriages of justice: 
 
“I would say potentially if you’re not precognosing the witnesses 
and if you’re relying to a greater extent on the good offices of the 
Crown to tell you what the witnesses are saying, that creates a risk 
that wasn’t there under the old system where you could actually 
interview the witnesses.  I mean, there are examples that everybody 
has of witness statements which turn out to be embellished and 
trials proceeding where it turns out that what’s in the so-called 
police statement is rather more than the witness actually told the 
police.  Now, if the witness doesn’t come forward to be interviewed 
and you go to the Fiscal and say, what did the witness say? … 
you’re then flying the kite somewhat when you go to trial.  So there 
is a risk in that.  Because you’re not... pushing them to precognosce 
witnesses, there is a risk that there could be more miscarriages of 
justice.  There’s no doubt about that!”  [Interview 6, defence 
solicitor] 
 
192. Other defence solicitors put their concerns more starkly: 
 
“I have no doubt that there have been miscarriages of justice 
because of poor preparation; no doubt whatsoever.” [Face-to-face 
non-stakeholder interview 3,  defence solicitor] 
 
 
Summary 
 
 Previous research discussed in this chapter into client experiences has shown that 
while the client is ultimately in control of their pleading decisions, most clients tend to be 
relatively passive; have a weak grasp of the case against them; and follow the advice of 
their solicitor.  
 Previous research has also shown that the financial arrangement under which 
defence solicitors work does make some difference to the overall patterns of pleading. The 
research reported here provides further evidence that this is the case.  
 Interviews and quantitative analysis have shown that the financial arrangement is 
not the only factor, but may be particularly important when decisions are in the balance in 
situations of ‘ethical indeterminacy’.  
 Statistical analysis of the data up to 2003 suggests that fixed payments have altered 
the patterns of case trajectories. In particular there has been a 3.5 percentage point rise in 
the proportion of cases concluding at the intermediate diet, which is specifically 
attributable to fixed payments and a fall of nearly 3 percentage points in cases concluding 
at the pleading diet. Both of these changes at the pleading and intermediate diet are 
statistically significant. There has been no statistically significant net change in the 
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proportions of cases which conclude on the day of trial (only a slight increase) and a slight 
(though not statistically significant) decrease in the proportion of cases which conclude at 
trial (i.e. after evidence has been led). 
 It was widely observed by a range of interviewees, including defence solicitors 
themselves, that the financially optimal time to advise a plea of guilty was at the 
intermediate diet. 
 In our phone survey only a few defence solicitors said that fixed payments impacted 
on their pleading advice, but far more felt that it had impacted on the pleading advice of 
other defence solicitors. Open questions in our phone survey and face-to-face interviews 
yielded more nuanced explanations about how the financial arrangement is one of several 
factors and in line with the concept of ‘ethical indeterminacy’. 
 The analysis found a small 1.5% net increase as a result of fixed fees in the share of 
cases which resolve on the day of trial (but before evidence has been led). This may be 
partly explained by the increase, as direct result of fixed payments, in the numbers of cases 
solicitors are now taking. In addition, it may also be partly explained by a widely-reported 
drop in the level of client contact – observed to be a consequence of fixed payments. 
 Perceived inconsistency in sentencing was said to lead to the practice of ‘sheriff-
shopping’ which some said undermined attempts to encourage earlier guilty pleas (such as 
through a more explicit expression of sentencing discounting).  
 Most of the depute fiscals we surveyed thought it had led to some decline in 
preparation by defence solicitors. Some defence solicitors felt it had made little difference; 
a majority felt it had led to a decline in effectiveness of the system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
193. This paper reports on an exploratory study into the ‘Impact of the Introduction of 
Fixed Payments into Summary Criminal Legal Aid’ commissioned by the Scottish 
Executive and carried out by a team of independent academic researchers from the 
University of Strathclyde.  Fixed payments for summary criminal legal aid were prescribed 
in the Criminal Legal Aid Fixed Payments (Scotland) Regulations 1999 as amended by the 
Criminal Legal Aid (Fixed Payments) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2002.  They 
were implemented from 1st April 1999.    
194. The research seeks to explore the impact of fixed payments using a range of 
quantitative and qualitative research instruments.  These include in-depth interviews with 
various officials, and practitioners in the legal aid and summary justice systems, postal and 
telephone surveys of solicitors supplying defence services under Summary Legal Aid and 
phone surveys of Depute Procurators Fiscal; the statistical analysis of data on legally-aided 
summary cases initiated between 1997/98 and 2001/02 supplied to the research team by the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB) and the statistical analysis of data supplied by the Crown 
Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) on the stage at which cases terminated / 
resolved. 
195. The general approach in this research has been one of ‘triangulation’: both 
quantitative and qualitative methods are used to uncover the likely impact of fixed 
payments on different parts of the system and on different actors in the system;  opinions of 
observers of and actors in the system are contrasted with statistical analyses of ‘outcomes’ 
of the behaviour of actors in the system; the reliability of the conclusions drawn using one 
research instrument is corroborated (or otherwise) by the conclusions drawn using another 
research instrument; conclusions based on inferences from the statistical analysis of one 
part of the system are checked for consistency with conclusion. 
196. This exploratory study points to a number of tentative conclusions on the impact of 
the introduction of fixed payments and suggests some areas for further research. 
 
Cost per case 
197. By setting the fixed payment for legal aid in summary cases below the average 
payment made in the years immediately prior to their introduction,  the average payment of 
Summary Legal Aid in such cases has fallen with the introduction of fixed payments.  Had 
there been no change in the number of legally-aided summary cases this would have led 
inevitably to a reduction in legal aid expenditure.  However, the data analysed in this study 
suggests that after the introduction of fixed payments the number of legally-aided cases 
may have risen. 
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Overall expenditure 
 
198. In the financial years 1999/2000, 2000/01 and 2001/02 the number of legally-aided 
summary cases rose faster than the volume of cases passing through the system (however, 
measured).  As a consequence, the ratio of legally-aided cases to cases passing through the 
system rose.  By 2001/02 total fees paid to solicitors for legally-aided summary cases was 
higher than it had been in 1997/98. 
199. This exploratory research suggests that the most probable explanation of this rise in 
the ratio of legally-aided cases to persons proceeded may be the apparent rise in the 
number of accused persons who fail to appear. This may in itself be a consequence of the 
impact of fixed payments.   
200. Although it has provided evidence on the impact of fixed payments, this 
exploratory research was not designed to predict what expenditure on Summary Legal Aid 
might have been had fixed payments not be introduced.  This could be an area for further 
research.  
201. The statistical analysis and interview evidence suggest that a further consequence of 
the introduction of fixed payments was that the number of intimations of Criminal Advice 
& Assistance rose.  Many of the defence solicitors interviewed observed that, as a 
consequence of the impact of fixed payments, there was now a tendency to claim for all 
work done under A&A. 
 
 
Income changes 
202. The statistical analysis of fee payments to solicitors’ firms suggests that, on 
average, they were not significantly different after the introduction of fixed payments from 
before their introduction for generalist and non-specialist firms.  However, on average, 
specialist firms suffered a reduction of income from summary legal aid in each of the first 
two years after the introduction of fixed payments. By 2001/02 the average income of 
specialist firms had returned to its pre-fixed payment level.  The number of legally-aided 
cases undertaken by this group of firms has risen. 
203. When the increased number of legally-aided summary cases undertaken, on 
average, by this group of firms is taken together with the increased number of intimations 
of Criminal Advice & Assistance the statistical analysis reveals that specialist firms had, on 
average, higher incomes from these activities combined in 2001/02 than in either of the two 
years preceding the introduction of fixed payments. 
204. In their responses to closed survey questions about their own practice and their 
observations of others and especially in response to more open interview questions, 
defence solicitors observed that fixed payments have led to an overall decline in the level 
of client contact. Some defence solicitors expressed reservations about this decline, while 
SLAB officials and other practitioners were more sanguine. It was suggested that this 
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decline in the level of client contact made it more difficult to advise the client to plead 
guilty at the first (‘pleading’) diet. There was some suggestion that this lower level of early 
client contact has led to an increase in the numbers of accused persons failing to appear. It 
is possible that this might be an important explanation for the rise in the ratio of legally-
aided persons to complaints initiated (discussed above). 
205. Fixed payments appear to have led to a significant drop in the use of precognitions. 
While many defence solicitors reported in face-to-face and phone interviews that they were 
now more selective about when precognitions were necessary, a few others appeared to 
suggest that, as a direct consequence of the impact of fixed payments, they did not now 
precognosce witnesses.  
206. It was widely reported that as a result of the sharp decline in the use of 
precognitions, there tended to be much greater reliance on prosecution summaries of the 
evidence. While some interviewees felt that this led to greater efficiency some defence 
solicitors, procurators fiscal and depute fiscals expressed concerns about the need to 
scrutinise evidence. 
207. It was widely observed that fixed payments had led to an overall change in case 
management, especially among specialist firms. In general, it was said, more cases were 
being dealt with by specialist firms and fixed payments meant with less time per case than 
under time-and-line. 
208. A persistent criticism of the Scottish criminal justice system is that guilty pleas are 
made too late in the process. While the ultimate decision about how to plead rests with the 
client, previous research (including that conducted recently in Scotland) shows that clients 
tend, on the whole, to be relatively passive and the advice of lawyers is crucial in shaping 
client expectations. In recent research in Scotland the method and structure of remuneration 
has been found to be one (among several) factors which affect the nature and timing of how 
cases plead. This report does not claim that dedicated and professional people, such as 
defence solicitors, abandon basic values for simple financial gain. Neither is it argued that 
commercial factors play no part at all. Rather it suggests (in line with previous research in 
Scotland) that modifications in behaviour will be greatest in instances of ‘ethical 
indeterminacy’: when there is a choice between two courses of action both of which have 
advantages and disadvantages, and where professionals are unsure about which is better.  
209. This research examined the conclusion of cases, by using COPFS data. Following 
the introduction of fixed fees, the largest effect has been the increase in the proportion of 
cases concluding at the intermediate diet stage  (up 8% percent after these were made 
mandatory and a further 3.5% after the introduction of fixed payments). Both of these 
changes were found to be statistically significant. The introduction of fixed payments has 
also produced a 1.5 % increase in the proportion of cases which concluded on the day of 
trial. The proportion of cases concluding at a trial fell by nearly 2%.  
210. The telephone survey showed that while most respondents had not reduced contact 
with their clients a majority observed that other defence agents had.  On the other hand 
respondents, their firms and the other defence agents they observed had reduced their use 
of precognitions.  The survey also revealed that although few respondents reported that 
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they had changed their own pleading practices as a result of the impact of fixed payments, 
a majority observed that other defence agents had. 
211. In face-to-face and telephone interviews with practitioners it was widely observed 
that the introduction of fixed fees provided an incentive for cases to plead guilty at the 
intermediate diet. 
212. It is difficult to determine whether pleading guilty at the intermediate diet is 
invariably advantageous to clients or not. Previous recent research in Scotland showed that 
if a client was willing for the case to go to trial there was around a 47% chance of no 
conviction at all. On the other hand, recent developments in case law on guilty plea 
discounting may provide some incentive in terms of the penalty. Some procurators fiscal; 
depute fiscals; and defence solicitors remarked that perceived inconsistency in sentencing 
between sheriffs had a tendency to undermine the effectiveness of such discounting 
practices.  These perceived inconsistencies were also said to be a factor in failures to 
appear. 
213. A range of views were expressed as to whether fixed payments had impacted on the 
overall effectiveness of defence work. Most of the depute fiscals we surveyed thought it 
had led to some decline in preparation by defence solicitors. Some defence solicitors felt it 
had made little difference; but a clear majority felt it had led to a decline in overall 
effectiveness; and a few appeared to suggest quite explicitly that their own work was less 
effective than it had been under time-and- line. Almost no practitioners or officials 
suggested that fixed payments had led to an increase in the effectiveness of defence work. 
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Appendix A  
Themes from Stakeholder Interviews 
 
A1. One of the earliest tasks of the study was to elicit the views and experiences of 
a range of ‘stakeholders’ in the Scottish summary criminal legal aid system. This helped to 
inform and focus subsequent investigation, as well as help to interpret results from other 
methods of investigation. In this context, the term ‘stakeholders’ refers to persons who are 
representatives of professional organizations or agencies and/or responsible for the making 
of summary criminal justice legal aid policy, or, attempts to influence the making of 
summary criminal justice legal aid policy. Thirteen face-to-face stakeholder interviews 
were conducted. These were based on a semi-structured interview schedule, conducted 
face-to-face.64 These face-to-face stakeholder interviews lasted between one and two-and-
a-half hours. The composition of these interviews with senior stakeholders was: 1 sheriff65; 
1 interviewee from a client organization; 4 senior prosecutors; 2 from SLAB; 5 defence 
agents/solicitors. Such interviews are therefore referred to by this report as, ‘face-to-face 
stakeholder interview’. 
 
 
Aims 
 
A2. The main aim of Fixed Payments was unanimously agreed to be about 
controlling expenditure. Although a few of the respondents suggested that a 
by-product might be to encourage the overall efficiency of the courts, none 
suggested that an aim was specifically to improve the quality of 
representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64  The topic guide which was sent to stakeholder interviewees is provided in Appendix A. An earlier 
draft of the topic guide was circulated to members of the Research Advisory Group for comment.  
65 It was originally intended to interview two sheriffs. In line with Scottish Executive protocols, two 
sheriffs were, after some delay, selected for the research team. One sheriff was interviewed. That 
interview, was relatively brief and the sheriff expressed the view that s/he did not feel well-placed to 
comment on the impact of fixed payments.  The other sheriff who had been selected was not contactable. 
This research has, nonetheless, benefited from the thoughts and advice of several sheriffs with whom the 
academic researchers have contact. Furthermore, a senior sheriff, who has long held a particular interest 
in summary criminal process and legal aid policy, provided the researchers with very detailed thoughts 
and suggestions on an earlier draft of this report. We are grateful to all the sheriffs who assisted the 
research.   
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Changes in Practice 
 
Comparison with practice under time and line  
 
A3. Several respondents suggested that there had been some justification for the 
Executive and SLAB view that under time and line there was some 
unreasonable exploitation of the payment regime. However, opinion was split 
as to whether this was widespread. Defence solicitors and procurators fiscal 
tended to argue that such firms could have been identified and dealt with 
rather than having to introduce fixed fees. 
 
 "It does seem to me that people were to an extent milking the system, and the 
others weren’t but there seemed to be ways… to an extent that they were 
given a blank cheque in respect of summary trials, whether that was accurate 
or not I’m not sure but there was certainly that perception and… So if the 
accused was appearing by themselves without representation the matter could 
be dealt with very quickly.  Sometimes as soon as they got a solicitor involved 
it was going off and off and off again, and at the end of the day it ends up in a 
plea and you wonder well what was all that about?" [stakeholder interview 13 
COPFS] 
 
 
Reduction in Contact with Clients 
 
A4. It was suggested that one impact of fixed payments has been a reduction in the 
number of meetings between solicitor and clients and a reduction in the use of 
letters to clients. Making the distinction between what is necessary to progress 
the case and client care one interviewee noted 
 
 "There might be things like prison visits, or you know, the fact that there may 
be more onus on the solicitor to try and manage the client relationship to 
ensure that they only do what is necessary to progress the case.  Whereas 
previously although obviously we always had the standard… necessary due to 
the economy… there would be things that they could certainly argue that they 
could legitimately do as part of the case but that would probably fall more into 
sort of client care, that sort of stuff which they might be able to take a more 
stringent approach to given that they are the one that will sort of lose out from 
it." [Interview 5 stake-holder SLAB]   
 
 
A5. Indeed, defence solicitors frequently mentioned that there may have been a 
general reduction in contact with clients to discuss evidence and the case 
against the accused person as well as to explain the procedure which the client 
faces. Some stakeholder interviewees expressed concern that the fixed 
payment structures effectively discouraged client support and care 
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 "But those are the sort of cases where you lose out.  Where the client needs 
extra care.  And you would think in a way that’s where you should be getting 
paid more because she’s more difficult to deal with, and custody of her children 
depended on the outcome of that case.  And she also had a father in the 
background who’s also a manic depressive who was causing all sorts of 
trouble with bail orders and things.  It was a nightmare of a case.  And, you 
know, that’s… you get quite a few like that". [Stakeholder Interview 3 Defence 
Solicitor]  
 
A6. Most stakeholder interviewees also observed that there was, all else being 
equal, a direct relationship between the level of client contact and delay. Less 
contact between solicitors and clients tended to make it more likely that 
clients would fail to appear 
 
 "A lot of them you know, the only time a lawyer sees them is actually on the 
day that there is some sort of court hearing.  Now that results in cases being 
put off because if they then kind of say to them something, well they’re not 
quite prepared at that stage or whatever." [Stakeholder Interview 12 COPFS] 
 
A7. SLAB officials tended to regard this “unforeseen” [sic] effect as a loophole 
which could be easily exploited 
 
 "We have been paying quite significant sums of money for failures to appear 
cases, now under the old system they just did that as part of the certificate. 
Under the current system because the failure to appear is not a function of the 
original incident – it’s a separate offence – they’re perfectly at liberty to apply 
for it and the failure to appear can carry a greater risk of imprisonment than the 
original offence and that’s one of the criteria set down in our legislation that 
must be taken into account for granting legal aid, so we’ve been paying out 
quite large amounts of money.  Shortly there’ll be regulations put in place to 
deem the failure to appear as being part of the original offence.  And we’ve 
wanted that for some time.  Because there’s virtually no work, they might write 
the odd letter saying you know the person was that the doctor or more 
commonly that they were in jail somewhere else and for us that’s just a waste 
of money." [Stakeholder Interview 4 SLAB official] 
 
 
Use of Precognitions 
 
A8. Almost all of the stake-holder interviewees believed that precognitions were 
used much less under Fixed Payments than under time and line. None felt 
fixed payments had  increased the overall use of precognitions. SLAB 
officials argued that Fixed Fees were encouraging defence solicitors to be 
more selective in their use of precognitions. Under time and line, it was 
argued, defence solicitors over-used precognitions. 
 
"Of course though we can’t tell…  I don’t think that’s terribly common and I 
think…  Well for many criminal cases I can see why there’s no need – Because 
there’s either evidence or there’s not, so they will need to take a judgment as 
to whether or not it’s necessary" [Stake-holder interview 4, SLAB] 
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Similarly, a stakeholder defence solicitor confirmed the strong impression that 
precognitions had been cut and that firms had to be more ‘selective’. 
 
 "There were some solicitors who used to precognose cases themselves but I 
suspect that the reason was twofold.  One, they got a very early idea of what 
the evidence is but secondly they get paid more for doing it.  And if they’ve 
nothing else to do, which I think would be sad, but if they’ve nothing else to do 
then I can understand why it would make sense for them to go and precognose 
it but I can’t imagine any solicitor precognosing in a fixed fee case.  It’s just not.  
Doesn’t make any economical sense.  What some of them are doing are 
sending out questionnaires to clients, and relying entirely on what comes back 
from that and not taking that any further."  (Stake-holder Interview 3, defence 
solicitor) 
 
A9. It was widely acknowledged by stake-holder lawyers that, as a result of fixed 
payments, some defence solicitors are choosing to be much more selective in 
the deployment of precognitions. However, what an appropriate ‘selection’ 
meant was felt to be more variable and indeterminate.  For example: 
 
 "For sure it’s definitely affected the way people behave.  Instead of making a 
profit, preparation costs for a private practitioner… if you’re a good private 
practitioner, you’re doing the job right, you’ll still do what preparation is 
necessary, but you will very much only do what is necessary.  So that you 
know, very good, proper firms will possibly be selective about who they 
precognose, that’s common sense. Those who are less ethically proper, will cut 
corners, because it’s costing them money, and they’ll cut a lot of precognition. 
It’s not for me to suggest who does what and where the line is. I think there are 
probably differences from solicitor to solicitor, firm to firm. And I think there are 
also differences, you’ll find, from city to city." (Stake-holder Interview 9, 
defence solicitor) 
 
A10. There was widespread impression among lawyer stake-holder interviewees 
that there may well be firms which are choosing, as a matter of routine, not to 
precognose or hardly at all.   Respondents noted nonetheless the duty of 
defence solicitors as professionals and the implications of the recent Anderson 
judgement; obligations to the Law Society; and audits by SLAB. Asked 
whether s/he was suggesting that some firms may not be hardly precognosing 
at all, one stakeholder defence solicitor said 
 
 "They may well do, I don’t know. It’s not something they would be likely 
broadcast, I would imagine, as I say we’ve got certain professional 
responsibilities in terms of the Law Society and the Criminal Legal Assistance 
Register, so you know people from SLAB come round to audit your firm.  There 
could be an argument - but - there could be an argument they are providing an 
inadequate professional service.  But again I’m not aware of anyone who has 
actually been prosecuted for such a matter at the Law Society…  But yes, you 
hear these things, whether it’s true or not I don’t know."  (Stake-holder 
interview 7 defence solicitor) 
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A11. Another stake-holder solicitor in private practice also commented that while 
the reduction in the use of precognitions has been dramatic, there is a high 
degree of variation 
 
 "I mean different firms have approached it differently but in relation to 
precognitions for example, that is now not an automatic process, which it might 
have been before.  There’s much more selectivity about what witnesses you 
would precognose.  There are stories of some firms that don’t precognose at all 
and simply rely on the fiscal’s office if they can get notes of evidence." [stake-
holder interview 2 defence solicitor] 
 
A12. It was felt that solicitors who choose to precognose witnesses as a matter of 
routine now find it difficult to do so and aware that there is, in effect, a 
disincentive to do so 
 
 "certainly the way that we now approach it, was that you got precognition 
agents to go out and speak to all the witnesses, now we’ll write to witnesses 
and ask for them to contact us, so I now end up spending half a day taking 
statements from witnesses, or take their phone numbers and never quite get 
round to phoning them back.  So undoubtedly it has affected how solicitors 
prepare cases – I can’t really say much more on that - because – if… the Legal 
Aid Board audit firms and your professional responsibility is in terms of the Law 
Society. So I would like to think that there aren’t any abuses taking place out 
there." [Stake-holder Interview 7 Defence Solicitor]   
 
Possible displacement of some of the costs of the decrease in the use precognitions 
to COPFS 
 
 
A13. It was suggested that defence lawyers are now relying more on summaries of 
evidence prepared by the procurator  fiscal’s office than they did under time 
and line.  
 
 "What has happened, I think, is that there is a much greater use of the Fiscal’s 
office when civilian witnesses don’t become co-operative.  Whereas under the 
old system, you would actually go out to make sure the witnesses were 
precognosed now, because that’s uneconomical, you can say… well, the 
witnesses have all been written to, they haven’t replied, can I please have an 
outline of their evidence?"  (Stake-holder Interview 6 defence solcitior) 
 
 
A14. Procurators fiscals reported that, as a result of fixed payments, it was more 
common for defence solicitors to rely on the prosecution witness statements 
and that this was tantamount to a form of ‘informal disclosure’ of prosecution 
evidence 
 
 "…from the prosecution perspective… what we sometimes see happening is 
defence agents go through an intermediate diet and say we are fully prepared 
and ready to proceed to trial.  But on the day of the trial they will come up, they 
will sidle up to you and say, “Gie us a look at your statements because I don’t 
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have any”, which basically means that they haven’t been in a position where 
they wanted to go to trial.  They haven’t been precognosing.  And they’ve been 
keeping the £500 or whatever it is, I can’t remember if it’s £500. They just keep 
it all without any of it going on precognitions.  I mean I can understand why 
they do it I mean they’ve got their own costs, their own overheads and if 
precognition’s not a necessary part of it as far as they can see...  In any 
particular case they may feel they can get by without precognitions then some 
of them will do that."  (Stake-holder Interview 14, COPFS) 
 
 
A15. Although informal and ad hoc disclosure may take place more often as a result 
of the introduction of fixed payments, stake-holder defence solicitors tended 
to argue strongly for early and full disclosure of evidence. There were two 
grounds for this. First, on the grounds of natural justice in an adversarial 
system it was argued to be matter of ‘equality of arms’ or a ‘level playing 
field’, so that prosecution evidence could be put to the test. 
 
 
 "There should be full disclosure by the Crown and the Legal Aid Board, I know, 
are very interested in that.  We are too, we are at a disadvantage …we’re given 
some statements occasionally and we’re told we’re not supposed to use 
them… and a lot of the time the fiscals office will give us a summary of the 
evidence, which isn’t terribly helpful.  And the summaries are very often 
prepared by police officers and we’ve come across examples recently of police 
officers lying about, for example in a case we had a couple of weeks ago, a 
police officer who said in his statement: “I looked at the video and I could see 
the accused stealing the item from the shop”.  We looked at the video and you 
couldn’t see that at all.  Now if we were advising on the basis of [the statement 
alone]…then we would be saying to the client – who might or might not 
remember and who was a regular shoplifter – well you need to plead guilty to 
that, the policeman says he saw you doing it on the tape.  So when you see 
things like that you know you’ve still got to keep a proper check and you can’t 
always just trust the police. [sic] " [Stake-holder Interview 2, Defence Solicitor] 
 
 
A16. Secondly, it was also argued that full and early disclosure would help to 
expedite the resolution of many cases by allowing defence solicitors to advise 
their clients to plead guilty at the first opportunity if it was clearly appropriate 
in light of prosecution evidence.  
 
 "where the client told you the position was basically a not guilty and without the 
evidence to say to them, well hang on a second that doesn’t make any sense.  
Sometimes clients who are under the influence of drink or drugs and have 
managed to come up with a memory of it that is totally at odds with what 
happened but I don’t have any statements so I can’t confront them with them.  
If they plead not guilty and I get the statements, then at the intermediate diet I 
can sit them down and say “see what you told me before, that’s just complete 
rubbish.  Here’s what the statements are” and at that point they may very well 
agree to change the plea…."  [Stake holder Interview 2 Defence Solicitor] 
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A17. That the lack of early and full disclosure legitimately inhibits a guilty plea in 
cases where there is likely to be a conviction was also recognised by 
prosecutors 
 
 "If your client wasn’t giving you any clear instructions to plead guilty and there 
was an element of doubt in his story, but you were almost there, you were 
almost… you knew that he’d been involved, you knew that in all probability he 
was guilty but his clear instructions were not to plead guilty and he was looking 
for further advice, sometimes you felt inhibited because you didn’t have the full 
story. You don’t have any of the papers that the Crown have got, you’re just 
hearing his side of it and it’s very very easy to say just, well, lets reserve your 
position we’ll put in a not guilty plea at the moment. And then we’ll investigate it 
and once it’s been investigated we’ll be in a position to advise you of what the 
evidence is against you and that’ll inform your instructions to us. But that’s far 
too easy because under time and line and under fixed fee legal aid there’s also 
the added bonus to the defence agent that he gets paid. Then if that is the 
situation it would almost be silly not to advise your clients to hold off if he’s not 
100 percent sure." [Interview 14 Stakeholder COPFS] 
 
  
A18. Other interviewees also noted that the introduction of Fixed Payments and the 
subsequent sharp reduction in the use of precognitions has displaced some 
costs to the Crown through for example the increased use of requests from the 
defence for summaries of the Crown’s evidence. Full disclosure, therefore, 
was felt to raise major resource implications for COPFS. 
 
 "from our point of view the resource implications are enormous. [sic]" [Stake-
holder interview 13, COPFS] 
 
A19. It was argued that a logical implication of full and early disclosure would be 
to reduce fixed fee payments to the defence  
 
 "Now at the end of the day it has to be considered, if the solicitors are being 
paid this flat fee which is supposed to incorporate money towards 
precognosing witnesses and they’re not doing it, and at the end of the day our 
resources are being spent on that – there’s a massive issue there about who at 
the end of the day is paying…  If we are going to be carrying out this work, and 
the courts at the end of the day say we have to disclose this, then it’s not just 
the physical paper and the photo copying, it’s a member of staff who’s taking 
over the additional duties to do this task.  So while we can always charge them 
a fee you know, what realistically is that fee to be?  I mean you’re talking about 
it could be a member of staff full time doing work of that nature.  So it’s a big 
issue. And I think at the end of the day fair enough they don’t want to do that 
work then take away part of their fee. I don’t think they should get as much if 
they’re not going to do it and I think if they’re going down that road….  If we 
have got to go down the road of disclosure then it’s going to have to be taken 
away from them. And they’re gonna have to say if they particularly want to see 
a witness, then justify it, why they need to precognose them?"  [Stake-holder 
interview 13, COPFS] 
 
 
 
A20. Similarly, another COPFS interviewee argued 
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 "if we are going to go down the route of full disclosure, or partial disclosure 
even from the crown to the defence then that should be taken away from the 
fixed fee, that should be factored out. But at the moment I think it’s been 
factored in but [precognitions are] not being done or it’s being done to varying 
degrees. [sic]"  [stake-holder interview 14 COPFS] 
 
A21. It was also suggested that the desire for disclosure would be financially 
counter-productive for defence agents 
 
 "And I said to defence agents here that they were shooting themselves in the 
foot.  I think that they were because they always could have obtained a 
summary from us but they went down the road of asking for the police 
statements And it could end up at the end of the day well who knows but if the 
fixed fee is cut then it’s stupid. They have lost a way of obtaining income for 
themselves."  [stake-holder interview 13, COPFS] 
 
 
A22. A stake-holder defence solicitor also foresaw the potential argument that the 
fixed payments could be reduced if there was full and early disclosure of 
prosecution evidence 
 
 "So as a foundation, then there really should be full disclosure by the Crown.  
But they’re not keen on it and they certainly aren’t keen on any of the potential 
penalties.  And I know what will happen – if there is full disclosure then the 
fixed fee will just be reduced… but that’s another fight for another day." [Stake-
holder Interview 7, Defence Solicitor] 
 
 
A23. However, there was another (non-financial) reason cited for scepticism about 
full and early disclosure. It was argued that it would compromise the 
respective adversarial roles of prosecution and defence. In particular there was 
concern that full and early disclosure would enable defence solicitors to 
challenge prosecution evidence more effectively  
 
 "Why I have always been reluctant to have witness statements being handed 
out, I have always been happy to give a summary as long as it wasn’t some…  
If the defence agent couldn’t get hold of a witness for whatever reason.  Let’s 
say they were being uncooperative or they were out of the country, they were 
on holiday, then obviously we would have to provide a summary – I never 
provided the police statement and the reason for that was that in certain hands 
the defence agent would use that statement against that witness and would 
start to say things like, well, you didn’t say that on that occasion, and you didn’t 
say this.  And I don’t think that that was the appropriate to use of it at the end 
of the day and I mean, I know sometimes that they do that and maybe they can 
provide justification for it but it’s a road that I don’t think we should be going 
down but we are, and if we are going down it we have to be 100 percent 
accurate - in that the police statements will be taken verbatim."  [Stake holder 
interview COPFS 13]  
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Influences Informing Clients’ Plea Decision-Making Processes 
 
A24. Pleading decisions and timings in the changes of plea were noted to rest 
ultimately with the client.  
 
 "But the fact is that it doesn’t entirely rest with the solicitor to time the plea, 
however hard the solicitor works, however diligent the preparation.  The 
ultimate decision rests with the client. And if the client has a reason for 
pleading at a particular stage, then that’s a matter for the client." [Stakeholder 
Interview 10, sheriff]   
 
A25. Defence solicitors repeatedly made the point that where a client insisted s/he 
was not guilty these instructions are accepted. However, the ability of many 
clients to fully comprehend the case against them was questioned. It was 
widely recognised that many clients are easily confused and relatively passive, 
displaying a weak grasp of the case against them. 
 
 "their physical and mental health is so poor sometimes that they are just not 
aware of why they are in prison and for what, what they’ve done etc.  The 
whole process just happens round about them, they’re not engaged in it you 
know I don’t think they understand [how to instruct lawyers] at all." [Stakeholder 
Interview 8, client support organisation] 
 
 
A26. Nonetheless, defence solicitors were aware of the financial structure within 
which they were operating. Where a client wished to plead not guilty the 
solicitor would follow this instruction, but less clear and definite instructions 
from the client might bring a range of other factors into play, including 
financial considerations.  
 
 "I can see that… if you know that you are going to get £500 for a case that 
could be resolved at the beginning but equally it might be resolved with no 
worse position for the client, which I think a lot of the research previously 
showed, then obviously there is an incentive there."  [Stakeholder Interview 2 
Defence Solicitor] 
 
A27. For some this meant that clients, by and large, tended to follow the advice of 
their defence agents 
 
 "I think they do what their solicitor tells them, and you can see quite clearly that 
some solicitors, if it suits them not to plead, they don’t, and you know it 
depends …the solicitor decides whether or not they’re pleading, the accused 
has very little involvement in it"  [Stake-holder Interview 13, COPFS] 
 
 
 "[Defence agents] want to get pleas sorted out sooner. They want pleas sorted 
out at intermediate diets... it’s in no-one’s interest for cases to be...  I’m not 
saying they were spun out before but it maybe focuses people’s attention – if 
something’s going to be a [guilty] plea, it should be a plea at the intermediate 
diet.  If it’s not going to be a plea then you continue onto trial, you go to trial.  
All of that is driven by the client as well, you can’t force someone into pleading 
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guilty at the intermediate diet just because that suits you financially. But you’re 
aware of how the plea is tendered.  So solicitors, from their point of view, they’d 
probably wish to have matters resolved sooner rather than later. But that’s 
always at the end of the day dictated by the client.  But certainly it’s in your 
mind, you know why bother pleading guilty at the trial – if it’s an adjusted plea 
you can adjust that plea at the intermediate diet – do it sooner, it’s only a few 
weeks, but still." [sic. Interview 7 Stake-holder Defence solicitor] 
 
 
A28. SLAB officials viewed the introduction of fixed payments as a way of 
encouraging earlier guilty pleas, especially at the Intermediate Diet 
 
 "Under time and line system there was no encouragement to plead early if 
there was indeed going to be a plea, so there was no reason to do it other than 
on the day of trial.  So one of the things we were hoping for by stacking the 
payments the way we did was to encourage earlier pleas at intermediate diet 
because we recognised there were actually savings – not for summary legal 
aid - but there were savings elsewhere in the system in terms of court time, 
inconvenience to witnesses etc."  [Stakeholder Interview 5 SLAB Official]    
 
A29. Indeed, pleading guilty at the intermediate diet was widely recognised by 
stakeholder practitioners as the most economic management of fixed 
payments.  
 
 "The most economic use of fixed fees is simply to plead everybody not guilty, 
apply for legal aid, get legal aid granted, then plead them all guilty in the 
intermediate diet."  [Interview 6 Stake-holder Defence solicitor] 
 
A30. SLAB officials expressed doubt, however, as to whether there had been much 
of a trend towards pleading guilty earlier (ie at the intermediate diet) 
 
 "I don’t know if we’ll have seen as big a movement towards intermediate diet 
as we might have expected.  And I don’t know why that is." [Stakeholder 
Interview 5 SLAB Official]   
 
 "You know they’re not doing any more work for their client and that’s why 
originally it was thought it was going to encourage pleas at the intermediate 
diet…  It doesn’t do that, there’s been precious little change and if you look at 
the figures you’ll see that.  The tripartite group between us, the law society and 
the Executive… what it shows is that… after about the first year or eighteen 
months because it takes solicitors about a year or eighteen months to work out 
how to manage a system." [Stakeholder Interview 4 SLAB Official]   
 
 
A31. However, while there was also a feeling among SLAB officials that the fee 
structure was intended to encourage earlier guilty pleas in cases where an 
accused may have pled guilty either shortly before or on the day of trial or 
after evidence had been led, there was also perceived to be a decrease in guilty 
plea rates at the pleading diet. 
 
 "The other oddity of the system was that, and you’re probably aware a bit more 
generally, there’s, because you’ve got to get, you’ve got to plead not guilty 
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initially to get into the fixed payment.  It means that the intermediate diet, as 
well as focusing back from the trial you are also looking forward from the 
pleading diet, and so that’s really a flaw in the system that encourages you to 
get at least as far as the intermediate diet, rather than encouraging you to 
actually take a frank look at the case at the outset." [Stakeholder Interview 5 
SLAB Official]    
   
A32. On the other hand it was widely recognised by court practitioners and SLAB 
officials alike that defence solicitors are often not in a position to advise 
clients as to how to plead until after the pleading diet. It was accepted that it is 
very often unrealistic to expect defence agents to be in a position to offer a 
plea of guilty at the pleading diet.  
 
 "But yeah, we recognise that there’s a lack of information at the outset and 
sometimes there’s a lack of incentive to plead early, so that’s why we’re looking 
at these changes but they’re reliant on other changes being made to the 
system." [Stakeholder Interview 5 SLAB Official]  
 
A33. Similarly, stakeholder defence solicitors made the point that it would be 
inappropriate for them to advise a guilty plea at the pleading diet without 
having looked at the evidence  
 
 "without the evidence to say to them, well hang on a second that doesn’t make 
any sense.  Sometimes clients who are under the influence of drink or drugs 
and have managed to come up with a memory of it that is totally at odds with 
what happened but I don’t have any statements so I can’t confront them with 
them.  If they plead not guilty and I get the statements, then at the intermediate 
diet I can sit them down and say “see what you told me before, that’s just 
complete rubbish.  Here’s what the statements are” and at that point they may 
very well agree to change the plea."  [Stakeholder Interview 2 Defence 
Solicitor] 
 
 
A34. The reduction in client contact was regarded as one of the reasons why there 
appeared to be a reduction in guilty pleas at the pleading diet  
 
 "I think this business of them not having contact with their clients is a difficulty 
because they’re not in a position to say, I mean obviously it’s an instruction 
from their client.  So a lot of them say, not guilty." [Stakeholder Interview 12 
COPFS] 
 
 
A35. On the other hand, prosecutors observed a major shift in the numbers of cases 
pleading guilty earlier 
 
 "There’s no incentive for [defence solicitors] to proceed to trial I don’t think 
they’re making enough money to go ahead to trial.  I don’t think it’s financially 
worth it for them and I don’t think it is unless the trial goes on for a particular 
length of time...  so there probably is more pleas on the day coming from 
people who otherwise might have spun something out for several days at a 
trial."  [sic. Interview 13 Stake-holder COPFS] 
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A36. The same COPFS stake-holder felt that this could be directly attributed to the 
impact of fixed fees 
 
 "You feel that whereas before things went on for ever with people arguing the 
toss, there’s a lot more cases been resolved earlier and people seem anxious 
to get things out of the way.  So I think that’s where the motivation lies at the 
end of the day rather than thinking I’m going to put all my effort into this case.  
How can you blame them though for £500 when they’re getting that regardless 
of what they do? I mean why should they?"  [Interview 13 Stake-holder 
COPFS] 
 
 
Perceptions of the Influence of Expected Sentencing Decisions on Plea Decision-
Making Processes 
 
 
A37. Individual shrieval reputations were regarded as central in plea decision 
making, especially the timing of guilty pleas. It was argued that these 
perceptions tended to encourage delay.  
 
 "I know there are instances where they [accused persons] wouldn’t plead 
guilty, or wouldn’t be encouraged to plead guilty say at the intermediate diet, 
because, I don’t know, their lawyers might have some knowledge about who 
the Sheriff is going to be on the Bench at a particular time. Some of our clients 
when they find out who the Sheriff is, they don’t turn up." [Stakeholder 
Interview 8 Client Support] 
 
A38. A particularly important determinant of type and timing of plea was felt to be 
the likely sentence. Perceived inconsistency in sentencing practices between 
individual sheriffs was felt to encourage ‘sheriff shopping’ among defence 
lawyers.  
 
 "So the good lawyers will make sure that the client appears before a 
compassionate Sheriff, rather than a rude, grumpy, heavy sentencing sheriff.  
Sheriff shopping. But it does go on in every court where there’s more than one 
sheriff."  [sic. Stakholder Interview 11, COPFS]  
 
 
A39. Moreover, a number of stakeholders (especially those from the COPFS) 
believed that real or perceived inter-shrieval disparity in sentencing practice 
(especially in the application of Du Plooy) undermined the attempt to 
encourage earlier guilty pleas. 
 
 "consistent with the legislation in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
that says, “Sheriffs may” and I think that the Du Plooy case has maybe just 
clarified the legislation but as I say I’m not 100% sure of that.  But again this is 
something that McInnes has covered in his report, and basically we’re just 
talking about beefing up the legislation around intermediate diets to try and 
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make them more effective and I think that would be a good idea because at the 
moment there’s no doubt that some Sheriffs just see it as a tedious waste of 
time.  You go in with far too many cases to start with for there to be any sort of 
appropriate analysis of them and basically all you say is “ well we’ve got five 
out of the seven citations back” the defence agents say “we’re tendering a plea 
of not guilty and are ready to proceed to trial” and it gets knocked on.  So the 
Sheriffs don’t take any interest in it, it’s just “right fine” on it goes and then the 
next time it calls we’ve still only got five out of the seven, we’re missing two 
witnesses, the defence aren’t in a position to go to trial and so it’s not achieved 
anything.  But elsewhere I know some Sheriffs have been proactive and are 
saying “I am entitled to consider giving you a discount if you plead at this diet, 
and as you have done I’ll give you x” and it makes the accused aware that he 
has been given a discount and when defence agents here that as well they’re 
more inclined because they want to keep their client so that the next time he 
does something wrong he comes back to them again." [Stakeholder Interview 
14 COPFS] 
 
 
The role of Defence Solicitors & Perceptions about the Risk of Miscarriages of 
Justice 
 
A40. Some stakeholder COPFS interviewees said that they regarded effective 
defence as a necessary brake and check on prosecution practices. This was 
part of the adversarial system and was the legitimate and indeed necessary 
role of the defence in our system. 
 
 "I mean sometimes obviously a trial will be justified, I mean there are some 
cases where when we mark them up and we consider there to be sufficiency of 
evidence and it’s in the public interest to mark them up for prosecution and 
we’ll accept that it’s a fairly thin case and perhaps in those cases it should be 
taken to trial" [Interview 14 Stakeholder COPFS] 
 
  
Risk of Miscarriages 
 
 
A41. Senior SLAB officials tended to suggest that there was no evidence of 
miscarriages of justice as a result of fixed payment. It was argued that there 
appeared to be no great increase in appeals against conviction as a result of 
fixed payments and that clients had not been complaining that their cases had 
been inadequately investigated 
 
 "I have never heard one claim, never once have I seen any claim that someone 
didn’t get their case handled properly by their solicitor, never. Which is always 
the thing I thought could that happen? But you know people change their 
solicitor and whatever but it’s something I’ve never, ever seen any evidence of. 
So it seems to work."  [sic] [Stake-holder Interview 4 SLAB] 
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 "if there were people who were having miscarriages of justice as a result of 
their representation being provided with fixed payment I’m quite sure that 
would have become very apparent by now and it really hasn’t." [Interview 5 
stake-holder SLAB] 
 
A42. However, lawyer stake-holder interviews (both prosecution and defence) were 
less sanguine. Most stake-holder lawyer respondents hinted or suggested that 
there was a greater risk of miscarriages of justice. One reason was the drop in 
precognitions and greater reliance on prosecution evidence.  However, 
different stakeholder lawyers expressed these concerns in different ways. 
Some suggested that there may not be an increase in miscarriages of justice as 
a direct consequence of the introduction of fixed fees yet but that the concern 
was for the future 
 
 "A lot of people were saying, well this is it there’s going to be a lot more 
miscarriages of justice and I don’t think on it’s own the introduction of fixed fees 
has yet been responsible for that happening. I think in particular when the rules 
were changed so that you could make an application in exceptional cases to 
go onto time and line, there’s not really any argument we can put forward 
anymore that we’re not going to be able to properly prepare a case because of 
the legal aid rules, but the concern is for the future. I mean if say it’s still £500 
per trial in 10 years time, then I think it is more likely to cause miscarriages and 
the warnings we were sounding back then will sound a bit more prophetic. But 
as things stand, I think a lot of the worst case examples people gave have not 
happened [sic]." [Stake-holder Interview 2 Defence Solicitor] 
 
A43. Another stake-holder defence solicitor suggested that preparation has been 
compromised but this did not necessarily have serious consequences as 
demonstrated by the lack of any cases on the quality of representation or any 
apparent increase in appeals against conviction. 
 
 "I’m not aware of any cases having arisen as a result of, say, a lack of 
preparation or something that couldn’t be covered.  Equally in virtually every 
trial that I’ve done where although I have a full note of evidence or sometimes 
the police statements – there’s always something that’s come up, that I think 
well that would’ve been covered under the old system.  There’s always 
something that’s come up during the trial that under the old way of preparing 
might have been covered, but now although we’ve got the basics of the 
information, you know, maybe a lack of the finer detail, it becomes an issue at 
the trial. But that’s difficult - I don’t think there’s been an increase in appeals 
and such like because of it."  [Stake-holder Interview 7 Defence Solicitor]   
 
A44. These accounts are broadly consistent with those given in SLAB interviews: 
there has been no major rise in appeals or complaints about the quality of 
representation – at least not yet. It is a difficult balance for stake-holder 
defence solicitors to strike: on the one hand they wish to argue for an increase 
in the fee so that they can maintain the quality of service for clients and yet on 
the other hand it would be embarrassing (an apparent admission of 
unprofessionalism) to say that as a result of fixed fees preparation and the 
precognitions of witnesses is much less thorough or even inadequate 
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 "certainly the way that we now approach it, was that you got precognition 
agents to go out and speak to all the witnesses, now we’ll write to witnesses 
and ask for them to contact us, so I now end up spending half a day taking 
statements from witnesses, or take their phone numbers and never quite get 
round to phoning them back.  So undoubtedly it has affected how solicitors 
prepare cases – I can’t really say much more on that - because – if… the Legal 
Aid Board audit firms and your professional responsibility is in terms of the Law 
Society. So I would like to think that there aren’t any abuses taking place out 
there."  [Stake-holder Interview 7 defence solicitor] 
 
A45. Other defence solicitors were less cautious 
 
 "The likelihood is that because corners are being cut, because the defence do 
not have the funding available to carry out full and thorough investigation, there 
may be a greater number of cases in which points are missed which result in 
advice being given to plead guilty where perhaps the better advice might have 
been to proceed to trial or that perhaps witnesses are not brought to trial and 
there is likely to be a number of people convicted who would not otherwise 
have been convicted."  [Interview 6 Defence solicitor] 
 
A46. Another stake-holder defence solicitor suggested that it was inevitable that 
fixed fees would lead to some increase in the likelihood of miscarriages of 
justice 
 
 "From the point of view of conducting cases I think it can be restrictive because 
you tend to know that with a fixed fee you’re not going to get sanctioned for 
some of the things which you would normally want to get sanctioned for, and 
you may tend to try and deal with the case in some other way.  I hope I don’t 
but I’m aware that solicitors, again talking generally, will take a view on whether 
or not a step which may or may not be taken should be taken because of the 
restriction of the fixed fee, so whether or not it results in miscarriages of justice 
I don’t know.  I suppose there may be occasions where if somebody restricts 
the work they’re doing because of the amount of money that may be paid for it, 
and something is missed…  In fact I’m sure it will happen." [Stake-holder 
Interview 3 Defence Solicitor] 
 
A47. The extent of this increased risk of miscarriages, by its nature, was perceived 
by all stake-holder lawyers to be very difficult to quantify  
 
 "Difficult to know.  You might never know because it’s what you’ve not done…  
I mean there are cases where the police will come to you and say the witness 
Joe Smith said that he was looking out the window and he saw the accused 
commit the crime.  And if you take that on face value you’ll maybe say to Joe 
Smith, look people saw you, people saw you.  If you then go and precognose 
the person who actually did the seeing, they might say, I don’t know what 
they’re talking about, I never gave a statement to the police.  So without going 
that extra step, you don’t know whether or not you’re going to do your client 
injustice or not.  So I suspect yes, there will have been miscarriages of justice 
in that matters will not have been discovered, and will never be discovered 
which otherwise would have benefited the client.  But I think it’s impossible to 
calculate."  [Stake-holder Interview 3, Defence Solicitor] 
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A48. The widely-reported drop in the use of precognitions by the defence was 
highlighted as a key source of a possible increased risk of miscarriages of 
justice 
 
 "I would say potentially if you’re not precognosing the witnesses and if you’re 
relying to a greater extent on the good officers of the Crown to tell you what the 
witnesses are saying, that creates a risk that wasn’t there under the old system 
where you could actually interview the witnesses.  I mean, there are examples 
that everybody has of witness statements which turn out to be embellished and 
trials proceeding where it turns out that what’s in the so-called police statement 
is rather more than the witness actually told the police.  Now, if the witness 
doesn’t come forward to be interviewed and you go to the Fiscal and say, what 
did the witness say?  … you’re then flying the kite somewhat when you go to 
trial.  So there is a risk in that.  Because you’re not… pushing them to 
precognose witnesses, there is a risk that there could be more miscarriages of 
justice.  There’s no doubt about that!" [Interview 6 Defence Solicitor] 
 
 
Effects on Case Management Styles 
 
A49. The fixed payments structure was widely felt to reward those lawyers who 
were willing to handle a very high volume of cases.  
 
“The firms that run like a factory…have been able to make quite substantial 
amounts of money.” [Stakeholder Interview 4 SLAB]  
 
 "For sure it’s definitely affected the way people behave.  Instead of making a 
profit, preparation costs for a private practitioner… if you’re a good private 
practitioner, you’re doing the job right, you’ll still do what preparation is 
necessary, but you will very much only do what is necessary.  So that you 
know, very good, proper firms will possibly be selective about who they 
precognose that’s common sense. Those who are less ethically proper, will cut 
corners, because it’s costing them money, and they’ll cut a lot of precognition." 
[Stakeholder Interview 9 Defence Solicitor] 
 
A50. Developing a good reputation and among accused person was particularly 
important  
 
 "I think that’s probably quite a lot of law firms that actually quite like fixed fees. 
There will be a lot of defence agents who have loads and loads of clients, who 
have got an area basically tied up and have got a good reputation amongst the 
accused and the accused’s associates so they all go to that lawyer. It doesn’t 
necessarily mean that he is the best lawyer, it means that he gets on best with 
the accused. And if he’s getting the numbers through the door and he’s not in 
every case required to do a lot of work, then that lawyer is going to like fixed 
fees. But there’s other lawyers who are good lawyers, very thorough lawyers 
who won’t be taking on as much business because they know they can’t do as 
thorough a job, or alternatively are not as popular with the accused people for 
whatever reason. So they won’t have that level of business and they’ll be the 
ones that struggle.  So it’ll just depend on who you ask as to whether or not 
fixed fees are seen as a good thing or a bad thing. Because for sure they are 
  105
working for some firms out there and there’ll be no drop and if anything there 
might be an increase."  [Interview 14 Stake holder COPFS] 
 
 
Non Fixed Payment Incentives: Professional, legal and personal obligations 
 
 
A51. It was widely felt that while the structure of the fixed payments system may 
have in effect dis-incentivised the careful investigation and preparation of 
defence, other countervailing professional, legal and moral obligations came 
into play. Of legal-professional obligations, the concern was about an 
Anderson-type challenge by a client against defective representation.  
 
"There is a school of thought -  those who grew up in post Anderson v HMA era 
- feel that, they must be seen to have dotted every i and crossed every t.  If you 
don’t do that, then it’s a potential appeal on the grounds of inadequate 
preparation or services."  [Interview 6 Defence Solicitor]  
 
"I do feel sorry for solicitors, because they’re hangbound by it, is the Anderson 
Case, which you’ll know all about.  So you know, they say I better get that 
missing statement for this client, because if I haven’t covered every angle 
they’ll go to another lawyer and before you know it there’s an Anderson appeal.  
So you’ve got to cover your own back." [Stakeholder Interview 11 COPFS] 
 
A52. However, there was also a feeling that while Anderson’s implications were 
much discussed the routine practical effect in most summary cases may have 
been more limited 
 
"the Anderson appeals that go on in relation to solemn matters, you know 
people have been getting sentenced to years and years in prison.  I’m not 
aware of any cases having arisen as a result of say a lack of preparation or 
something that couldn’t be covered."  [Stakeholder Interview 7 Defence 
Solicitor]  
 
 
Transfer Rules  
A53. Some defence solicitors also expressed anger at lack of transparency accusing 
SLAB of “hiding behind the data Protection Act” and suggested that the case 
transfer payments may encourage the use of ‘inducements to clients to tempt 
them away from a defence solicitor and who has conducted most of the 
necessary work 
"You can have a perfectly amicable meeting with a client one day.  Two days 
later, you receive notification of them instructing somebody else.  You never 
find out why that’s the case.  You’ve no idea whether the client has been 
approached.  You’ve no idea whether the client has been offered an 
inducement.  You’ve no idea whether a client is unhappy with the advice that 
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they’ve been given.  It may well be that the client was unhappy but if you don’t 
know that and the client doesn’t tell you, how can... and there is… there is 
certainly an advantage to some firms in seeking to take clients of other firms 
and have legal aid transferred because that way you can make a lot of money, 
well, not a lot of money, but you can make more money for doing nothing and I 
cannot see…” 
 
"It’s frankly ludicrous and it’s a disgrace.  It’s not so much that what happens 
part the way through a case.  You can complete a case.  You can be paid for a 
case and if someone else comes along and represents the client at the 
deferred sentence six months later, they are entitled to receive £275 for doing 
£50 worth of work and you are asked to repay the Legal Aid Board £255 for 
work which you did in good faith and for which they paid you and that is an 
absolute scandal.  I can see if a case is transferred between the pleading diet 
and the intermediate diet why the fee should be split but beyond that, it is 
frankly ludicrous."  [Interview 6 Defence Solicitor] 
 
Increased use of A&A? 
 
A54. There was some suggestion that there were displacement effects into Advice 
and Assistance  
 
"Obviously they sat down and said well is there any work that we can push into 
A&A.  And it’s quite clear that in the early days my staff had a position where 
they would say well you’re not getting it, they would try to put precognitions in 
and we’d say no that’s part of your core fee and things like that.  But that’s 
settled down and there’s been some growth in criminal A&A but not as much 
as it might have been."  [Interview 4 stakeholder SLAB] 
 
 
Incentives to take cases beyond 30 minutes of Trial 
 
A55. One point mentioned by a small number of interviewees related to perceived 
incentives to take cases beyond the first 30 minutes of trial which were said to 
relate to failures to appear 
 
"That’s where you know a case starts in may go through the first day and then 
a witness or something doesn’t appear, to there’s no evidence heard although 
you’ve turned up and then you go on to the next day when the witness is found 
and the case goes ahead.  Each of these are all regarded as part of the trial 
and the way the payment is structured, where you get you know you start off 
the first 30 minutes the core payment and then you get 100 and then up to 
£400.  They’re up to £400 because it’s been spread and that £400 was set as a 
proxy for very complex case." [Interview 4 SLAB stakeholder] 
"There are obviously other ways in which the thing can be exploited. Adding 
additional Fixed Fees to one case by getting separate certificates for failure to 
appear complaints for example is an obvious one that people are well aware 
of."  [Interview 9 Stake-holder solicitor] 
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Part-heard trials 
 
"in any system, people quickly work out the best way to play that system. Take 
a case for example, that looks as if it may go on some time. It’s very much to 
the solicitor’s advantage to get a part-heard trial. Because in addition to £500 
fixed fee, they’ll get paid £200 for coming back again. If a trial is not completed, 
the trick, if I can put it that way, is not to get it adjourned straight to the second 
trial day, but to get a notional trial diet fixed. There’s no so such thing in the 
legislation as a notional trial diet, there’s just a trial diet even though all the 
courts fix what they call notional trial diets. Therefore you come back, you 
stand up for two minutes, just to confirm that everything looks okay for the trial, 
you get paid £200. If everything’s not okay, you fix another notional trial diet 
and come back for five minutes and get paid £400 the next time, and so forth. 
And it’s £400 every time after that. So that the £500 fixed fee can end up being 
well into significant four figure sums for very little work." [Interview 9 Stake-
holder solicitor] 
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Topic Guide for Semi-Structured Face-to-Face Interviews with Stakeholders 
 
“Aims of the Topic Guide 
 
This draft topic guide is intended as a general guide for interviewers. ‘Stake-holders’ are 
understood as personnel with a relatively broad (or ‘macro’) view of the criminal justice and 
legal aid system as a whole. They are normally people in reasonably senior positions within 
their organisation. Their thoughts are intended to help to inform and focus hypotheses for 
subsequent testing and exploration in this and subsequent research studies.  
 
Interviews with stake-holders are deliberately intended to be discursive rather than based on 
‘closed’ questions.  Therefore, the topics listed here in note form are a broad guide to the 
interviewer rather than to be precisely followed or treated as an exhaustive list. 
 
Interviews are intended to last no more than one hour. 
 
 
1. Perceived aims of the intro of FF and why 
2. Any perceived changes in aims since then 
3. How believed it is supposed to work (eg swings and roundabouts). Level of fees and 
balance of payment in terms of cases which settle early and those which go to trial (eg 
more/less front-loading) 
4. Perceptions of success – how would one measure whether successful? Unforeseen 
consequences? 
5. Strengths and weakness of scheme? Eg: has it made administrative dealings between 
SLAB and defence firms easier  
6. Perception of initial reactions to FF?  
7. Changes in attitude over time? If so how? 
8. How are people responding to FF? changes in type of work; changes in use of legal aid 
scheme (eg: A&A; precognitions; appeals; summary/solemn mix) 
9. How successful has it been? Will it be? 
10. Differential geographical impact? 
11. Differential impacts on firm types (mix of work/size etc) 
12. How can firms make the most efficient economic use of the fixed fees structure? 
13. What other questions should we ask? What should we explore?” 
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Appendix B 
Analysis of SLAB Data 
Aggregate picture of Summary Criminal Legal Aid over Time 
B.1 This study presents the research team’s analysis of the data supplied by the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB).  It begins with a brief introduction on the 
nature of this data and the way in which it differs from the more familiar data 
published in the SLAB Annual Report.  It then moves on to a presentation of 
some broad trends revealed from an examination of this data for Scotland as a 
whole. 
 Summary Legal Aid Expenditure 
B.2 In order to put the data analysed in this report into context this sub-section 
presents descriptive data on Summary Legal Aid for a number of years prior to 
the introduction of fixed payments.  Chart 1 presents data on expenditure on 
Summary Legal Aid from 1994/95 to 2003/04 based on data published in SLAB 
Annual Reports and supplied to the researchers by SLAB.   
B.3 As this Chart shows expenditure on summary legal aid reached a peak of over 
£53m in 1996/97.  Thereafter it declined until 2000/01 since when it has risen.  
The Chart also illustrates that most of the growth during this period was for 
Sheriff Court Summary cases.  However, it should be noted that prior to 
2001/02 SLAB aggregated the Stipendiary Magistrate Court expenditure with 
District Court expenditure, but after that year  it has been aggregated with 
Sheriff Summary Court expenditure.  Thus, Chart 1 slightly exaggerates the 
growth in Sheriff Summary Court expenditure from that year66.   
B.4 Chart 2 plots the expenditure data together with the number of cases for each 
year.  This shows that both the decline in expenditure before the introduction of 
fixed payments and its rise shortly thereafter is related to the number of legally 
aided cases.  Chart 3 reveals that over both periods the average cost per case 
was also declining. 
B.5 As shown in Chart 3 average expenditure per case rose for Sheriff Summary 
cases until 1997/98 when it reached over £891.  It has declined since then but 
most rapidly with the introduction of fixed payments in 1999/2000.  For District 
Court cases the average payment reached a peak of almost £672 in 1997/98.  A 
more detailed discussion of the increase in Criminal Legal Aid Expenditure in 
the 1980s and 1990s is given in Stephen (1998). 
 
                                                 
66  This problem does not arise with the detailed statistical analysis discussed later in this report. 
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Chart 1 
 
Chart 2 
Summary Legal Aid Expenditure and Number of Cases
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Chart 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of SLAB-provided Data  
B.6 SLAB provided the university researchers with data files on all Summary Legal 
Aid cases for which applications were received from September 1996 until 
February 2003.  The data analysed in this Report is that covering the financial 
years 1997/98 to 2001/02 and a total of 305,992 cases.  This allows the analysis 
of two years prior to the introduction of Fixed Payments and three years when 
Fixed Payments were applied.  By defining the data in terms of the date the 
application was received (rather than the date of payment), means that each 
financial year covered in the analysis will be one in which either fixed 
payments applied or did not apply.   
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B.7 The information provided on each case covers: legal aid reference number, date 
application received, calendar year in which application was received, financial 
year in which application was received, month and year in which application 
was received, court type, court location, main charge crime/offence category, 
Annual Report crime/offence category, firm code, branch code, solicitor code, 
date first payment made, total solicitors fees excluding VAT, total outlays 
excluding VAT, total payments to counsel excluding VAT, total payments to 
solicitor advocate excluding VAT, total paid excluding VAT, account type. The 
keys to the solicitor and firms codes were not requested by nor provided to the 
university research team (thus ensuring anonymity of both solicitors and firms).   
Differences from SLAB’s Annual Reports 
B.8 It should be noted that the results reported here in terms of number of cases and 
payments made will differ from those reported in SLAB’s Annual Reports.  
SLAB’s Annual Report figures on payments made allocates such payments and 
the case statistics relating to payments to the financial year in which the 
payments are made.  However, the data analysed in this report relate 
expenditures to the financial year in which the application was made.  This is 
more appropriate to the purpose of this research project since it will relate the 
data to the payment regime applying at the time the decision to apply for legal 
aid was made.  The decision to apply will thus reflect the willingness of the 
solicitor to accept the case under the payments regime applying at the time of 
application. 
B.9 It should be noted that an important limitation of the SLAB data we received is 
that there is no measure of the actual work done by the solicitor for either the 
years before or after the introduction of fixed payments.  This, of course, means 
that any impact of the change in the payment regime on the work actually done 
by solicitors on legally-aided cases cannot be analysed quantitatively.  
Similarly, no outcome data (e.g. final plea, stage of conclusion etc) is provided 
by SLAB data, however, we are able to make use of COPFS data. 
 
Statistical Method 
B.10 The SLAB data include an indicator for the solicitor through whom the 
application for legal aid was made, an indicator for the solicitors firm concerned 
and the court in which the case was due to be heard.  This permits three ways 
for the individual case data to be aggregated for analysis (in addition to the 
global total for Scotland):  by the solicitor, by the firm, and by the court.  Such 
alternative aggregations do not merely represent ways of describing the data, 
they allow for a more sophisticated analysis.  Carrying out the statistical 
analysis at the level of the solicitor (firm, court) rather than in aggregate has the 
advantage of being quite a strong test of whether there has been a change over 
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time.  Any effect has to be statistically significant over very large numbers of 
solicitors (firms, courts) rather than over a single aggregate measure, which can 
mask particular patterns within that single aggregate measure. 
B.11 Furthermore, the data provided to the researchers by SLAB constitute a panel 
with pooled cross-section and time-series characteristics, and as such are 
amenable to a fixed-effects regression analysis. This separates the 
characteristics of cases attributable to the solicitor, or firm or court from those 
attributable to the year in which it was granted legal aid.  This allows the 
separation of patterns of behaviour attributable to the solicitor involved, the firm 
involved and the court in which cases were heard from the year in which the 
legal aid application was made.  These patterns are referred to below as: 
solicitor fixed effects, firm fixed effects, court fixed effects and time effects 
respectively.  Consequently, a more accurate estimate of the time effects is 
made possible.  These time effects then represent the pattern across the system 
in general after account has been taken of the effects of specific solicitors 
(firms, courts). 
B.12 Without estimating the solicitor (firm, court) fixed effects the behaviour over 
time of solicitors (firms, courts) handling large numbers of legally aided cases 
would dominate that of those handling small numbers of cases which may be 
very different.  This would not be a problem if we simply wanted to measure 
aggregate expenditure on Summary Legal Aid over time but that is not the 
purpose of this research.  What we focus on here is testing whether there have 
been behavioural changes over time.  The time dimension of the fixed effects 
analysis estimates how, on average, solicitors (firms, courts) are affected over 
time.    In this way, we can test whether there is a statistically significant change 
over time at the level of individual solicitors, firms and courts which may differ 
from that observed in the aggregated data.  
B.13 The statistical analyses reported below and in Appendix C also have the 
characteristics of an Event Study.  This is an approach widely used in finance 
and in policy analysis.  Statistical methods are used to identify whether an 
‘event’ changed the relationship between observed variables.   
B.14 In this study the ‘event’ is the introduction of the fixed payment regime.  
Basically we test whether, on average, the income received by solicitors and 
firms from Summary Legal Aid changes over time as a consequence of the 
introduction of Fixed Payments.  We, also, test whether, on average, the number 
of Summary Legal Aid cases undertaken by a solicitor or firm changes as a 
consequence of the introduction of Fixed Payment.  Both of these are done by 
examining the pattern of the variable of interest over time and statistically 
testing whether significant changes in the pattern coincide with identifiable 
‘policy events’.   
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B.15 Account must be taken of other ‘policy events’ over the relevant period.  Such 
events, in the present context, could include: the commencement of any 
legislation; changes in COPFS policy advice to prosecutors which is likely to 
affect the treatment of cases; changes in criminal procedure which are likely to 
effect the number of cases in the summary justice system which give rise to 
legal aid payments or any factor likely to affect the willingness of solicitors to 
undertake defence work on summary cases.  Information was provided by 
COPFS staff, SLAB and the Justice Department on such potential events.   
B.16 As far as the years covered in the analysis of the detailed data supplied by 
SLAB are concerned there are four ‘events’ other than the introduction of fixed 
payments which occur in the relevant time period: the extension of the use of 
fiscal fines in July 1998; a change in COPFS policy with respect to the 
prosecution of cases involving a racial motivation or aggravation from April 
1999; the introduction by SLAB of the code of practice and registration for 
criminal defence agents from October 1998; the implementation of human rights 
legislation in 1999. 
B.17 The extension of the use of fiscal fines (as pointed out at paragraph 21, above) 
can only have affected cases in the District Courts.  The vast majority of legally 
aided cases in Summary Courts are in the Sheriff Courts which are thus 
unaffected by the extension of the use of fiscal fines.  Below when we examine 
the increase in the ratio of legally aided cases to complaints initiated we will 
distinguish between the situations in Sheriff Summary and District (including 
Stipendiary magistrate) Courts.  This phenomenon cannot explain, in any case, 
the rise in the absolute number of legally aided cases in the Sheriff Summary 
Courts. 
B.18 A second change in COPFS policy/practice identified as taking place during the 
period covered by the fixed payments research is that there should be a 
presumption that the public interest should be in favour of a prosecution in cases 
involving a racial motivation or aggravation.  This instruction was issued to 
procurators fiscal on 6th April 1999.  Thus it coincides with the introduction of 
fixed payments in summary cases.  It should also be noted that the statutory 
offences of racially aggravated harassment and racially aggravated behaviour 
came into force on 30th September 1998. 
 
B.19 The number of cases involving a racial motivation or harassment has clearly 
grown over the years covered by the research.  The data provided by SLAB 
does not allow us to identify which of this type of case were granted legal aid.  
Our analysis has to rely on other sources.  It is based on two specific studies and 
the COPFS Annual Report for 2000/01.    
 
B.20 The first study, Racist Crime and Victimisation in Scotland, was published on 
3rd May 2002.  It was carried out by Ian Clark and Susan Moody of Dundee 
University and published by CRU.  The study looked at the first 2 years (1999 
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and 2000) of implementation of the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 which created the 2 new statutory crimes.   
 
B.21 The research identified at total of 450 cases of which 436 were summary cases.  
These cases involved a total of 30 summary courts.  All of these cases were 
completed by the end of 2000, more cases may have been initiated during this 
period and this data does not include any cases prosecuted as common law 
offences with a racial aggravation.  A total of 12 of these cases had been 
disposed of before the beginning of fiscal year 1999/2000, leaving 424 which 
could have commenced during that fiscal year.  Of these a further 75 were 
disposed of more than 6 months after the end of that fiscal year.  It is likely that 
the vast majority of these did not commence during 1999/2000.  This suggests 
something around 350-375 relating to 1999/2000.  These have to be compared 
with 43,674 legally aided cases in the Sheriff Summary courts for the fiscal year 
1999/2000.  The increase in the number of legally aided cases in Sheriff 
Summary courts between 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 was 1,451.  Consequently, 
if all of the prosecutions for racially motivated or aggravated crimes in 
1999/2000 gave rise to a legally aided case they can only account for about one 
quarter of the net increase in legally aided cases.   
 
B.22 However, the contribution of these types of cases to the increase in the number 
of legally aided cases in 1999/2000 is actually much less than this suggests 
since the number of complaints initiated in the Sheriff Summary courts in that 
year was 2,510 fewer than in 1998/1999.  Thus if the ratio of legally aided cases 
to complaints initiated in 1999/2000 had been the same as in 1998/1999 there 
would have been around 2,252 fewer legally aided cases.  The likely number of 
prosecutions for racially motivated or aggravated crimes can only account for 
just under 15% of this gross increase in legally aided cases between 1998/1999 
and 1999/2000. 
 
B.23 The second study of prosecutions of racially motivated or aggravated crimes is 
that carried out by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland in its 
Thematic Report on Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service’s Response on 
Race Issues.  The report itself looks at fiscal years 2002/03 and 2003/04 which 
are both beyond the period for which the SLAB data has been analysed in detail.  
However, an appendix to the report provides data on earlier years from which it 
can be deduced that in 2001 and 2002 there were 528 and 948 convictions, 
respectively, in cases where the main or secondary offences fell under s50 of the 
1998 Act or there was a racial aggravation of a common law offence covered by 
s96.  Conviction rates in such cases are around 80% which would raise the 
number of prosecutions to 660 and 1185 for the 2 years.  Once again the 
absolute number of prosecutions and the year by year increase is small relative 
to those for legally aided cases (where our data is for financial years). 
 
B.24 A third source of data is the Annual Report of COPFS.  Unfortunately, only one 
of these for the years covered by the research explicitly mentions the number of 
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prosecutions for such offences.  The Annual Report for 2000/01 reports that 
there were 916 prosecutions in that year under s50 of the 1998 Act and 113 
prosecutions for common law offences where there was racial aggravation (the 
later figure may be an under recording).  Thus 1029 prosecutions are identified 
for 2000/01.  This compares to 48,581 legally aided Sheriff summary cases.  
Our estimate for 1999/2000 based on Racist Crime and Victimisation in 
Scotland is 350 which gives an increase between 1999/2000 and 2000/01 of 
around 680 compared to a net increase in legally aided cases in Sheriff summary 
courts of 4,907.   
 
B.25 If the ratio for 1999/2000 is applied to the number of complaints initiated in 
2000/01 it suggests that the gross increase in legally aided cases is around 3,517 
suggesting a share of about 19% of the increase in legally aided cases being due 
to an increase in prosecutions for racially motivated or aggravated offences. 
 
B.26 The evidence presented above clearly refutes the suggestion that increases in the 
prosecution of racially motivated or aggravated offences can explain anything 
but a small fraction of the increase in legally aided cases in the Sheriff Summary 
courts in the period covered by our research67. 
B.27 SLAB introduced its Code of Practice and the registration of defence solicitors 
from October 1998 just 6 months before the introduction of fixed payments for 
summary legal aid.  It is clear that the number of solicitors firms (700) who 
registered in October 1998 was less than the number who successfully applied 
for summary legal aid in 1997/98 (791) and 1998/99 (749).  According to the 
SLAB Annual Report for 1999/2000 the number of firms registered rose to 714 
whilst the number of firms successfully applying fell to 699.  By 30th September 
2000 (SLAB evidence to Justice 1 Committee of the Scottish parliament) the 
number of firms registered had fallen to 707 while the number successfully 
applying for summary legal aid in 2000/01 fell to 691.  There is no data 
available for the number of firms registered in 2001/02.  Over the first 2 years of 
the register the number of firms registered rose whilst the number of firms 
successfully applying fell.  The number of firms successfully applying fell again 
in 2001/02 to 660.  At 31st March 2004 the number of firms registered had fallen 
to 665.  
B.28 This suggests that the introduction of the code of practice and registration led to 
a reduction in the number of firms offering legally aided service in summary 
cases.  It is difficult, however, for this exploratory study to judge whether the 
subsequent reduction in the number of firms providing legally aided summary 
services was due to fixed payments or the burdens of registration and 
compliance, or both. However, the behavioural changes identified in this report 
                                                 
67  It should be noted that if ‘persons proceeded against’ is used as the measure of the volume of business 
passing through the courts the racially motivated crimes would account for an even smaller proportion of  
cases. 
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are not directly attributable to registration and the introduction of the code of 
practice.68  
B.29 The Use of Human Rights Legislation in Scottish Courts (Greenhill et al, 2004), 
has identified the number of criminal cases in the period from May 1999 to the 
end of 2003 where a human rights issue was raised.  Approximately 290 
summary cases per annum were involved.  This represents 0.3% of the average 
annual number of legally aided summary cases in this period.  However, in the 
first 2 years these ran at a much higher level equivalent to 640 per annum or 
slightly less than the number of cases involving racial motivation or 
aggravation.  In subsequent years the level is much smaller.  This certainly can 
go no way to explain the continued increase in the number of legally aided 
summary cases.   
B.30 When the number of criminal cases raising human rights issues is added to the 
number of cases involving racial issues for 1999/2000 and 2000/01 they can, at 
the very most, account for 20% of the gross increase in legally aided Sheriff 
Summary Court cases.  Thus the other identified events  do not appear to 
account for the change in behaviour identified around the time of the 
introduction of fixed payments for summary legal aid.  This Report now turns to 
the statistical analysis which identifies such a change in behaviour. 
B.31 Before discussing the results of the detailed statistical analysis the next sub-
section presents some of the overall trends exhibited in the data provided by 
SLAB. 
Overall Trends 
B.32 Chart 4 shows for District & Stipendiary Magistrate Courts and Sheriff 
Summary Courts (by bars scaled on the left vertical axis) fee payments to 
solicitors (net of VAT) for cases granted summary legal aid in the 2 years prior 
to the introduction of fixed payments and for three years thereafter.  It also 
shows, (by broken lines scaled on the right vertical axis), the number of cases 
granted legal aid.  It is clear that after the introduction of fixed payments 
expenditure rose broadly in line with the number of cases.  This is confirmed by 
the virtually static average payment to solicitors illustrated in Chart 5. 
                                                 
68 Indeed, these changes were rarely mentioned in interviews and surveys. 
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Chart 4 
Expenditure and Number of Cases
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Chart 5 
Mean Solicitor Fee
£0
£100
£200
£300
£400
£500
£600
£700
£800
1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002
District & Stip Sheriff Summary
Pre-fixed payments Post-fixed payments
 
 
  119
B.33 The fall in the mean (average) cost of summary cases between the pre- and post-
fixed payment periods is a direct consequence of the fact that the fixed payment in 
each type of court was set below the average payment made under the previous 
‘time and line’ system in the years immediately preceding the introduction of 
fixed payments.  It is thus a matter of logic that for a given number of legally 
aided cases in the years following the introduction of fixed payments total 
expenditure on Summary Legal Aid should be expected to be lower than it would 
have been had fixed payments not been introduced.  What the research reported 
below is concerned with is any impact which the change of payment system had 
on defence agents, their case management strategies, case trajectories, other 
elements of the legal aid system and the number of cases for which Summary 
Legal Aid payments are made. 
B.34 Chart 6 shows a comparison of the number of legally aided summary court cases 
and the number of complaints initiated in the Sheriff Summary courts for the 
years covered by the SLAB data.  The latter figures are from the Scottish Courts 
Service.  They provide a measure of the business passing through these courts.  
 
  120
Chart 6 
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Chart 7 
Sheriff Summary Courts:
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B.35 Chart 7 shows the number of legally-aided Sheriff Court cases as a percentage 
of complaints initiated for each of the years covered by this study.  The ratio 
rises after the introduction of fixed payments suggesting that there may have 
been a change in behaviour around the time of the introduction of fixed 
payments.69  
B.36 The figures illustrated in Charts 1–7 are aggregates for all of Scotland and as 
such are a rather simple indicator of how the system has reacted nationally to 
the introduction of fixed payments.  No allowance is made for the change in the 
system to have impacted differently on different parts of the country, on 
different firms or on different solicitors. The analysis in this report takes these 
possibilities into account to provide a more detailed and sophisticated analysis. 
This Appendix reports in detail on the analysis of this data which seeks to 
produce a more focussed analysis of the impact of fixed payments on the fee 
income received by solicitors and their firms.   
Analysis of solicitor-level data 
B.37 In this section the data provided by SLAB on Summary Legal Aid payments to 
solicitors is analysed for the years 1997/98 to 2001/02.  This is done by 
summing the payments received by each solicitor for each of the five years 
covered.  Table 1 summarises these data together with the total number of cases, 
number of solicitors receiving payments, average payments per solicitor and 
average number of cases per solicitor.  
B.38 The Table illustrates that the number of solicitors being paid for carrying out 
legally aided Summary Court work declined by almost 24% between financial 
years 1997/98 and 2001/02.  However, the largest fall in any of these years was 
prior to the introduction of fixed payments.  The fall since the introduction of 
fixed payments has been just over 16%.   
B.39 The total number of legally aided summary cases over the five year period has 
risen by over 17%.  The fact that the number declined in the year prior to the 
introduction of fixed payments means that the rise in the number of legally 
aided cases since the introduction of fixed fees is even greater, being over 22%.  
As a consequence of this the average number of cases handled by solicitors 
carrying out legally aided summary work has increases by almost 54% over the 
five year period and by over 45% since the introduction of fixed payments.  
However, most of the increase occurred between 2000/01 and 2001/02 (over a 
17% increase).   
                                                 
69 This analysis presumes that the data for the two years prior to the introduction of fixed payments which 
were provided to the research team by SLAB are representative of the pre-fixed payments system. 
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B.40 The final row in Table 1 shows that the average of the total fees paid to each 
solicitor over the five year period has risen from £23,787 to £30,369.  This is a 
statistically significant increase. 
Solicitor Fixed Effects 
B.41 The data in Table 1 is, however, potentially misleading.  It involves taking 
averages across solicitors with very different degrees of involvement in 
summary cases and different case management practices.  These differences can 
be taken account of by using a fixed effects model to estimate how fees vary 
over the period.  The regression in Table 2 uses fixed effects for individual 
solicitors.  The interpretation of the variables is as follows: Average9798 is the 
estimated average fee income in 1997/98, the coefficient on Change9899 is the 
difference between the average fee income in 1998/99 and that in 1997/98, that 
on Change9900 is the difference between the average in 1999/2000 and that in 
1997/98 etc.  The estimated coefficients are arrived at after taking account of 
time-invariant factors associated with individual solicitors. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Fees per Solicitor 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      6902 
Group variable (i): sol_code                    Number of groups   =      2021 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0195                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0334                                        avg =       3.4 
       overall = 0.0002                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(4,4877)          =     24.20 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0470                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
    tot_fees |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
  Change9899 |  -1014.323   673.6897    -1.51   0.132    -2335.059    306.4119 
  Change9900 |  -5150.337   694.6601    -7.41   0.000    -6512.183    -3788.49 
  Change0001 |  -5195.963   713.3954    -7.28   0.000    -6594.539   -3797.386 
  Change0102 |  -1323.971   730.1625    -1.81   0.070    -2755.419    107.4759 
  Average9798|   27579.99   473.4272    58.26   0.000     26651.86    28508.12 
     sigma_u |  31164.757 
     sigma_e |   17385.18 
         rho |  .76266378   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2020, 4877) =    13.89          Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
B.42 The results in Table 2 suggest very different conclusions from those drawn from 
Table 1.  Results shown in italics are those for which the estimated coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 95% level.  The estimated average fee 
income for 1997/98 is now almost £27,580.  The estimated average fees for 
each of the post-fixed payment years is now below the 1997/98 level.  However, 
the difference between the 1997/98 figure and that for 2001/02 is not 
statistically significant at the conventional (95%) level.  Thus this regression 
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suggests that while average fee income from summary legal aid fell in the two 
years immediately following the introduction of fixed payments, it rose again in 
2001/02 to a level not statistically significantly different from that in 1997/98. 
 
Solicitor categories 
B.43 There may be, however, common effects across solicitors of which account 
must be taken..  For example, whilst the impact of the introduction of fixed 
payments on the fee income of solicitors who are heavily involved in summary 
legal aid may be rather different from that on solicitors who are only 
occasionally involved in this area of work, those who are heavily involved may 
have very similar experiences.  Indeed, Stephen (2001) has argued that the 
likely response of defence agents to the introduction of fixed payments will 
differ depending on their degree of involvement in legal aid work.  These 
considerations suggest that it is useful to try to identify whether the effects on 
solicitors with different degrees of involvement in summary legal aid do, 
indeed, differ. 
Table 2: Summary Fees by Solicitor Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      6926 
Group variable (i): sol_code                    Number of groups   =      2023 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2084                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.7379                                        avg =       3.4 
       overall = 0.6038                                        max =         5 
                                                F(14,4889)         =     91.92 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5944                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
    tot_fees Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     GEN9798 
    GEN9899 
    GEN9900 
    GEN0001 
    GEN0102 
    Spec9798 
   spec9899 
   spec9900 
   spec9901 
   spec9902 
   Nspec9798 
  nspec9899 
  nspec9900 
  nspec9901 
  nspec9902 
19184.82   685.4681    27.99   0.000     17840.99    20528.64 
847.8539   896.8547     0.95   0.345    -910.3843    2606.092 
-457.7961    920.316    -0.50   0.619    -2262.029    1346.437 
673.8285   948.5813     0.71   0.478    -1185.817    2533.474 
2024.189    964.507     2.10   0.036     133.3222    3915.056 
32692.05   1356.172    24.11   0.000     30033.34    35350.75 
-922.6766   1492.488    -0.62   0.536    -3848.624    2003.271 
-9813.105   1538.507    -6.38   0.000    -12829.27    -6796.94 
-3659.422   1579.129    -2.32   0.021    -6755.225   -563.6198 
6864.513   1609.354     4.27   0.000     3709.457    10019.57 
-6726.391   1492.743    -4.51   0.000    -9652.838   -3799.943 
52.45216   1781.158     0.03   0.977    -3439.417    3544.322 
1579.28    1844.69     0.86   0.392    -2037.142    5195.701 
540.7383   1880.574     0.29   0.774    -3146.033    4227.509 
-1507.931   1932.001    -0.78   0.435    -5295.521    2279.658 
     sigma_u 
     sigma_e 
         rho 
22064.265 
15885.109 
.65862085   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2022, 4889) =     5.61          Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
B.44 Table 2 presents results from a solicitor fixed effect regression which 
distinguishes between solicitors in terms of their involvement in summary legal 
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aid.  For each of the five years analysed solicitors have been ranked in terms of 
the number of summary cases they handle and allocated to 3 categories 
according to where they lie in the distribution of cases by solicitor.  A solicitor 
is deemed a specialist (spec) if he/she is in the top quartile and a non-specialist 
(nspec) if in the lowest quartile.  The remaining solicitors (GEN) are those 
whose numbers of cases lie between the lower and upper quartiles.  
B.45 The estimated coefficients of the variables in Table 2 have the following 
interpretation: GEN9798  gives the average income of solicitors lying between 
the top and bottom quartiles in 1997/98; _GEN9899 gives the estimated 
difference between the average income of these solicitors in 1998/99 and that in 
1997/98; _GEN9900 gives the estimated difference between their average 
income in 1999/2000 and that in 1997/98 etc.; SPEC9798 gives the estimated 
difference between the average income of solicitors in the top quartile in 
1997/98 and the average income of those lying between the top and bottom 
quartiles; _SPEC9899 gives the estimated difference between the average 
income of solicitors in the top quartile in 1998/99 and those in the top quartile in 
1997/98 _SPEC9900 gives the estimated difference between the average 
income of solicitors in the top quartile in 1999/2000 and those in the top quartile 
in 1997/98 etc.; NSPEC9798 give the estimated difference between the average 
income of solicitors in the bottom quartile in 1997/98 and those lying between 
the top and bottom quartiles in 1997/98; _NSPEC9899 gives the estimated 
difference between the average income of solicitors in the bottom quartile in 
1998/99 and that in 1997/98 etc.    
B.46 The results reported in Table 2 suggest that solicitors lying between the top and 
bottom quartiles saw their average income fluctuate by a statistically 
insignificant amount in the first two years after the introduction of fixed 
payments but in the third year their average fee income rose by a statistically 
significant amount.  Solicitors in the top quartile appear to have suffered a 
statistically significant fall in average fee income (relative to before fixed 
payments) for the first two years followed by a statistically significant rise.  
Solicitors in the bottom quartile appear to have had a rise in average income 
(relative to the pre-fixed payment period) for two years followed by a fall, but 
none of these changes were statistically significant. 
B.47 The way in which these changes in average fee income have been generated can 
be seen by examining the average number of legally-aided summary cases 
undertaken by each group of solicitors over the period.  This is summarised in 
the solicitor fixed effects regression reported in Table 3. 
B.48 The average number of cases undertaken by solicitors lying between the top and 
bottom quartiles rose by small but significant amounts in the second and third 
years after the introduction of fixed payments.  The second of these was larger 
and may be seen to explain the statistically significant increase in the average 
incomes of these solicitors. 
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B.49 The average number of cases undertaken by solicitors in the top quartile also 
rose in the second and third years after fixed payments were introduced.  In both 
years this was by a large and statistically significant amount.  In the first case 
this was by enough to move average income back towards the pre-fixed fee 
level.  In the latter case it was enough to raise average income to an amount 
which was statistically significantly greater than pre-fixed payment income. 
 
Table 3: Summary Cases by Solicitor Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      6926 
Group variable (i): sol_code                    Number of groups   =      2023 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3031                         Obs per group: min =         1 
      between = 0.7633                                        avg =       3.4 
      overall = 0.6434                                        max =         5 
 
                                               F(14,4889)         =    151.87 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5898                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
  sol_cases  Coef.   Std. Err.      t     P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     GEN9798  
    GEN9899  
    GEN9900  
    GEN0001  
    GEN0102  
    Spec9798  
   spec9899  
   spec9900  
   spec9901  
   spec9902  
   Nspec9798  
   nspec9899  
   nspec9900  
   nspec9901  
   nspec9902  
 
30.60421   1.029593    29.72   0.000     28.58574    32.62267 
 1.07259   1.347102     0.80    0.426    -1.568335    3.713516 
 1.92775   1.382342     1.39    0.163    -.7822608    4.637762 
 4.334371   1.424797     3.04   0.002     1.541129    7.127614 
 7.600527   1.448718     5.25   0.000     4.760388    10.44067 
47.26953    2.03701     23.21   0.000     43.27607    51.26298 
-4.316954   2.241762    -1.93   0.054    -8.711815    .0779061 
 2.459396   2.310883     1.06   0.287    -2.070973    6.989766 
14.74741   2.371899      6.22   0.000     10.09742     19.3974 
35.65386   2.417297     14.75   0.000     30.91488    40.39285 
-10.40821   2.242145    -4.64   0.000    -14.80382   -6.012601 
 .4623225   2.675352    0.17   0.863    -4.782569    5.707214 
 -.1697512   2.770779   -0.06   0.951    -5.601724    5.262221 
-2.23223   2.824679    -0.79   0.429    -7.769869    3.305409 
-6.535651   2.901922    -2.25   0.024    -12.22472   -.8465796 
 
     sigma_u  
     sigma_e  
         rho  
35.518059 
23.859905 
.68905041   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(2022, 4889) =     6.41          Prob > F = 0.0000 
B.50 The average number of cases undertaken by solicitors in the bottom quartile 
only changed significantly in the third year after the introduction of fixed 
payments.  In that case it was a reduction in the average number of cases. 
 
Analysis of firm-level data 
B.51 It may be argued that the appropriate unit of analysis for estimating the impact 
of fixed payments is not the individual solicitor but the solicitor firm.  In multi-
solicitor firms, whether they are partnerships or sole principals with employed 
assistants, the decision on the level of involvement in summary legal aid is 
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likely to be made at the level of the firm and not the individual solicitor.  
Furthermore, the practices of firms in terms of which registered solicitor carries 
out legal aid work as opposed to who applies for legal aid may differ.  This 
section analyses the data supplied to the researchers by summing fees and 
number of cases for all solicitors in each firm.  Table 4 summarises these data. 
 
Table 4: Firm Averages 
 Pre-Fixed Payments Post-Fixed Payments 
 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 
Active Firms 791 749 699 691 660
Cases per Firm 74.61 76.13 83.24 90.23 105.20
Fee Income per 
Firm £47,451 £42,572 £48,587 £53,837 £58,269
 
B.52 This Table shows that the number of firms undertaking legally-aided work in 
Summary Courts declined by just over 17% over the five year period but in 
contrast to the number of solicitors the largest annual reduction occurred in the 
year after the introduction of fixed payments (almost 7%).  The overall 
reduction since the introduction of fixed payments was just over 12.5%.  Thus 
the number of firms undertaking legally-aided work has declined less sharply 
than the number of solicitors.  Similarly the number of cases per firm has risen 
by less since the introduction of fixed payments than has cases per solicitor.  In 
this case the increase is 34%.  Finally the average of total fees paid to firms for 
summary legal aid has risen from £48,116 to £53,537 over the five year period.  
However, this average had risen to £50,089 in the year before the introduction 
of fixed payments.  In fact the change in average fees is not statistically 
significantly different from zero in either case. 
 
Firm fixed effects 
B.53 As in the case of solicitors the analysis has to take account of time-invariant 
firm effects.  This is done by running a fixed effects regression with the fixed 
effects relating to each firm in the data set and by distinguishing firms by their 
level of involvement in summary legal aid70.  This distinction is based on where 
a firm lies in the distribution of cases per solicitor.  Specialists are defined as 
those where the number of cases per solicitor involved in Summary Legal Aid is 
in the top quartile (top 25%).  Specialists accounted for just over 80% of 
legally-aided summary cases in 1997/98 and received 81% of the fees paid for 
such cases.  By 2001/02 both their share of the number of cases and of fees had 
                                                 
70  In the case of firms involvement is measured by average number of cases per solicitor in the firm 
carrying out summary legal aid. 
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fallen to 77%. Non-specialists are those whose cases per solicitor are in the 
bottom quartile, whilst Generalists lie between the top and bottom quartiles.   
B.54 The results of the firm fixed effects regression are shown in Table 5.  The 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the variables  are as follows: that 
on GEN9798 is the estimate of the average fee income of firms lying between 
the bottom and top quartiles in 1997/98; all the other estimated coefficients 
measure differences from this fee income.  Thus those for _9899 to _0102 
measure the change in the average fee income of those firms for the years 
1998/9 to 2001/02.  That for spec9798 measures the difference between the 
average fee income of firms in the top quartile in 1997/98 and that for those 
lying between the top and bottom quartiles in that year.  The estimated 
coefficients on _spec9899 and _spec0102 measure the difference between the 
average of firms in the top quartile in years 199/9 to 2001/02 and their average 
in 1997/98.  Finally that for nspec9798 measures the difference between the 
average fee income of firms in the bottom quartile in 1997/98 and that for those 
lying between the top and bottom quartiles in that year.  While _nspec9899 to 
_nspec01/02 measure the difference between the average fee income of firms 
in the bottom quartile for each of the years from that in 1997/98. 
 
Table 5: Firm Summary Income by Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      3590 
Group variable (i): frm_code                    Number of groups   =       938 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1521                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5302                                        avg =       3.8 
       overall = 0.4236                                        max =         5 
                                                F(14,2638)         =     33.80 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5028                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
tot_fees Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
GEN97/98 
GEN9899  
GEN9900  
GEN0001  
GEN0102  
Spec9798  
spec9899  
spec9900  
spec0001  
spec0102  
Nspec9798  
nspec9899 
nspec9900 
nspec0001 
nspec0102 
43113.18   1638.694    26.31   0.000     39899.93    46326.44 
490.5951   2142.69      0.23   0.819    -3710.927    4692.118 
-2388.336   2223.874    -1.07   0.283     -6749.05    1972.379 
-2855.681   2294.922    -1.24   0.213    -7355.711    1644.349 
1550.947   2341.492     0.66   0.508    -3040.399    6142.294 
46658.24   3313.354    14.08   0.000     40161.21    53155.28 
-1220.495   3694.467    -0.33   0.741     -8464.84    6023.851 
-21483.05    3811.28    -5.64   0.000    -28956.45   -14009.65 
-13319.63   3807.351    -3.50   0.000    -20785.33   -5853.937 
2590.071    3956.19     0.65   0.513    -5167.477    10347.62 
-14055.91   3602.675    -3.90   0.000    -21120.26   -6991.556 
1530.883   4234.542     0.36   0.718    -6772.476    9834.242 
2718.089   4450.871     0.61   0.541    -6009.462    11445.64 
6485.144   4445.907     1.46   0.145    -2232.673    15202.96 
2587.279   4579.789     0.56   0.572    -6393.062    11567.62 
sigma_u  
sigma_e  
rho  
61953.737 
28423.289 
.82611763   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(937, 2638) =    16.07           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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B.55 These estimated coefficients suggest the following interpretation.  The average 
fee income for firms lying between the top and bottom quartiles fell below the 
1997/98 level in the first two years after the introduction of fixed payments but 
not by a statistically significant amount (as indicated by the negative and 
statistically insignificant estimated coefficients on the variables _GEN9900, 
_GEN0001).  However as shown by  _GEN0102 in 2001/02 they rose by a 
statistically insignificant amount.  Thus there was no significant change in the 
fee income of these firms after the introduction of fixed payments..   
B.56 The average income of firms in the top quartile fell in each of the first two years 
after the introduction of fixed payments by a statistically significant amount (as 
evidenced the estimated coefficients on _spec9900, _spec0001) but rose in 
the third year above the level at which it had been in the years before the 
introduction of fixed payments (_spec0102) but by a statistically insignificant 
amount.   
B.57 The average fee income of firms in the bottom quartile fluctuated greatly in the 
3 years after the introduction of fixed payments (as shown by the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients on _nspec9900, _nspec0001 and _nspec0102).  
However, in no year was the amount statistically significantly different from 
that in 1997/98. 
B.58 Specialist firms’ income clearly suffered in the first year after the introduction 
of fixed payments and then gradually recovered.  The lack of significant change 
for the other two groups of firms is probably as much to do with the higher 
variation of income across firms in these groups due to the smaller number of 
cases.  Further insight may be gained from considering how the average number 
of cases for each group varies over time.  This is shown in Table 6. 
B.59 The average number of cases undertaken by the non-specialist firms shows no 
statistically significant change over the period while those of the generalists 
rises by a statistically significant amount in 2001/02.  However, this latter 
change is only enough to maintain average income at the pre-fixed payments 
level.  On the other hand, specialist firms increased the average number of cases 
from 2000/01 with a very large increase in 2001/02.  Clearly, the first increase 
in cases was insufficient to raise average income back to the pre-fixed payment 
level but the second was. 
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Table 6: Firm Summary Cases by Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      3590 
Group variable (i): frm_code                    Number of groups   =       938 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2125                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5374                                        avg =       3.8 
       overall = 0.4395                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(14,2638)         =     50.85 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4910                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
   frm_cases Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
      GEN9798 
    GEN9899  
    GEN9900  
    GEN0001  
    GEN0102  
    Spec9798  
   spec9899  
   spec9900  
   spec0001  
   spec0102  
   Nspec9798  
  nspec9899  
  nspec9900  
  nspec0001  
  nspec0102  
69.54295   2.503711    27.78   0.000     64.63352    74.45239 
.2118362   3.273751     0.06   0.948    -6.207544    6.631216 
1.441847   3.397791     0.42   0.671    -5.220758    8.104452 
1.202635   3.506343     0.34   0.732    -5.672826    8.078095 
10.75451   3.577495     3.01   0.003     3.739533    17.76949 
62.18781   5.062374    12.28   0.000     52.26119    72.11444 
-7.169   5.644665    -1.27   0.204    -18.23742    3.899418 
.1939413   5.823141     0.03   0.973    -11.22444    11.61233 
15.77411   5.817138     2.71   0.007     4.367499    27.18073 
49.58197   6.044543     8.20   0.000     37.72945     61.4345 
-22.23389   5.504419    -4.04   0.000     -33.0273   -11.44047 
3.490611   6.469829     0.54   0.590    -9.195843    16.17706 
-1.055648   6.800352    -0.16   0.877    -14.39021    12.27892 
5.466106   6.792768     0.80   0.421    -7.853586     18.7858 
-2.98264   6.997322    -0.43   0.670    -16.70343    10.73815 
     sigma_u 
     sigma_e 
         rho 
103.31001 
43.427091 
.84983424   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(937, 2638) =    19.45           Prob > F = 0.0000 
B.60 It should also be noted that the increase in number of cases undertaken by 
specialist firms corresponds to the two years with the largest increases in the 
ratio of legally aided cases to complaints initiated (see Tables 7 & 8 below). 
B.61 It is of interest to note that although the number of firms undertaking legally 
aided summary work has reduced since the introduction of fixed payments and 
the number of cases has increased, the degree of concentration of legally aided 
work across firms has not changed by much.  The Herfendahl concentration 
index which is widely used as a measure of industrial concentration by 
economists and competition authorities when applied to cases per firm fell from 
0.00522 in 1998/99 (having fallen from 0.00563 in 1997/98) to 0.00512 in 
2001/02.  Thus legally-aided work has become less concentrated in Scotland, as 
a whole, since the introduction of fixed payments.  The next section will 
examine concentration at the court level.  
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Analysis of court-level data 
 
B.62 The data set supplied to the research team includes a court identifier indicating 
in which court each legally aided case was to be heard.  Thus cases can be 
aggregated for each summary court for each year.  This allows an analysis of the 
impact of fixed payments on the business passing through each court and 
ultimately on whether the number of solicitors or firms carrying out business in 
each court has been affected by the introduction of fixed payments.  A time 
invariant court fixed effect can be used to take account of the different practices 
of defence agents, procurators fiscal and indeed sheriffs or magistrates.  These 
factors may be regarded as aspects of court culture.  By using court fixed effects 
the impact of fixed payments can be analysed after accounting for such court 
effects.  
 
B.63 In paragraph B.34, above, it was pointed out that the total number of legally 
aided summary cases would be likely to change over time as the number of 
complaints initiated by procurators fiscal change over time.  In order to take 
account of this at the aggregate level Chart 7 looked at the ratio of legally aided 
summary cases to complaints initiated.  The chart illustrated that this ratio had 
risen after the introduction of fixed payments for summary cases.  This ratio will 
now be examined at the individual court level after account has been taken of 
time invariant court effects. 
B.64 Table 7 reports the results of a (court) fixed effects regression where the 
dependent variable is the ratio of legally aided summary cases in each Sheriff 
Summary Court to complaints initiated by the procurator fiscal in that court for 
the same financial year.   
Table 7: Ratio of Legally Aided Cases to  
Complaints Initiated in Sheriff Summary Courts 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       243 
Group variable (i): court                       Number of  groups   =        49 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2372                         Obs per gr oup: min =         4 
       between = 0.0011                                         avg =       5.0 
       overall = 0.0461                                         max =         5 
 
                                                F(4,190)            =     14.77 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0022                        Prob > F            =    0.0000 
 
     comprat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
       9899 |  -.0108355   .0115203    -0.94   0.348    - .0335596    .0118887 
       9900 |   .0185274   .0115203     1.61   0.109    - .0041967    .0412516 
       0001 |   .0476007   .0115951     4.11   0.000      .0247291    .0704724 
       0102 |   .0640086   .0115951     5.52   0.000      .041137    .0868802 
     _1997/98|   .3789697   .0081477    46.51   0.000     .3628982    .3950413 
     sigma_u |  .11765908 
     sigma_e |  .05702262 
         rho |   .8097962   (fraction of variance due to u_ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(48, 190) =    21.11             Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Table 8: Ratio of Legally Aided Cases to  
Complaints Initiated in Sheriff Summary Courts 
(restricted regression) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       243 
Group variable (i): court                       Number of groups   =        49 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2337                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.0011                                        avg =       5.0 
       overall = 0.0454                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(3,191)           =     19.42 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0022                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
     comprat |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
       9900 |   .0239452   .0099739     2.40   0.017     .0042721    .0436182 
       0001 |   .0530185   .0100601     5.27   0.000     .0331754    .0728616 
       0102 |   .0694263   .0100601     6.90   0.000     .0495832    .0892694 
      199799 |    .373552   .0057607    64.84   0.000     .3621893    .3849148 
     sigma_u |  .11765908 
     sigma_e |   .0570054 
         rho |  .80988924   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(48, 191) =    21.12             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
B.65 The interpretation of the estimated coefficients in Table 7 is as follows: that on 
1997/98 is the average ratio of legally aided cases to complaints initiated after 
account has been taken of court specific effects; that on _9899 is the difference 
between the average ratio in 1998/99 and that in 1997/98; _9900 the difference 
between the average ratio in 1999/2000 and that in 1997/98 etc..  The estimated 
coefficients reported in Table 7 suggest that (as compared with 1997/98) there 
was no statistically significant change in the ratio between 1997/98 and either 
1998/99 or 1999/200.  This would imply that 9899 and 9900 could be 
omitted from the regression.  However, a likelihood ratio test rejects omitting 
both of these variables.  However, 9899 can be legitimately omitted.   
B.66 The result of imposing this statistically valid restriction is shown in Table 8 
where 1997999 is the ratio for the estimated average for the two years preceding 
the introduction of fixed payments.  The results show that the ratio rose after the 
introduction of fixed payments.  This suggests that after the introduction of 
fixed payments an accused person in a Sheriff Summary Court was more likely 
to be in receipt of legal aid than before the introduction of fixed payments.  
However, the increase was less in 1999/2000 than in the two subsequent years. 
B.67 The results reported in Tables 7 and 8 take no account of the effect of changes in 
the composition of crimes for which accused proceeded against.  The 
composition of crimes and offences may vary across both courts and time and 
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this may affect the ratio of legally-aided cases to persons proceeded against.  
This can be controlled for by adding as explanatory variables the proportion of 
complaints initiated in each crime or offence category.  However, such data 
were not available to the research team71. 
 
Impact on concentration defence agents 
B.68 It was suggested at the time of the introduction of fixed payments that they 
might lead to a reduction in the number of solicitors willing to provide legally 
aided defence, particularly in rural areas.  One way of measuring the availability 
of solicitors to undertake summary defence work throughout Scotland would be 
to analyse SLAB’s register of criminal defence solicitors.  However, the 
experience from the survey of defence agents (Study C) suggests that a 
significant number of solicitors on the register do not, in fact, practise in 
criminal cases.  Thus the register may be misleading.  Nor would consulting the 
current register provide evidence on what impact fixed payments had on the 
availability of defence services.  The alternative approach used here is to look at 
the number of solicitors actually providing defence services in summary courts 
before and after the introduction of fixed payments. 
B.69 The number of solicitors providing defence services in each summary court and 
the number of cases which each handles have been calculated for 1998/99 and 
2001/02.  Two measures are used here: the first is simply the number of 
solicitors in receipt of legal aid payments on behalf of clients whose cases were 
called before that court; the second is the Herfindahl Index for each court (see 
paragraph B.22, above).  The Herfindahl Index is used because the simple 
number of firms gives equal weight to firms with only one case in a court and 
firms with very many cases.  There may be firms representing an accused 
person from outwith the locality of the court and thus only appearing on an 
occasional basis.  It might be argued, however, that fixed payments would be 
likely to discourage this practice. 
B.70 The two measures of representation were calculated for courts for 1998/99 and 
2001/02.  It is, perhaps, surprising how many firms act for accused persons in 
even the remotest rural courts.  For example, in the case of Wick, 23 different 
firms of solicitors represented accused persons in 1998/99 and 21 in 2001/02.  
However, many of these firms must have represented very few clients since the 
Herfindahl Index in these years was 0.219147 in 1998/99 and 0.280994 in 
2001/02.  These represent firm-equivalents of 4.6 and 3.6 respectively.  Thus in 
Wick concentration increased by 25% but accused persons do appear still to 
have a number of firms from which to choose72.  Overall there appears to have 
                                                 
71  However, when an alternative but less satisfactory measure of business passing through the courts 
(persons proceeded against) was used to calculate the legally aided ratio the addition of the proportions of 
each crime and offence did not affect the estimated time effects significantly. 
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been a small reduction on average in the number of firms representing clients in 
the summary courts.  This has resulted in a significant increase, on average, in 
concentration but the level of concentration is not unduly high73.  
 
Impact on Advice & Assistance 
B.71 It is not unreasonable to expect that in a period when summary legal aid fees are 
subject to limitation that solicitors firms carrying out legally aided work would be 
likely to ensure that they received payment for all aspects of legal advice.  It has 
been suggested in the past that not all solicitors claimed everything that they might 
under Advice & Assistance.  In particular, when their client’s application for 
summary legal aid was successful they did not submit a claim for Advice &  
Table 13:  Criminal Advice & Assistance Intimations 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      3891 
Group variable (i): firm                        Number of groups   =      1026 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0088                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0080                                        avg =       3.8 
       overall = 0.0027                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(4,2861)          =      6.33 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0264                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
firm_AAcases |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     GEN9798 |   180.8523   3.731978    48.46   0.000     173.5347      188.17 
   _GEN9899 |  -8.543872   5.253073    -1.63   0.104    -18.84406     1.75632 
   _GEN9900 |  -5.048562   5.469203    -0.92   0.356    -15.77254    5.675416 
   _GEN0001 |   7.714279   5.564704     1.39   0.166    -3.196957    18.62551 
   _GEN0102 |   16.80728   5.670164     2.96   0.003     5.689256     27.9253       
     sigma_u |  301.58103 
     sigma_e |  104.67333 
         rho |   .8924859   (fraction of variance due to u_i)  
F test that all u_i=0:     F(1025, 2861) =    37.99          Prob > F = 0.0000 
Assistance.  Under a regime of fixed payments for summary legal aid solicitors 
might be more likely to claim for Advice & Assistance.  Gray, Fenn & Rickman 
(1999) found this to be the case when standard payments were introduced for 
magistrates’ court cases in England & Wales.  One of the SLAB stakeholder 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 However, it has been suggested to the research team that the SLAB data may obscure changes which 
have actually taken place.  The firm granted the legal aid certificate but whose office is at a distance from 
the court may not actually be that which represents the accused person in discussions with Depute Fiscals 
or in court.  The representation may be provided by a registered practitioner located locally.  Prior to the 
introduction of fixed payments the firm located at a distance would have received payment for travelling to 
the distant court. 
73  The analysis in this section is based on a slightly smaller data set than that analysed elsewhere in this 
report.  The data set was revised by SLAB but time did not permit the recalculation of the Herfindajhl 
indices.  It is likely that recalculation would result in a very small increase in concentration for 2001/02.  
For example for the case of Wick cited in the text the number of firms involved is not affected by the 
revision but the total number of cases in 2001/02 rises by by 1.65% resulting in a very small change in the 
Herfindahl index from 0.280944 to 0.281578. 
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interviewees suggested that this had happened but not by as much as might have 
been expected. 
B.72 In order to test whether such an effect has taken place the number of Advice & 
Assistance cases was regressed against year dummies in a firm fixed effects 
regression.  The results are reported in Table 13.  The estimated coefficients are 
not statistically significantly different from zero with the exception of that for 
2001/02.  However, this regression takes no account of differences in behaviour 
of firms with different levels of involvement in summary legal aid.   
 
Table 14:  
Criminal Advice & Assistance Intimations by Firm Specialisation  
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      3891 
Group variable (i): firm                        Number of groups   =      1026 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1629                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4750                                        avg =       3.8 
       overall = 0.3905                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(14,2851)         =     39.62 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4725                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
  firm_cases |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
     Gen9798 |   154.7959   5.490949    28.19   0.000     144.0292    165.5625      
         _GEN9899 |  -4.898256   6.949546    -0.70   0.481     -18.5249    8.728388 
    _GEN9900  |  -3.919481   7.350399    -0.53   0.594    -18.33212    10.49316 
    _GEN0001 |  -3.254268   7.455414    -0.44   0.663    -17.87282    11.36428 
    _GEN0102 |  -.7537807   7.617117    -0.10   0.921     -15.6894    14.18183 
    SPEC9798 |   120.7061   11.10078    10.87   0.000     98.93972    142.4724 
  _spec9899 |  -11.61017   11.91448    -0.97   0.330    -34.97204     11.7517 
  _spec9900 |   25.14118   12.43995     2.02   0.043      .748977    49.53338 
  _spec0001 |   75.93262   12.68073     5.99   0.000      51.0683    100.7969 
  _spec0102 |   105.6137   12.88193     8.20   0.000     80.35484    130.8725 
   NSPEC9798 |  -43.12232    11.4627    -3.76   0.000    -65.59835    -20.6463 
 _nspec9899 |   11.55462   12.89523     0.90   0.370     -13.7303    36.83955 
 _nspec9900 |   10.73058   13.64502     0.79   0.432    -16.02453    37.48569 
 _nspec0001 |   12.73497   13.69046     0.93   0.352    -14.10924    39.57918 
 _nspec0102 |   8.360919   14.24007     0.59   0.557    -19.56097    36.28281 
 
     sigma_u |  260.72465 
     sigma_e |  96.362459 
         rho |  .87981679   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(1025, 2851) =    25.94          Prob > F = 0.0000 
  135
B.73 Table 14 presents the results when such differences are considered and 
specialisation is determined in terms of Criminal Advice & Assistance.  In this 
case it can be seen that for firms in the top quartile the number of Advice & 
Assistance awards rose on the introduction of fixed payments.  For firms outside 
the top quartile there was no statistically significant change. 
 
Table 15: 
Criminal Advice & Assistance Income by Firm Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      3891 
Group variable (i): firm                        Number of groups   =      1026 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1516                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4471                                        avg =       3.8 
       overall = 0.3581                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(14,2851)         =     36.38 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4478                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
   tot_fees |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     GEN9798 |    9908.65   375.8807    26.36   0.000     9171.625    10645.68      
      _GEN9899 |  -404.4678   475.7284    -0.85   0.395    -1337.274    528.3387 
   _GEN9900 |  -408.7783   503.1687    -0.81   0.417     -1395.39     577.833 
   _GEN0001 |  -291.8257   510.3574    -0.57   0.567    -1292.533    708.8813 
   _GEN0102 |  -412.9853   521.4267    -0.79   0.428    -1435.397    609.4263 
    Spec9798 |   6263.067   759.8993     8.24   0.000      4773.06    7753.075 
  _spec9899 |  -422.6927   815.6009    -0.52   0.604     -2021.92    1176.535 
  _spec9900 |   3213.723   851.5716     3.77   0.000     1543.964    4883.481 
  _spec0001 |   6260.491    868.054     7.21   0.000     4558.413    7962.568 
  _spec0102 |   8492.617   881.8271     9.63   0.000     6763.534     10221.7 
   Nspec9798 |  -2608.342   784.6746    -3.32   0.001    -4146.929   -1069.755 
 _nspec9899 |   722.7002    882.738     0.82   0.413    -1008.169     2453.57 
 _nspec9900 |   601.7381   934.0646     0.64   0.519    -1229.772    2433.249 
 _nspec0001 |   689.4481   937.1752     0.74   0.462    -1148.162    2527.058 
 _nspec0102 |   608.9963   974.7987     0.62   0.532    -1302.385    2520.378      
     sigma_u |  16913.788 
     sigma_e |  6596.4538 
         rho |  .86797755   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(1025, 2851) =    23.97          Prob > F = 0.0000 
B.74 The impact of the change in the number of Advice & Assistance intimations by 
specialist firms can be seen feeding through to their income from Advice & 
Assistance in Table 15 which reports the results of a firm fixed effects 
regression which allows for firm specialisation in Advice & Assistance.  There 
is no statistically significant change in the average A & A income of firms 
outside the top quartile after the introduction of fixed payments.  However, the 
average A & A income of firms in the top quartile was statistically significantly 
higher in each year after the introduction of fixed payments. 
  136
Impact on solemn LA 
B.75 As well as increasing their claims for Advice & Assistance firms may have been 
willing also to undertake more solemn legally aided work after the introduction 
of fixed payments because it was relatively more remunerative.  Table 16 
reports the results of a firm fixed effects regression with number of solemn 
legally aided cases as the dependent variable.  This data only includes firms who 
had undertaken both legally aided Summary work and legally aided Solemn 
work.  The results suggest that firms in the top quartile for summary legal aid 
have increased their involvement in solemn legal aid work but that the increase 
began prior to the introduction of fixed payments.  In 1998/99 these firms (on 
average) did no more solemn work than those lying between the top and bottom 
quartiles (for summary work) but after that year their involvement increased 
more than that of firms lying between the top and bottom quartiles.    
 
 Table 16:  
Solemn Legal Aid Cases by Summary Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2771 
Group variable (i): firm                        Number of groups   =       759 
 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3680                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5074                                        avg =       3.7 
       overall = 0.3742                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(14,1998)         =     83.09 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.3855                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
Solemn_cases |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
     GEN9798 |   9.050911   .5359566    16.89   0.000     7.999819      10.102  
   _GEN9899 |   4.332412   .7029648     6.16   0.000     2.953791    5.711033
   _GEN9900 |    5.27537   .7430636     7.10   0.000     3.818109    6.732631
   _GEN0001 |   4.946889   .7474181     6.62   0.000     3.481089     6.41269
   _GEN0102 |   3.903337    .769075     5.08   0.000     2.395064     5.41161
    SPEC7879 |  -1.272393   .9602047    -1.33   0.185      -3.1555    .6107141 
  _spec9899 |   15.57138   1.176822    13.23   0.000     13.26345    17.87931
  _spec9900 |   14.48302   1.217136    11.90   0.000     12.09604    16.87001
  _spec0001 |    14.8467   1.234027    12.03   0.000     12.42659    17.26682
  _spec0102 |   13.99088    1.26966    11.02   0.000     11.50089    16.48088
   nspec9798 |   .0898136   1.013011     0.09   0.929    -1.896855    2.076482 
 _nspec9899 |  -4.233303    1.30776    -3.24   0.001    -6.798018   -1.668587
 _nspec9900 |  -5.701923   1.280643    -4.45   0.000    -8.213458   -3.190389
 _nspec0001 |  -4.810001   1.283632    -3.75   0.000    -7.327399   -2.292604
 _nspec0102 |  -3.752971   1.336939    -2.81   0.005    -6.374912   -1.131029
 
     sigma_u |  16.062849 
     sigma_e |  7.4927513 
         rho |  .82129501   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(758, 1998) =    16.28           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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B.76 Firms in the bottom quartile reduced their involvement in solemn legal aid from 
1999/2000.  For all categories of firm (on average) the change in the number of 
Solemn cases handled occurred prior to the introduction of fixed payments for 
summary work. 
 
Table 17: 
Solemn Legal Aid Income by Summary Specialisation 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2771 
Group variable (i): firm                        Number of groups   =       759 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3133                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4469                                        avg =       3.7 
       overall = 0.3063                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(14,1998)         =     65.12 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.3089                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
Tot_Solm_fees |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf.Interval] 
     GEN9798 |   20734.98    1642.95    12.62   0.000     17512.91    23957.06 
   _GEN9899 |   9710.359   2154.906     4.51   0.000     5484.262    13936.46 
   _GEN9900 |   16355.71   2277.827     7.18   0.000     11888.55    20822.87 
   _GEN0001 |   9624.843   2291.175     4.20   0.000       5131.5    14118.19 
   _GEN0102 |   2065.825   2357.563     0.88   0.381    -2557.716    6689.365 
    SPEC9798 |   1106.772   2943.462     0.38   0.707    -4665.805     6879.35 
  _SPEC9899 |   35723.63   3607.491     9.90   0.000     28648.79    42798.46 
  _SPEC9900 |   42153.49   3731.075    11.30   0.000     34836.29     49470.7 
  _SPEC0001 |   19546.54   3782.853     5.17   0.000     12127.79    26965.29 
  _SPEC0102 |   2825.042   3892.084     0.73   0.468    -4807.926    10458.01 
   NSPEC9798 |  -1146.517   3105.338    -0.37   0.712    -7236.557    4943.522 
 _NSPEC9899 |  -8037.327   4008.876    -2.00   0.045    -15899.34   -175.3121 
 _NSPEC9900 |  -15232.59    3925.75    -3.88   0.000    -22931.58   -7533.601 
 _NSPEC0001 |  -8785.997   3934.914    -2.23   0.026    -16502.96   -1069.033 
 _NSPEC0102 |  -1719.036   4098.325    -0.42   0.675    -9756.474    6318.403 
     sigma_u |   37437.93 
     sigma_e |  22968.678 
         rho |  .72653356   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(758, 1998) =     9.62           Prob > F = 0.0000 
B.77 Table 17 reports the results of the firm fixed effects regression on income from 
Solemn Legal Aid.  It should be noted that as for Table 16 this table only 
considers firms undertaking both summary and solemn legally aided work.  The 
first point to notice is that the estimated coefficients on SPEC9798 and 
NSPEC9798 are not statistically significantly different from zero, implying that, 
on average, there were no differences in Solemn legal aid income across the 
three categories of firm in 1997/98.  From 1998/99 differences between the 
categories did emerge but by 2001/02 they had disappeared again.  Clearly the 
categorisation of firms used for summary legal aid does not apply to solemn 
legal aid.  Notwithstanding this there seems to have been no consistent impact 
of the introduction of fixed payments for summary legal aid on income from 
  138
solemn legal aid.  Whilst the observed change in behaviour might be the result 
of an ‘announcement effect’ (i.e. as a consequence of the passage of the 
legislation introducing fixed fees) the statistical analysis reported above, of 
itself, cannot make that link.  The fact that income from solemn work for all 
categories of firms in 2001/02 returned to its 1997/98 levels would seem to 
argue against this.  However, the number of solemn cases undertaken by 
summary ‘specialists’ did remain at the higher level. 
 
Impact on Firm Legal Aid Income 
B.78 The analysis of results reported in paragraphs B.52 to B.57 suggests that there 
has been a traceable impact of the introduction of fixed payments for legally 
aided summary work on the number of instances of, and income from, Criminal 
Advice & Assistance.  This suggests that consideration of the impact of the 
introduction of fixed payments for summary work on the incomes of firms 
providing legally aided defence should consider summary legal aid and criminal 
Advice & Assistance together.   
Table 18:  
Fee Income, 
Summary Legal Aid and Criminal Advice & Assistance  
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      3589 
Group variable (i): firm                        Number of groups   =       938 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1532                         Obs per group: min =         1 
      between = 0.5256                                        avg =       3.8 
      overall = 0.4255                                        max =         5 
                                               F(14,2637)         =     34.09 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5075                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
   aasumfees  Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval
     GEN9798 
    GEN9899  
    GEN9900  
    GEN0001  
    GEN0102  
     sumspec  
   spec9899  
   spec9900  
   spec0001  
   spec0102  
   sumnspec  
  nspec9899  
  nspec9900  
  nspec0001  
  nspec0102  
54129.83    1890.202    28.64   0.000      50423.4   578
  155.9704  2471.497     0.06   0.950      -4690.3    50
-2723.808   2565.14     -1.06   0.288    -7753.699   230
-2996.303   2647.09     -1.13   0.258    -8186.887   219
 1797.294   2700.814     0.67   0.506    -3498.636   709
52030.18    3821.806    13.61   0.000     44536.14   595
-1515.332   4261.402    -0.36   0.722    -9871.361   684
-18337.99   4396.141    -4.17   0.000    -26958.22    -97
-8179.94    4391.609    -1.86   0.063    -16791.29   431
10555.42    4563.29      2.31   0.021     1607.427   195
-16895.91   4157.634    -4.06   0.000    -25048.46   -874
2008.002    4884.444     0.41   0.681    -7569.728   115
2772.196    5134.134     0.54   0.589    -7295.142   128
7104.748    5129.754     1.39   0.166    -2954.001    17
2778.504    5293.213     0.52   0.600    -7600.768   131
     sigma_u  
     sigma_e  
         rho  
77638.642 
32784.991 
.8486676   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(937, 2637) =    19.08           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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B.79 Table 18 presents the results of a firm level fixed effects regression where the 
dependent variable is the sum of fees for Summary Legal Aid and Criminal 
Advice & Assistance.  Here (unlike Tables 14 and 15) specialisation is defined 
with respect to Summary Legal Aid. 
B.80 The estimated coefficients suggest that the average income of firms in the top 
quartile fell by a statistically significant amount on the introduction of fixed 
payments, rose in the second year to a level not statistically significantly 
different from the pre-fixed fee level but  by 2001/02 it had risen significantly 
and substantially above what it had been prior to the introduction of fixed 
payments.  The average income for the two groups of firms below the top 
quartile did not change in a statistically significant way after the introduction of 
fixed payments. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
B.81 This study has been principally concerned with the analysis of data provided by 
SLAB covering Summary Legal Aid cases in the financial years 1997/98 to 
2001/02.  This data is different from that published in SLAB’s Annual Reports 
in that it allocates cases to the year in which the application is made rather than 
when payments are made.   
B.82 At a general level, it has been shown that the ratio of legally aided cases in the 
Sheriff Summary Courts to complaints initiated rose after the introduction of 
fixed payments (Chart 8).  Much of the study has been concerned with the way 
in which different categories of solicitors’ firms have responded to the 
introduction of fixed payments.  The analysis distinguishes between firms on the 
basis of the amount of legally aided summary court work which they did in a 
financial year.  Three groups were identified: those in the top quartile; those in 
the bottom quartile; and those lying between the top and bottom quartiles. 
B.83 Firms in the top quartile, on average, have increased their number of legally 
aided summary cases since the introduction of fixed payments.  By 2001/02 this 
was by a substantial number.  Thus, although fixed payments would be lower 
than the fee per case obtained by firms prior to fixed payments, the average 
income from summary cases in 2001/02 of these firms was higher than in 
1997/98 but the difference was not statistically significant (Table 6).  The firms 
in the top quartile also increased their number of Criminal Advice & Assistance 
intimations (Table 14) and consequently the average income from this activity 
rose after the introduction of fixed payments for summary work (Table 15).  
When income from summary legal aid and criminal Advice & Assistance are 
added together these firms, on average, had a significantly higher income in 
2001/02 than in 1997/98 (Table 18).    
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B.84 The average income from Summary Legal Aid of the firms in the bottom 
quartile fluctuated greatly after the introduction of fixed payments, but was 
never below that in 1997/98 (Table 6).  The income from Criminal Advice & 
Assistance achieved by this group of firms, on average, rose after the 
introduction of fixed payments but by a statistically insignificant amount (Table 
15).  However when the two sources of income are consolidated for this group 
of firms there is no statistically significant change in overall income (Table 18). 
B.85 For the final group of firms (those lying between the top and bottom quartiles in 
1997/98) average income from summary legal aid was not different by a 
statistically significant amount in any year since the introduction of fixed 
payments (Table 6).  These firms did not increase their average number of 
legally aided cases until 2001/02 (Table 8).  Nor did this group manage to 
change their income from Criminal Advice & Assistance by a statistically 
significant amount after the introduction of fixed payments for summary legal 
aid.  Consequently the average level of income from these two sources 
combined did not change by a statistically significant amount after the 
introduction of fixed payments. 
B.86 Since the introduction of fixed payments for legally aided summary work the 
number of firms in Scotland undertaking this work has fallen significantly 
(Table 4) but, at least initially, this may have been due to the introduction of 
registration and a code of practice by the Scottish Legal Aid Board.  However, 
concentration in this work has not increased for Scotland as a whole when 
measured by the Herfindahl Index (paragraph B.68 – B.).  The number of 
solicitors’ firms representing legally aided defendants in each of Scotland’s 
summary courts in 1998/99 and 2001/02 was calculated as were the 
corresponding Herfindahl Indices.  In some respects it was surprising to find 
how many firms had represented clients in each individual court, including the 
small rural courts.  The Herfindal Index was used to take account of the fact that 
some of these firms may only have represented a very small number of clients.  
With relatively few exceptions the Firm-Equivalent of the Herfindahl Index in 
2001/02 was 4 or greater, suggesting that a reasonable number of firms were 
providing defence services in even the remotest summary court. 
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Appendix C: 
Analysis of Crown Office Data 
 
 
Introduction 
C.1. This study analyses data supplied to the research team by the Crown Office on 
the proportion of cases concluding at each stage for each summary court in 
Scotland from 1990/91 to 2001/03.  This data allows an analysis of the 
proportion of cases concluding at each of four stages. 
C.2. During the period covered by these data two major policy changes occurred in 
the Scottish criminal procedure in recent years.  The first change, introduced in 
1996, imposed mandatory Intermediate Diets.  The second policy change, 
which occurred in 1999, reformed the payment of summary legal aid from a 
“proportional” (time and line) system to an almost-fixed system.  
C.3. Mandatory Intermediate Diets were introduced in order to reduce the number of 
“cracked trials”.  Over the preceding decade the increase in legal aid 
expenditure on criminal legal aid was greatest in cases which never went to trial 
because the accused persons changed their initial pleas from ‘not guilty’ to 
‘guilty’ at, or shortly before, their trial diet.  These are often referred to as 
‘cracked trials’.  The eventual guilty pleas may have been to modified charges 
or to the original charges.  It has been argued that this phenomenon is a product 
of the institutional structure of the legal aid system (Stephen, 1998) and Scottish 
criminal procedure (Samuel, 1996). 
C.4. In announcing the proposed scheme of fixed fees for Summary Legal Aid, on 
12th October 1998, the Minister of State for Home Affairs at the Scottish Office 
said that it was designed to bring about a saving of £10m per annum in the cost 
of Summary Legal Aid.   
C.5. Neither reform changed the policy under which only those accused persons who 
plead ‘not guilty’ at the pleading diet are eligible for Summary Legal Aid.   
Those pleading ‘guilty’ at the pleading diet are only entitled to ABWOR.  The 
financial incentive has been modified under the two systems after a non-guilty 
plea at the pleading diet. Whereas under the old system, the amount of legal aid 
and assistance was proportional to the amount of work done by the lawyer in 
and out of court, under the new in the Sheriff Summary Court system the 
remuneration has become a fixed fee (this has been determined as £500 in 
2003/2004), at least until the trial has exceeded thirty minutes.  After that time, 
lawyers are remunerated proportionally on court appearances (£100 for the first 
day, £200 for the second, and £400 for every day thereafter).  
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C.6. The switch from a proportional to a fixed fees system represents a major change 
in the financial incentive to lawyers who provide criminal assistance. This 
change in policy can potentially have an effect on lawyers’ behaviour and on 
the lawyer-client relationship and hence on plea bargaining and case 
trajectories. 
C.7. In order to provide a preliminary indication of the impact of the introduction of 
fixed fees, it seems particularly important to determine statistically whether 
they have produced any modification at all in case trajectories.  
C.8. Under the null hypothesis we expect the introduction of fixed fees to have no 
impact on the trajectory of cases through the criminal procedure system.  This 
would be true if lawyers were not financially “sensitive” but motivated by “the 
interests of justice” only.  Under the alternative hypothesis, lawyers who are 
financially “conscious” modify their case management depending on the 
configuration of the corresponding financial rewards. This will ultimately be 
reflected in a change in the plea bargaining process and the trajectory of cases 
through the criminal justice system.  
C.9. This study attempts to test the former hypothesis against the alternative by 
exploiting information provided by the Crown Office.  These data provide the 
number of cases concluding at each stage in criminal procedure.  They are 
available for each Sheriff Court and for the District Courts corresponding to 
each Sheriff Court area.  They allow us to assess whether it is possible to 
identify any change in case trajectories over the system as a whole. 
C.10. The data provide us with information on the number of cases concluding at each 
stage of the legal process in both Sheriff Summary Courts and District Courts 
(see Figure 1). The dataset is related to all74 49 Scottish Sheriff Court areas 
from 1990/1991 to 2002/2003.  
C.11. As a simplification, summary criminal cases can conclude at any one of four 
stages of the criminal procedure:  
 At the first (or pleading) diet;  
 At an intermediate diet;  
 On the day of trial without evidence being led 
 At  trial after evidence is led.  
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Except for the case of Glasgow Sheriff Court for the years 1990/91 and 1991/92.  These observations are 
inconsistent with the remaining years because the Stipendiary Magistrate Court data is aggregated with 
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Figure 1: Adapted from Goriely et al (2001) 
                                                                                                                                                 
the District Court data for these years.  For all other years the Stipendiary Magistrate Court data is 
aggregated with the Sheriff Court data.  
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C.12. Figure 1 (Case trajectory) summarises the main elements of the typical path of 
summary cases of a not guilty plea case, through pleading diet; intermediate 
diet; and trial diet at which evidence is given (leading to a finding of guilty or 
not guilty). Of course, this figure represents a simplified picture. It simplifies 
the more complex and messy reality for the sake of clarity for readers who may 
not be entirely familiar with the Scottish summary process. As Goriely et al 
comment : “In reality, the trajectory of such a case is just as likely to resemble 
some variation on a theme that goes: pleading diet; continued pleading diet; 
intermediate diet (non-appearance by the accused); appearance on warrant; 
intermediate diet; continued intermediate diet; trial diet (adjourned for lack of 
an essential witness); intermediate diet; trial diet (accused convicted and case 
adjourned for reports to be obtained); sentencing diet (case adjourned because 
reports not ready); sentencing diet”.  
C.13. During the first three stages, plea bargaining may take place in order to 
determine whether the case can conclude (generally, but not exclusively, with a 
guilty plea) or proceed to the following stage until it reaches the full trial. Only 
cases involving substantial contested evidence are expected to proceed to trial. 
C.14. In order to determine whether the introduction of fixed fees has produced a 
change in the way cases are handled throughout the legal process, we can use 
the techniques typical of event studies.  There statistical tests assess whether an 
“event” has had an impact on the process under analysis.  This approach is often 
used to test for the impact of policy changes, or external shocks, on an aspect of 
economic behaviour.  Here it is used to test whether the introduction of fixed 
fees had an impact on the way cases proceed through the summary justice 
system. 
C.15. It should be noted that the data set used here does not itself relate directly to 
legally-aided cases but to all cases proceeding through the Summary Justice 
system.  Thus the results reported below do not represent a direct impact on 
Legal Aid expenditure but merely indicate whether or not changes in the Legal 
Aid system appear to have an impact on the way cases proceed through the 
criminal justice system. 
 
Econometric Specification 
C.16. We run two-way fixed-effects regressions, which in the most general 
representation take the following form: 
itt
t
ti
i
iit DDY   		

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91/1990
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.     (1) 
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Where, 
CasesofNumber Total
X Stageat  gTerminatin Cases ofNumber 
Y   
  is a generic constant term, i is the court identifier and t  is time. iD is a set of 
dummy variables taking a value of one if that observation refers to court i, and 
tD is a set of dummy variables taking a value of one whenever that observation 
refers to year t. 
C.17. This panel data specification is referred to as a two-way fixed effects panel 
because it accounts for two types of fixed effects. The first controls for all those 
factors which are specific to each court and can be referred to in broad terms as 
“court culture”.  The second effect, which is of more interest to us, is related to 
the observable differences over time.  The time effects measure any difference 
in the dependent variable for the year concerned. The constant term can be 
interpreted as the average value of the dependent variable in the absence of 
court and time effects.  Using this method we are able to address a number of 
issues of interest. 
Are there significant time effects in the way the total number of reports received 
go through Sheriff Summary Courts and District Courts?  
C.18. As a preliminary to testing for time effects on the number of cases concluding at 
each stage it is necessary to test for any changes in the nature of cases set down 
for the District and Sheriff Summary Courts by the Procurator Fiscal.  Under 
Scottish Criminal Procedure the prosecution exercises exclusive prerogative 
over the choice of venue and jurisdiction.  Changes in the prosecution’s choice 
of venue may affect the proportion of cases concluding at each stage.  We test 
for this by examining the number of cases set down for the Sheriff Summary 
and District Courts respectively as a proportion of all reports received by the 
Procurators Fiscal (PF).  Procurators Fiscal decide the appropriate prosecution 
forum for each case and when alternatives to court based proceedings should be 
used.   
C.19. Table 1 reports the output of regressions75 which analyse the changes over time 
of the number of cases which are handled through Sheriff Summary Courts and 
District Courts as a share of the Total Reports Received.  In order to facilitate 
the reading of the regression output, we have also plotted in Figures 2 and 3 the 
coefficients of the time effects with their respective confidence interval against 
time.  Only if the confidence interval falls wholly above or wholly below zero, 
can a coefficient be said to be significantly different from zero (at the standard 
levels).   
 
                                                 
75 The court effects are omitted from the Tables for brevity. 
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Table 1 
 Proportion of Total Reports Received dealt by: 
 Sheriff Summary 
Courts 
District Courts Sheriff Summary 
Courts 
District 
Courts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
y9192 -0.014 0.002   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9293 -0.017 0.004   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9394 0.043 0.050   
 (0.029) (0.024)*   
y9495 0.046 0.037   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9596 0.051 0.023   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9697 0.041 0.014   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9798 0.077 0.061   
 (0.029)** (0.024)*   
y9899 0.015 -0.010   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9900 0.009 -0.020   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9901 0.011 -0.025   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9902 0.054 -0.027   
 (0.029) (0.024)   
y9903 0.032 -0.053   
 (0.029) (0.024)*   
intdiet   0.026 0.002 
   (0.014) (0.012) 
fixfees   -0.018 -0.053 
   (0.016) (0.013)** 
Constant 0.289 0.210 0.307 0.229 
 (0.020)** (0.017)** (0.008)** (0.007)** 
Obs. 635 635 635 635 
Within R2 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.04 
Between - R2      
Overall - R2      
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
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Figure 2 
Sheriff Summary Courts as a share of Total Reports Received
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Figure 3 
District Court as a share of Total Reports Received
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C.20. The results show that on the whole time effects are statistically insignificant at 
the standard 95 percent confidence interval, and no significant change over time 
can be detected in the way cases go through the two types of courts.  The only 
exceptions are represented by the fiscal years 1994/95 for the District Courts (a 
year that does not concern our analysis) and the year 1997/98 for both Sheriff 
Summary and District Courts. The fact that this second effect can be detected in 
both types of court implies that it is probably due to more general effects, non-
specific to the separation of cases between Sheriff Summary and District 
Courts.  A more significant exception is given in column (4) of Table 1 where 
we test for any impact of the introduction of mandatory Intermediate Diets and 
Fixed Fees on the number of cases in the District Courts as a proportion of 
reports received.  The significant negative coefficient on the fixed fee dummy 
suggests that the introduction of fixed fees coincided with a reduction in the 
proportion of reports received being set down for the District Courts.  However, 
since there is no corresponding positive impact on the proportion being set 
down for Sheriff Summary Courts, this reduction is probably due to an increase 
in the number of cases being diverted from courts to be concluded by other 
means.  
 
 
Are there significant time effects once cases are handled by Sheriff Summary 
Courts? 
C.21. Table 2 shows the results of regressing76 the number of cases concluding at 
each stage as a share of all cases going through Sheriff Summary Courts.  In 
figures 4 A, B, C and D, we have plotted the coefficients and the corresponding 
confidence intervals. These figures present interesting evidence. Firstly, figure 
4B shows that the number of cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet stage 
increases stably over the whole period.  However, a sharper increase 
corresponds to the fiscal year 1996/97 when these Diets were made mandatory, 
but an increase above average (above the constant) occurs in each year post 
1994/95. 
                                                 
76 The court effects are omitted from the Tables for brevity. 
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Table 2 
Sheriff Summary Courts  
Proportion of Cases Concluding at : 
 
Pleading Diet Intermediate Diet On Day of Trial After Trial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
y9192 -0.008 0.001 0.013 -0.006 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
y9293 -0.010 -0.014 0.021 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)* (0.007) 
y9394 -0.024 0.002 0.016 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
y9495 -0.032 0.027 0.005 -0.000 
 (0.014)* (0.010)** (0.010) (0.007) 
y9596 -0.047 0.043 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010) (0.007) 
y9697 -0.062 0.089 -0.024 -0.003 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)* (0.007) 
y9798 -0.063 0.095 -0.026 -0.005 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.007) 
y9899 -0.045 0.099 -0.040 -0.015 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.007)* 
y9900 -0.044 0.114 -0.047 -0.023 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.007)** 
y9901 -0.061 0.124 -0.034 -0.029 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.007)** 
y9902 -0.095 0.131 -0.006 -0.030 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010) (0.007)** 
y9903 -0.140 0.154 0.010 -0.023 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010) (0.007)** 
Constant 0.654 0.032 0.201 0.113 
 (0.010)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.005)** 
Obs. 635 635 635 635 
Within R2 0.23 0.61 0.20 0.13 
Between - R2  0.08 0.004 0.12 0.01 
Overall - R2  0.10 0.52 0.08 0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
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Figure 4A 
SheriffSummaryCourts:CasesTerminatedAtfirstdiet
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
Coeff Lower C.I. Upper C.I.
 
 
Figure 4B 
Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Terminated At Intermediate Diet
y = 0.0156x - 0.0285
R2 = 0.9516
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
Coeff Lower C.I. Upper C.I. Linear (Coeff)
 
 
 
 
  151
Figure 4 C 
Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Terminated On Day of Trial
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Figures 4 D 
Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Terminated By Trial
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C.22. A second interesting point is that after 1998/1999 the number of cases 
concluding at the pleading diet has reduced.  Correspondingly, the number of 
cases concluding on the Day of Trial (these cases conclude before evidence is 
led and generally with a guilty plea) has increased.  Figure 5 shows, as a sub-
section, the post 1998/99 observations from Figures 4A and 4B.   Three 
important points can be observed from Figure 5. First, it underlines how these 
two effects, (a decrease in the proportion of cases concluded at the Pleading 
Diet and an increase in the proportion concluding on the day of trial), have been 
almost contemporaneous. Secondly, it also appears to show that the reduction in 
the proportion of cases which concluded at the pleading diet is greater than the 
increase in the proportion of cases which concluded on the day of trial.  A third 
piece of important evidence is that there has been a decrease in the proportion 
of cases which concluded at trial (after evidence is led).  
. 
 
Figure 5 
Sheriff Summary Courts: Cases Terminated at First Diet versus cases terminated on Day of Trial
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Are the time effects due to the introduction of fixed fees? 
C.23. In order to determine whether the time effects highlighted above correspond to 
the introduction of fixed fees, we replaced the year dummies presented above 
with dummies relative to the period when fixed fees were in place, i.e. all fiscal 
years post 1998/99. However, to isolate the impact of fixed fees from that of 
mandatory Intermediate Diets, we also include a dummy variable which takes a 
value of one for all those years after these were made mandatory, i.e. 1996/97.  
Equation (1) is modified accordingly, 
itFIXFEESINTDIETi
i
iit DDDY   	

21
49
1
  (2) 
C.24. It should be emphasised that 2 measures any impact if fixed fees in addition to 
the effect of mandatory Intermediate Diets for the years after the introduction of 
fixed fees.  Table 3 presents the results77 of these regressions for each stage of 
the cases handled by Sheriff Summary Courts. These results show that, as 
expected, the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets has unambiguously 
reduced the number of cases concluding at any other stage.  Interestingly, this 
policy has not only reduced the number of cases which proceed beyond 
intermediate diets (the intended scope of the policy), but also the number of 
cases concluding prior to the Intermediate Diet.  This phenomenon has been 
analysed in more detail in Stephen (2002, 2005). 
 
Table 3 
 Sheriff Summary Courts  
Proportion of Cases Concluding at: 
 Pleading Diet Intermediate Diet On Day of Trial After Trial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
intdiet -0.036 0.084 -0.040 -0.008 
 (0.007)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.003)* 
fixfees -0.028 0.037 0.011 -0.019 
 (0.008)** (0.005)** (0.005)* (0.004)** 
Constant 0.633 0.041 0.211 0.114 
 (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.002)** 
Obs. 635 635 635 635 
Within R2 0.14 0.56 0.12 0.12 
Between - R2      
Overall - R2     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
 
                                                 
77 Again, the court effects are omitted from the table for brevity. 
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C.25. However, whereas we expected an effect on the plea bargaining process 
induced by the introduction of a further stage to be observed, we might only 
expect the introduction of fixed fees to produce an effect only if lawyers’ 
behaviour is affected by incentives.  Under the null hypothesis 2 in equation 
(2) should be insignificantly different from zero.  If 2 is significantly different 
from zero, the change in the payment system has produced a distortion in the 
plea bargaining process.  The results in Table 3 allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis. The introduction of fixed fees has had a significant impact on the 
way cases are handled through the four stages.  Under the new payment 
scheme, a larger proportion of cases proceed beyond the pleading diet and enter 
the plea bargaining process. Interestingly, however, a smaller proportion of 
cases conclude through trial.   
C.26. It should be noted, however, that the results in Table 2 suggest that, at least as 
far as cases concluding at the pleading diet are concerned, the impact is felt 
only from 2000/01. 
C.27. Figure 6 shows that after the introduction of fixed fees, the largest effect has 
been the increase in the proportion of cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet 
stage (+8 percent of the total after these were made mandatory and a further 3.5 
percent after the introduction of fixed fees). The introduction of fixed fees has 
produced also a 1.5 percent increase in the proportion of cases concluding on 
the day of trial.  
Figure 6 
Effect of Intermediate Diets and Fixed Fees
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Figure 7 
Stages at which Cases Proceding beyond  Pleading Diet Conclude
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 Figure 7 describes these effects as a proportion of all cases going beyond the 
pleading diet.  This figure shows that the introduction of mandatory 
intermediate diets has produced a reduction in both the proportion of cases 
concluding on the first day of trial and those going to trial.  The introduction of 
fixed fees has increased by a further 6% the proportion of cases which conclude 
at the intermediate diet stage and reduced by a similar size the number of cases 
which conclude through trial.  As a share of all cases going beyond the first 
stage, the share of cases concluding on the day of trial is also reduced by a mere 
0.25%. 
 
Is there a significant difference in the impact of fixed fees on the behaviour of 
bigger courts? 
C.28. It is possible that bigger courts because of the volume of cases they handle 
might behave differently from smaller courts after the introduction of the new 
policy. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we can test whether the effect of 
the introduction of fixed fees on the courts of four big cities is larger than the 
“normal” impact of fixed fees. We can add to the specification in equation (2) a 
dummy variable which takes a value of one whenever a big city is under 
consideration. We consider four cities as bigger:  Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh 
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Table 4 
 Sheriff Summary Courts  
Proportion of Cases Concluding at: 
 FD FD ID ID DT DT BT BT 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) 3b) (4a) (4b) 
intdiet -0.036 -0.037 0.084 0.082 -0.040 -0.036 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.007)** (0.008)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.003)* (0.003)** 
fixfees -0.030 -0.029 0.034 0.035 0.015 0.012 -0.019 -0.018 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.005)* (0.004)** (0.004)** 
FFCITY 0.024 0.015 0.030 0.013 -0.049 -0.010 -0.006 -0.018 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015)** (0.019) (0.010) (0.013) 
INTDCITY  0.014  0.028  -0.060  0.018 
  (0.028)  (0.019)  (0.018)**  (0.012) 
Constant 0.633 0.633 0.041 0.041 0.212 0.212 0.114 0.114 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Obs. 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 
Within - R2 0.14 0.14 0.56 0.57 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Between- R2          
Overall - R2         
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent 
FD – Pleading Diet 
ID – Intermediate Diet 
DT – First Day of Trial 
BT – By Trial 
 
and Glasgow.  Table 4 presents the results of these regressions.  These show that 
in general the introduction of intermediate diets or fixed fees did not produce a 
greater impact in the bigger city courts.  The only exception to this result is the 
significant drop in the proportion of cases concluding on the first day of trial for 
bigger cities as shown in column (3a).  However, when the impact of the 
introduction of Mandatory Intermediate Diets is allowed to vary between the 
cities and elsewhere also (column (3b), it is found that it is impact of mandatory 
Intermediate Diets that have the impact on this  stage for the cities. 
 
Should the fixed effects be at the level of the individual court or the 
Sheriffdom? 
C.29. The analysis thus far has been based on the assumption that the fixed effects are 
at the level of the individual Sheriff Summary Court.  Differences in the fixed 
effects have been attributed to differences in ‘court culture’.  An alternative 
assumption is that the fixed effects are at the level of the Sheriffdom.  This 
would imply that the underlying process which generates differences in the 
proportion of cases concluding at each stage is common for each Sheriffdom 
but differ across Sheriffdoms.  This might be a consequence of prosecutorial 
policy since the COPFS is organised on the basis of Sheriffdoms.  We therefore 
investigate whether a model with individual court fixed effects is superior to 
  157
one based on Sheriffdom fixed effects.  There are six different Sheriffdoms in 
Scotland, and we have listed them in Table 5.  
Table 5 - Sheriffdoms 
Sheriffdom Number 
of 
Courts 
Courts 
Grampian  16 Aberdeen, Banff, Dingwall, Dornoch, Elgin, Fort Williams, 
Inverness, Kirkwall, Lerwick, Lochmaddy, Peterhead, 
Portree, Stonehaven, Stornoway, Tain, and Wick 
Tayside  10 Alloa, Arbroath, Cupar, Dundee, Dunfermline, Falkirk, 
Forfar, Kirkaldy,  Perth, Stirling 
Lothian  7 Duns, Edinburgh, Haddington, Jedburgh, Linlithgow,  
Peebles,  Selkirk 
North 
Strathclyde  
8 Campbeltown, Dumbarton, Dunoon, Greenock, Kilmarnock, 
Oban, Paisley, Rothesay 
South 
Strathclyde 
7 Airdrie, Ayr, Dumfries, Hamilton, Kirkcudbright, Lanark, 
Stranraer 
Glasgow 1 Glasgow and Strathkelvin 
 
 
C.30. The even-numbered columns in Table 6 present the results of regressions based 
on Sheriffdom fixed effects.  To aid comparison we model the fixed effects of 
five of the Sheriffdoms as deviations from that of the Glasgow and Strathkelvin 
Sheriffdom.  Thus the fixed effect for each of these other five Sheriffdoms is 
that for Glasgow and Strathkelvin plus that for the Sheriffdom concerned.  
These fixed effects can be interpreted as the average proportion of cases 
concluding at each stage over the whole period under investigation.  As well as 
the fixed effects the results reported in Table 6 show the impact of the 
introduction of mandatory Intermediate Diets and the introduction of fixed fees.  
The odd columns in the table show the results when the fixed effects are at the 
level of the individual court replicating Table 4. 
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Table 6 
 Sheriff Summary Courts 
Proportion of Cases Concluding at: 
 FD FD ID ID DT DT BT BT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 SSFSST SSFSST SSISST SSISST SSDSST SSDSST SSTRSST SSTRSST 
intdiet -0.036 -0.036 0.084 0.084 -0.040 -0.040 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007)** (0.010)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.003)* (0.004) 
fixfees -0.028 -0.028 0.037 0.037 0.011 0.011 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.008)** (0.011)* (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.005)* (0.007) (0.004)** (0.004)** 
grampian  0.237  -0.010  -0.176  -0.051 
  (0.032)**  (0.013)  (0.015)**  (0.005)** 
tayside  0.182  0.004  -0.155  -0.031 
  (0.033)**  (0.013)  (0.016)**  (0.004)** 
lothian  0.183  0.006  -0.136  -0.053 
  (0.033)**  (0.013)  (0.017)**  (0.005)** 
nstrath  0.097  -0.008  -0.091  0.002 
  (0.033)**  (0.013)  (0.016)**  (0.006) 
sstrath  0.153  0.001  -0.146  -0.007 
  (0.033)**  (0.013)  (0.016)**  (0.008) 
glasgow  0.455  0.044  0.356  0.145 
(Constant)   (0.032)**  (0.012)**  (0.015)**  (0.004)** 
Constant 0.633  0.041  0.211  0.114  
 (0.004)**  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.002)**  
Observations 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 635 
Within - R2 0.14 0.26 0.56 0.49 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.25 
Between- R2          
Overall - R2         
LR test   -470.83  -189.79  -428.46  -381.65 
  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
C.31. Comparison of the odd and even columns of Table 6 suggests that the 
alternative specifications have little impact on the estimated effects of the 
introduction of mandatory Intermediate Diets and Fixed Fees.  There is almost 
no variation in the estimated coefficients78.  However, there is a small reduction 
in the standard errors of the estimated coefficients with the Sheriffdom fixed 
effects.  
C.32. However, the change in fixed effects results in the estimated coefficients on 
fixed fees for cases concluding on the day of trial and the introduction of 
mandatory Intermediate Diets on cases going to trial being not significantly 
different from zero.  The most striking feature of the change in specification is 
that it highlights differences across Sheriffdoms in the proportion of cases 
                                                 
78 But see further below. 
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concluding at the pleading diet.  They range from 45.5% of cases in Glasgow 
and Strathkelvin to 69.2% in Grampian and the Highlands.  There are 
apparently no differences across Sheriffdoms in the proportion of cases 
concluding at the Intermediate Diet.  Differences in proportions concluding on 
the Day of Trial or after trial reflect the proportions going beyond the pleading 
diet.  It should, however, be noted that this specification constrains the fixed 
effects to be constant over the period and the policies to have the same impact 
across all Sheriffdoms. 
 
 
Conclusion 
C.33. This study has analysed data provided by the COPFS on the stage at which 
summary cases conclude as they proceed through the Sheriff Summary Court 
system.  The results suggest that after the introduction of fixed payments there 
was a statistically significant change in the trajectory of cases through Sheriff 
Summary Courts.  After allowing for differences in ‘court culture’ it was found 
that on average the proportion of cases concluding at the pleading diet fell, as 
did the proportion concluding after evidence was led.  However, the change 
appears only to have begun from 2000/01.  On the other hand, the proportion of 
cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet and on the day of the trial rose.  These 
results are consistent with defence agents’ responding to the change in 
incentives brought about by the introduction of fixed fees. 
C.34. Tests were also carried out to determine whether the response to the 
introduction of fixed fees differed between the Sheriff Summary Courts in the 
four major cities and those elsewhere.  There is no statistically significant 
difference between the cities and elsewhere once the differences in responses to 
the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets are taken into account. 
C.35. Further tests were carried out to determine whether differences in ‘court 
culture’ were, in fact, differences in practises across Sheriffdoms.  Whilst it was 
found that there are statistically significant differences in the proportion of 
cases concluding on the first day of trial, on the day of the trial and after 
evidence is led between Sheriffdoms there is no difference in the proportion of 
cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet.  The results for the impact of the 
introduction of fixed payments are unaffected by replacing ‘court culture’ with 
‘Sheriffdom culture’. 
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Appendix D: 
Postal Survey, Telephone Survey of and Face-to-Face 
Interviews with Defence Solicitors 
Outline of Method 
D1. The Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB) provided the research team with the 
register of Criminal Legal Aid practitioners. From this list a random sample of 
three hundred practitioners was drawn. The initial survey size was sufficiently 
large to ensure a reasonable geographic representation. 
D2. After development of initial draft surveys it was realised that completion of the 
survey by telephone interview alone would take a considerable amount of 
respondents’ time. Many of the initial questions were closed questions, where 
respondents would only answer ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’. Many of these 
questions were separated out to form two questionnaires, one to be conducted 
by post, the other by telephone. The postal questionnaire contained 13 questions 
seeking information about the respondent and their firm. In addition, it asked 
respondents to note the three most pressing issues surrounding fixed payments 
so that the telephone questionnaire could be amended in light of these issues. It 
also asked respondents to indicate a telephone number and time at which an 
interviewer would be most likely to reach them.  
D3. The telephone questionnaire was much broader in scope than the postal 
questionnaire and contained open questions and different routes through the 
questionnaire, depending on the respondent’s answers to certain questions. 
Questions of this style could not have been asked easily in a postal 
questionnaire. In total the questionnaire contained thirty-six questions within 
four sections. After piloting the questionnaire on a small number of defence 
agents minor changes were made, but even where respondents gave lengthy 
answers to open questions the session could be completed in less than ten 
minutes. This was felt an acceptable length. 
D4. The telephone questionnaire could only be delivered to those who responded to 
the postal questionnaire. Of the three hundred first round surveys, seventy 
positive replies were received. It is worth noting that ten letters were received 
from solicitors indicating that they did not undertake criminal legal aid. A 
second letter and copy of the postal survey was sent to those who had not 
responded in any way. Replies from this second round increased the number of 
total useable responses to ninety-two. A response rate of one third (including 
those for whom the survey was not applicable) is relatively high for this kind of 
exercise. It was decided that the costs of further attempts to encourage 
participation were likely to outweigh the benefits. 
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D5. Two interviewers delivered the telephone questionnaire over the course of five 
weeks. Of the 92 postal respondents 62 telephone interviews were completed. 
The remaining thirty respondents decided either not to participate further or 
were unavailable for interview during the five week period. This is not as large 
a sample as was originally hoped for. As a result, all responses should be taken 
as indicative of defence solicitors’ views rather than representative of them. 
Throughout the interview process responses were strictly confidential and 
available only to those in the research team. It is not possible to identify 
individual respondents within the report. 
D6. Following the telephone survey of defence solicitors we conducted six follow-
up face-to-face interviews with ‘non-stakeholder’ defence solicitors. Such face-
to-face interviews allowed for exploration in greater depth and at greater length 
of some of the frequently raised issues in the telephone survey allowed; and 
these non-stakeholder face-to-face interviews with defence solicitors covered a 
wide geographical area. These follow-up interviews with non-stakeholder 
defence solicitor lasted between one and two hours. The aim was to help to 
understand some of the more frequently mentioned matters raised by defence 
telephone interviewees. These face-to-face interviews are referred to by the 
report as, ‘face-to-face non-stakeholder defence solicitor follow-up interviews’. 
 
I Postal Survey Results 
D7. The first section of the postal questionnaire gathered basic information on the 
respondent, their specialisation and how and where they spent their working 
time. Chart 1 outlines the status of the survey respondents. 
D8. Respondents were dispersed across levels of seniority, though were skewed 
towards more senior positions within firms. All respondents were registered 
with SLAB. 
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Chart 1 
 
D9. The survey asked whether respondents also practised civil law. Sixty-six 
respondents did, twenty-six did not. Those who did practice civil law were 
asked to indicate how much of their work was civil law practice. The response 
was split almost evenly with thirty-two respondents indicating that it accounted 
for less than 50% of their time and thirty-three respondents indicating that it 
accounted for more than 50%. One eligible respondent did not reply. 
D10. Respondents were asked to indicate what percentage of their criminal law work 
was conducted under legal aid. Twenty-six respondents (28%) said it accounted 
for less than fifty percent of their criminal law work, the remaining sixty-six that 
it constituted more than half of their total criminal law work. They were further 
asked to allocate their time spent on criminal law work within each court. Table 
1 details the results.  
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Table 1 
 District Sheriff 
Summary 
Sheriff Solemn High 
Missing 2 2 2 2 
Less than 
25% 
62 5 86 85 
Between 
26% and 
50% 
21 13 4 5 
Between 
51% and 
75% 
6 45 0 0 
Between 
76% and 
100% 
1 27 0 0 
D11. The data in the table indicate the number of respondents within each category. 
Only nine respondents spent more than 25% of their time in solemn proceedings 
and no-one spent more than half their time in solemn cases at the Sheriff Court 
or High Court. Respondents’ work was centred on the District and especially the 
Sheriff Summary courts. 
D12. The final questions asked about the respondents were whether they had been a 
criminal practitioner prior to the introduction of fixed payments and whether 
they were at the same firm now as they had been when fixed payments were 
introduced. Seventy-five respondents were criminal practitioners prior to the 
introduction of fixed payments, sixteen were not and one respondent did not 
answer the question. Fifty-eight respondents indicated they were with the same 
firm as they were when fixed payments were introduced. 
D13. After gathering details on the respondent, the subject of the survey moved to the 
firm for which the respondent worked. Respondents were asked to note the 
number of employees in each of the categories: Partner, Associate, Assistant, 
Trainee and Other Employee. Table 2 indicates responses in each category. 
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Table 2 
Partner Associate Assistant Trainee Other 
Employee 
All  
3.28 0.83 1.17 0.52 8.03 13.83 Mean 
1 0 0 0 0 6 Mode 
2 0 1 0 4 8 Median 
 It is clear from the table that there are a large number of small firms within the 
sample and a few very much larger firms. The modal value indicates the most 
frequent number of staff in each category within each firm. The median value is 
that which lies in the middle of the distribution. Since the mean, or average, 
number of staff members is above both the mode and the median value there are 
a few ‘outlier’ large firms and many more small firms. The most common firm 
had six members of staff. 
D14. Respondents were further asked to indicate how partners, associates and 
assistants specialised in criminal and civil law, or whether there was no 
specialisation. Thirty-seven had no partners specialising in criminal law, fifty-
eight none in civil law. There were 29 respondents who worked in firms with 
one partner specialising in criminal law, but only 16 with a partner specialising 
in civil law. Only two respondents had four or more partners specialising in 
criminal law and none in civil law. Given the information gathered on the size 
of firms and that all respondents were registered with SLAB this result is not 
surprising. This result was replicated for assistants and associates, although the 
results were starker, with less specialisation in either criminal or civil law. 
D15. Respondents were questioned about the balance between criminal and civil 
work undertaken by the firm for which they worked as a whole as well as 
individual staff members. Forty-seven respondents indicated more than fifty 
percent of the work undertaken by them was criminal work, forty-two that more 
than fifty percent of their work was civil work.  
D16. To gauge further the size of criminal law firms, respondents were asked to 
indicate the number of offices operated by their firm, if they had more than one 
office whether those offices were in the same town, and if they had offices in 
more than one town whether they were within the same sheriffdom. Fifty-seven 
respondents worked within one-office firms, with thirty-four working in firms 
with more than one office. Of these thirty-four, twenty-five had offices in more 
than one town. Very few respondents had offices in different sheriffdoms and 
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this seemed more prevalent in urban areas. Respondents were asked to detail the 
courts in which they worked. Not all did, but it was clear that rural solicitors 
could travel extensively while remaining within one sheriffdom, while solicitors 
in more urban areas could move between sheriffdoms though not travel as 
extensively. 
II Telephone Survey Results 
D17. The telephone survey consisted of four sections. Section one sought to 
determine any changes in the respondents’ activities or behaviour due to the 
introduction of fixed payments, section two examined the effect of fixed 
payments on the respondents’ firms, section three sought respondents’ views on 
the fixed payments system and section four concluded by asking respondents for 
their observations on the behaviour of other defence agents. The research team 
interviewers noted respondents who wished to discuss their answers at length, 
irrespective of answer, for subsequent face-to-face interviews. In total 62 
interviews were conducted. It proved impossible to conclude a telephone 
interview with the remaining 30 postal respondents. 
D18. The first group of questions sought to determine changes in the respondents’ 
activities. The first question asked about changes in the balance of civil and 
criminal work undertaken by respondents. Fifty respondents said it had made no 
difference, nine that it had made a difference and three respondents did not 
answer the question as they had not been defence agents at the time of the 
introduction of fixed payments. A follow-up question was asked to those nine 
who believed that the balance of their work had changed. All nine said they now 
undertook less criminal defence work. 
D19. Respondents were asked whether the introduction of fixed payments had altered 
the balance in their legally aided work between summary and solemn 
proceedings. Fifty-four said that it had not, three that it had, two were unsure 
and three did not answer the question. The follow-up question to the three 
respondents who believed that it had altered the balance of their work all said 
they now did more summary criminal work. 
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D20. Questions on the respondents’ own activities concluded by examining changes 
in Advice and Assistance. Respondents were asked first about the volume of 
Advice and Assistance grants they applied for following the introduction of  
Chart 2 
 fixed payments and subsequently whether they still undertook the same amount 
of work per grant. Chart 2 details responses. 
D21. It is clear that most defence agents believe the introduction of fixed fees has had 
no impact on either the number of grants and the amount of work they 
undertake, although seven respondents believed they now do more work per 
grant than they did previously. 
D22. The survey sought to determine how individual agent’s behaviour changed as a 
result of the introduction of fixed payments. Respondents were asked whether 
the overall amount of their client contact had increase, decreased or remained 
the same. The majority (39) believe that it had remained the same. A substantial 
minority (18) believed that it had decreased, with only one respondent believing 
it had increased. Four respondents either did not answer the question or were 
unsure. This finding was reinforced when respondents were asked about the use 
of precognition. The majority (35) believed that there were now fewer 
precognitions, with twenty respondents believing there had been no change and 
only one believing there were more. Six were unsure or didn’t respond. From 
Advice and Assistance Grants
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Response
N
o.
 o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
No. of Grants
Work per Grant
No. of Grants 2 3 50 3 3 1
Work per Grant 7 1 44 5 3 2
More Less The same Don't know Inapplicable Missing
  167
the subsequent open question directed to those who believed there were fewer 
precognitions the majority opinion was that since it was not covered in the fixed 
payment there was a reduced incentive to undertake them. Many solicitors noted 
that the Procurator Fiscal office in their area has been helpful in providing 
witness statements. 
D23. Relationships with depute fiscals were not seen to have changed for 38 
respondents, but 19 respondents felt their relationship with depute fiscals had 
changed. Those who felt their relationship had changed were asked to describe 
that change. This was due principally to seeking more statements from depute 
fiscals to replace precognitions. Some defence agents felt that it was 
increasingly difficult to get in touch with depute fiscals and that this had altered 
the relationship. One respondent suggested that this may be because fixed 
payments should not have impacted in the role played by depute fiscals, but has 
since it has altered the way in which defence agents interact with them. 
D24. The final question relating to the respondents’ behaviour in light of the 
introduction of fixed payments asked whether they had any impact on the 
pleading advice given to clients. The response was a clear ‘no’, with fifty-one 
respondents saying it had no impact, six that it had and five did not respond. A 
number of solicitors noted that while they may give advice it is their client who 
determines whether or not to plead guilty and this was unlikely to be influenced 
by fixed fees. 
D25. The survey moved on to consider the impact of the introduction of fixed 
payments for the respondents’ firms. The first three questions focused on firm 
size and resources. The first question asked respondents whether fixed payments 
had led to more or fewer partners and associates within their firm, the second 
whether there had been more or fewer trainees taken on. Forty-five and forty-
three respondents respectively noted that there had been no change in their firm. 
Seven and nine respectively believed there were less staff and only one and 
three that there were more. In all fixed payments seem to have had little impact 
on firm size. 
D26. Where it was clear there had been a change was in the number of precognition 
agents: the subject of the third question. Here, thirty-two respondents believed 
there were now fewer agents, twenty-one that there had been no change and 
only four that there were now more employed in their firm. This would appear 
in line with the decreased reliance on witness statements collected on behalf of 
the respondents’ clients and the increased use of statements taken on behalf of 
the Procurators Fiscal. Responses were less clear-cut when asked about whether 
firms’ methods of employing and paying precognition agents had changed.  
Twenty-three respondents believed that it had changed, while thirty-one 
believed that it had not. Four believed it remained the same. When those who 
believed employment/payment practices had changed were asked to describe 
those changes most said that fixed payments meant that precognition agents too 
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had to be paid on a fixed fee basis. This made the agents less likely to follow-up 
difficult witnesses and to reduce the number of precognitions, perhaps to none, 
and seek statements from the police and Procurators Fiscal. 
D27. The final questions asked regarding the impact of fixed payments on the firm 
sought to determine changes in the volume and balance of work undertaken. 
The impact on the amount of criminal defence work undertaken by respondents’ 
firms did not seem too great, with forty respondents indicating that it had made 
no change, ten that it had reduced the amount of criminal defence work 
undertaken and only six that it had increased it. It may be the case that firms 
were already mostly specialised and that there was little scope for the balance of 
work undertaken to change. The balance between summary and solemn work 
too was little changed, fifty-five respondents indicating that there had been no 
change.  
D28. Section three of the telephone survey sought respondents’ comments on the 
fixed payments system. The first question asked the respondent about the impact 
of the introduction of fixed payments on their own income, the second the 
impact on the firm for which they worked. There was no majority response for 
any option available to respondents. Chart 3 details responses. 
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D29. The most frequent response was that income for both individuals and firms had 
decreased as a result of the introduction of fixed payments. There was also a 
substantial number of respondents who did not know the impact. Given the 
sample size and dispersion of answers it is difficult to give a definitive answer 
as to the impact on self-perceived income changes. What is clear is that 
throughout the survey and over a number of different questions the rate of 
income received by defence agents per case was a concern. Statistical analysis 
conducted elsewhere in this report indicates that income overall has not fallen. 
D30. The final section of the telephone interviews sought to determine the 
respondents’ impressions of the behaviour of other defence agents. This section 
asked many of the same questions asked to the respondents about their own 
actions and allows a comparison to be made between how they report that they 
have responded to the introduction of fixed payments and how they believe 
fixed payments have impacted on other defence agents. 
D31. The first question asked about client contact. Respondents believed that other 
solicitors had reduced their client contact more than they had. Chart 4 shows the 
difference in responses, 
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D32. It is clear that more respondents believed that other defence agents had reduced 
the amount of client contact they undertook than had reduced their own client 
contact. Perceptions of other people’s activities are never as good as concrete 
evidence of individual activity, but it may be that some agents were unwilling to 
suggest during interview that they had reduced client contact, but that in general 
that was one of the outcomes of the fixed payment process. 
D33. Respondents were clear that they believed fixed payments had tended to reduce 
the number of courts in which other solicitors operated. Thirty believed they had 
tended to reduce the number of courts worked, only five that they had led to an 
increase. Sixteen believed there had been no change and fifteen did not know. 
There is good reason to believe this perception is correct, since a fixed payments 
system makes travel much less attractive and a concentration within one 
geographic area much more attractive. 
D34. There was very little difference between respondents’ use of precognitions and 
their perception of their use made by others. Although many more did not know 
how other people had reacted, the number of respondents answering ‘more’ and 
‘less’ was almost identical between each question. 
D35. Respondents were asked whether they thought the introduction of fixed 
payments had, in general, led to defence solicitors modifying their use of 
Advice and Assistance as compared to previous system under time and line. 
Twenty-nine respondents did not know, the same number (15) believed it was 
now used more as believed it was used as much as before and three believed it 
was used less. 
D36. Little change was found in how respondents had changed and how they 
perceived others to have changed in their dealings with Procurators Fiscal. 
Almost the same number of respondents believed there had been a change 
between the two questions, although many more were unsure about how others 
had reacted. Those who believed there had been a change were asked to 
describe the change. Comments on how others had responded were largely the 
same as the respondents described their own activity: mainly that more reliance 
was placed on getting as much information as possible from the depute fiscals 
and that depute fiscals were doing more work and therefore more difficult to 
contact prior to a hearing. 
D37. The starkest change in responses surrounded pleading. When respondents were 
asked to describe how their own behaviour had changed, fifty-five said that no 
change had taken place. Chart 5 shows how that changed when they were asked 
about the pleading practices of other defence agents. 
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Chart 5 
 
D38. There is a stark change in perception. Respondents did not think the 
introduction of fixed payments had altered their own pleading practice, but were 
considerably more likely to perceive a change in, or at least be unsure about the 
pleading practices of others. Almost three times as many respondents believed 
others had changed their pleading practices as had changed themselves. Those 
who believed practices had changed were asked to explain why. A common 
justification was that the fixed payments system provided an incentive not to 
plead guilty until later in the process. This was also driven by the fee payment, 
which made it more difficult to gather information and placed increasingly 
reliance on statements provided by the Crown.  
D39. The final question asked about the overall effectiveness of criminal defence 
work as a result of fixed payments. Forty-one respondents believed that it had 
an impact, seventeen did not and the remainder was unsure. An array of reasons 
was put forward for an impact or not on effectiveness. Many said effectiveness 
had been decreased because fewer witness statements were taken now and there 
was less investigation of the facts surrounding the case, and therefore the quality 
of representation was affected. This was blamed on the small fixed payment 
available for each case. Others disagreed, pointing out that as businesses, 
solicitors had to supply a service to their clients to the best of their ability 
irrespective of the conditions if they wished to please them. Some pointed out 
Pleading 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
um
be
r 
of
 R
es
po
nd
en
ts
Pleading - own
Pleading - Others
Pleading - own 6 51 2
Pleading - Others 22 19 21
Yes, some impact No impact at all DK
  172
that the fixed payment was likely to lead to greater efficiency and the removal 
of unnecessary waste within the system. A point made by a few respondents, 
though something that could not be verified from the data available to the 
research team, was that the average age of criminal defence solicitors is 
increasing.79 This not only reflected, it was felt, the relatively unattractive career 
available in criminal law practice, but also presented a problem for the future 
provision of criminal lawyers. 
 
III Follow-up Face-to-Face Interviews with (non-
stakeholder) Defence Solicitors 
D40. Following the telephone survey of defence solicitors we conducted six follow-
up face-to-face interviews with ‘non-stakeholder’ defence solicitors. These face-
to face interviews allowed for exploration in greater depth and at greater length 
of some of the frequently raised issues in the telephone survey allowed. These 
face-to-face interviews with ‘non-stakeholder defence solicitors interviewed 
covered a wide geographical area.  
Aim of the fixed payment system 
D41. Without exception all of the non-stakeholder defence solicitor interviewees 
believed that the main aim behind the introduction of fixed payments was to 
curtail spiralling expenditure on summary criminal legal aid. 
“I perceive the fixed fee to have been introduced primarily to allow the Board to 
manage the cost of it and to make it easier for them to do so.  Because prior to 
that what you had was an open-ended system where legal aid certificates are 
granted and the Board have absolutely no idea when that account’s submitted 
what it’s going to be.  So they were effectively leaving themselves open to a bill 
ranging between £100 and £1,000.”  [face to face non-stakeholder interview, 
defence solicitor 2] 
“[The aim was] to try and get control of how much was being spent and take 
away some of the discretion from the lawyers who were… some of whom were 
maybe spending too much time either because they wanted to make more 
money out of it or because they felt that, you know, the case deserved it.  But it 
seemed unfair that one person would be spending £3,000 worth of time on one 
case and somebody else might be spending £200.” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 4] 
D42. Non-stakeholder defence solicitor interviewees frequently referred to the 
suggestion that criminal defence solicitors were exploiting the time and line 
system and therefore had to be brought under control. 
                                                 
79 This study was explicitly not commissioned to investigate the possible changes in the demography of 
defence solicitors. 
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“some firms maybe did have an average case cost of £500 but there were 
certainly some firms screwing the arse off the system and getting £1,200 to 
£1,300.  They’re the ones that will have felt the pinch more because they have 
been, if not abusing, certainly maximizing the regulations” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2]  
D43. Some expressed disappointment at what they felt to be an excessively cynical 
view of defence solicitors as a whole. 
“that’s why I find it really galling,  there’s this common or continuing perception 
that criminal legal aid practitioners are at it and have been from time immemorial.  
When in reality we are more heavily audited and watched over now than I think 
we’ve ever been, within the context of a fixed fee.  Which doesn’t make sense.  
Because we are getting the same amount of money whether we do nothing or 
loads, we’re still getting £500.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence 
solicitor 2] 
Underlying aims 
D44. A commonly held view was that criminal defence practitioners were an ‘easy 
target’ due to their unpopularity with the profession at large; SLAB and society 
in general.  Suspicions were frequently voiced with regard to possible ulterior 
motives behind the introduction of fixed payments. 
  
“I suspect that at the end of the day the board would dearly love for private 
practice to be eradicated and probably for there to be state employed lawyers 
doing everything because I think they perceive that that would be cheaper.  Of 
course once you’ve got a fixed fee and that fixed fee is less expensive than the 
real cost of defending a case then clearly it’s a favourable scenario” [face to face 
non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2]  
 
“You whittle them away to the point where people say, I can’t afford to do this 
anymore.  Maybe that’s the master plan, I don’t know” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2] 
 
“what seems to be happening is that people think that they’re just trying to get rid 
of us to the extent that they can then introduce a public defender system where 
they have absolute control and if somebody doesn’t do what they want, they can 
sack them” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
 
“representation in criminal trials has never been regarded by the press or the 
public as a good thing.  It is never regarded until you yourself are facing 
prosecution as a good thing that lawyers get paid for representing the accused.  
So it’s not an area where there is ever going to be a groundswell of public opinion 
in support of those who represent those accused of crime.  It’s a fact of life” [face 
to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
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Level of fee 
D45. Without exception all solicitors interviewed made reference to the level of the 
core fixed payment.  Views differed as to whether the level was sufficient in 
representing the average cost of a summary case. 
 
“it’s my understanding that the average cost of a case was in excess of £500 
which is the fixed fee for a summary criminal case. So the £500 isn’t a true 
reflection of what the average cost of case was before it was imposed. I think it 
was nearer £700 or £800.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence 
solicitor 2] 
 
“Its…that’s a good amount of money if it’s a straight forward case and it’s 
something that once you’ve got the evidence you can advise a client that there’s 
enough there, they should be pleading guilty and try and mitigate it.  So you can 
bargain, if it’s settled at the intermediate trial diet or over the telephone then 
that’s a reasonable amount,… but the minute you start having to go into taking 
precognitions from witnesses and preparing for a trial, it would need to be, I think 
to justify the time, I think it would need to be about, at least double that and then 
you could think well that’s fair remuneration but it’s not brilliant.” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 1] 
D46. However frustration was expressed about the fact that the level had not been 
increased since its introduction in 1999. 
 
“Legal Aid hasn’t been increased since 1992… it’s difficult to equate legal aid 
rates from 1992 to 2004 where we are now because there’s a different mode of 
payment.  Which is, if one were being cynical, quite nice in a way for the board to 
avoid answering the question, or the government or the Executive.  But in reality 
we’ve had fixed fees now at £500… for five years in reality. Well what £500 
bought in 1999 is not what you’ll get for £500 now.  So there’s been a further 
reduction in terms of the retail price index, never mind the fact that we haven’t 
had an increase for twelve years. So we’re doing the same amount if not maybe 
more work for less.’ [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2] 
 
“to be fixed on £500 in 1998 or whenever it was and think right we’ll just leave it 
at that because my level of wages you know every year my costs go up, rental of 
property goes up, my family is growing up and it’s difficult to say to them that 
we’re going to get poorer every year for as long as, well for the foreseeable 
future.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
 
 
“The levels should be increased by at least 40%... you should be having £800 as 
the basic” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6]   
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D47. However some solicitors – particularly those based in more rural areas or 
smaller cities - accepted that the level of the fee, in their experience, was 
sufficient. 
“leaving the court time aside, the fee is not bad taking a broad axe approach to 
what’s generally involved in a summary trial.” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 3] 
D48. Even the rural based solicitors recognised the plight of the big city defence 
solicitors. 
“I don’t know why they bother in Glasgow actually.  I don’t see how they survive 
on it…  What used to happen was the average cost of a summary case was 
something like £200-250 in Dumfries… and the comparable figure in Glasgow at 
the time I think was £1,400.  Because it would cost us about £200-300 to do a 
case, it would cost about £1,400 in Glasgow because they would adjourn 2 or 3 
times, they’d have all day wasted in court.  And that’s just the way it works, so the 
fixed fee is fine for us.  But they’re not going to go on being… and that’s why we 
still take precognitions and do all these sort of things, but it’s not going to go on 
being fine indefinitely.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
 
‘Exceptional cases’ 
D49. Whilst all of the defence solicitors were aware that the regulations permitted 
SLAB to decide whether a solicitor should not receive fixed payments and 
instead receive payment based on a time and line system,  in certain exceptional 
circumstances, and subject to certain conditions, all considered the criteria to be 
satisfied in achieving such permission to be prohibitively restrictive. 
“I’ve never even thought about applying for it.” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 5] 
“I have never been successful, no.  Nor has anybody that I know.” [face to face 
non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 3] 
 
Swings & Roundabouts 
D50. Many defence solicitors expressed dissatisfaction that as professionals they are 
being paid on a ‘swings and roundabouts’ basis rather than simply being paid 
for the work that they do. 
“For a professional person who spent god knows how many years trying to get to 
grips with the system…  In most professions as you become better at something, 
you become more efficient and perhaps you’re in a position to cost more, or to 
put yourself out at a higher rate.  There’s no reflection of that here.  Somebody 
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who stands up on their feet for the first time and somebody who’s got twenty 
years’ experience charge out at the same rate.  That’s quite unusual for an 
established, independent profession, and to some extent that’s quite galling.” 
[defence solicitor 2]. 
D51. However it was accepted that, as a result of the swings and roundabouts, 
sometimes you would be paid more for a case under the fixed fee system than it 
would have attracted under time and line. 
“if say you’ve settled at the intermediate trial diet… after you’ve seen the 
evidence, if that is you can get hold of the evidence… you could settle for simply 
you getting a copy of the charge, reading a couple of statements and then saying 
to the client “look there’s enough corroboration here, lets see if we can plead 
guilty to a lesser charge or lets see what negotiating we can do and we’ll try to 
get you credit for pleading as early as possible” so for… spending ten minutes 
making that decision I could get 300 or 500 quid, and they’re nice to get.” [face to 
face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 1] 
D52. It was frequently cited however that the positive ‘swings’ like these were rare 
and by no means balanced out the number of ‘roundabout’ cases for which the 
remuneration under fixed payments was significantly less than would have been 
earned under time and line. 
“that’s one I can remember because it happened last week… and I have possibly 
another one coming up next week that will be like that.  But from this year they 
are the only ones I can remember where it’s jolly good, jolly nice and I’m glad all I 
have to do is fill this form in.  The rest of them have been… battles.” [face to face 
non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 1] 
D53. A common criticism of the ‘swings and roundabouts’ argument was that over 
the passage of time since the introduction of the fixed payment scheme the 
Board seem to be minimising the positive ‘swings’.  A frequently cited example 
of this was in relation to the decision by SLAB that ‘failures to appear’ could no 
longer attract a separate legal aid certificate. 
“potentially not an awful lot of work may have to go into it, a swing, a favourable 
swing if you want.  But the case for which you have failure to appear might have 
20 witnesses in it and you might have a file that thick for it…  And there was the 
rough with the smooth, but they’ve taken that away.  That just went, you couldn’t 
apply.”  [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2]  
“they seem to be taking away the swings or the cases where… for example if 
somebody pled not guilty to a failure to appear, you used to get two separate 
certificates but they put a stop to that.  So they seem to be cutting away at the 
swings.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
“And you just think, what the hell are they playing at?  And it’s just arbitrary.  It’s 
like “it’s my ball” you know what I mean?  “It’s my ball, I don’t like the sides, I’m 
away home, no game”.  That’s not negotiation, it’s not discussion, that’s just 
taking away what little swings, favourable swings if you like… so the swings and 
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roundabouts thing doesn’t work.” (face to face non-stakeholder interview defence 
solicitor 2) 
D54. However there was an appreciation that legal aid is funded from the public 
purse and, as such, expenditure must be justifiable. 
“it is a public purse and it has to be seen to be value for money.  And I don’t know 
how you go about that.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 
2] 
Changes in behaviour / practice 
Waiting-Time in Court 
D55. Defence solicitors, particularly those based in urban areas, made reference to the 
issue of time spent waiting in court.  Many felt it unfair that they could 
frequently spend a number of hours waiting in court for a case to call and 
receive no remuneration for this time at all. 
“If you’re on first between 10am and 10 past 10am, that’s you.  But if you’re still 
there at half past 12, that’s 2 and a half hours where you’ve earned nothing.  You 
can’t generate income, you can’t do other things because you’re sitting in a court, 
and that’s the swings and roundabouts again.  You know, you’ve just got to, 
you’ve got to live with that.  But it can be frustrating.  It can be even more 
frustrating if you’ve got a good trial and you don’t get going, you don’t get started 
and you’re there till 3 or 4 in the afternoon.  You’ve earned nothing at all and then 
you’ve got to come back the next time.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview 
defence solicitor 2] 
D56. As a result of the need to combat the issue of no payment for waiting time, 
many defence agents altered their practice to try and minimise this effect.  A 
‘conveyor belt’ system of managing cases emerged as a result of the need to get 
through as many cases as possible, in as little time as possible. 
“you are now getting larger firms chasing and specialising in the business and 
churning them through like a sausage machine.” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 3] 
“Some sheriffs in Edinburgh are astonished if you’re not in court exactly when 
they want you.  They have no concept of the fact that you might be covering 5 or 
6 courts.  You’re not there with one file, for one court.  You’ve got to make a living 
because there’s not that much money in it.  You’ve got to do bulk to make it work.  
Bulk means running about.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence 
solicitor 2] 
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Impact on Case management 
Contact with Clients 
D57. As we saw from the findings of the telephone survey and stakeholder 
interviews, it was widely reported that as a result of fixed payments there has 
been a sharp decline in the overall levels of client contact.  In the face-to-face 
interviews with non-stakeholder defence solicitors we explored whether or not 
this reported reduction in client contact was believed to have any significant 
effect on the quality of defence work: 
“frankly, it shouldn’t make any difference and I suspect anyone sitting here talking 
to you would say it doesn’t make any difference.  But in reality I am sure that it 
probably does.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2] 
“If somebody who may get the jail, whose life may be ruined deserves half an 
hour of my time, they’re going to get 3 minutes of my time” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
“You’re getting a considerably lower amount per case than you were before.  
Therefore everybody had to cut their coat according to the cloth.  So therefore 
repeat visits to precognose witnesses, lots of letters to the client telling them 
what’s happening in their case disappeared.  The quality of service being 
provided went down.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
“the whole way in which you prepared a case before, which involved you keeping 
your client informed and making sure your clients kept coming to see you.  The 
interest in that happening is not nearly as pressing.  Why have two or three 
meetings with your client that you’re not being paid for?  Why write 20 letters 
when you only need to write 10?  Sometimes the letters that you write and 
sometimes the information you’re seeking it would be beneficial and best 
professional practice would be to do everything.  But if you’re not getting paid for 
it, why do it is the reality.  I mean good professional practice, would be to say, I’ve 
got the police statements in but I don‘t have all the civilian statements.  Or I’ve 
got the civilian statements but I don’t have the police statements.  Come in and 
discuss what we’ve got and then you can say, well, I’ve got some more 
statements, come in and discuss them.  So you could do it step by step and 
discuss with your client and say, well, on the face of it, this is what the 
prosecution have.  We still need to hear from A, B and C.  If they say this, then 
your explanation holds water.  If they say that, your explanation doesn’t hold 
water, let’s meet again in a couple of weeks once the case is fully prepared.  The 
incentive to do that has gone.  The incentive to write long letters explaining what 
the purpose of the intermediate diet is, what you can do if you do need a legal aid 
certificate, information that might be of benefit to the client… the incentive to do 
that is not there.  Why… why bother spending a great deal of time printing out a 
letter explaining all about the intermediate diet procedure and what’s going to 
happen when you’re not getting paid any more for that or not getting paid for it at 
all.  Why go to the trouble of explaining things to the client?  There’s no 
incentive.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
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Precognitions 
D58. Defence agents described substantial changes in the use of precognitions and the 
employment of precognition agents. 
“As far as summary cases are concerned fixed fee cases, what you used to do 
was, you used to instruct a precognitions agent to obtain statements from 
civilians and generally speaking you would get copies of the police statements 
and that still is the case.  Nowadays certain firms do still instruct precognition 
agents, a lot don’t.  I did for the first 4 cases on a fixed fee basis and got 4 bills 
from the precognition agents and then said “well, I’m not doing that anymore”.  
So I stopped it .” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2]  
“well I know of the odd 1 or 2 firms where they are under the impression that if it’s 
fixed fee summary criminal stuff, you’re not allowed to interview or precognose 
people, they just don’t do it.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence 
solicitor 1] 
D59. The knock-on effect of the need to cut down on precognitions was reported to 
be a significantly increased use of prosecution evidence 
“In a summary case now… I probably wouldn’t (precognose), I’d probably just go 
straight to the Fiscal and find out from the Fiscal what the evidence was likely to 
be.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 5] 
“What has happened, I think, is that there is a much greater use of the Fiscal’s 
office when civilian witnesses don’t become co-operative.  Whereas under the old 
system, you would actually go out to make sure the witnesses were precognosed 
now, because that’s uneconomical, you can say well, the witnesses have all been 
written to, they haven’t replied, can I please have an outline of their evidence?  
Which is not the way the system was between from the late 19th Century and the 
coming into force of fixed fees and it’s [pause…] it’s one of the differences.  
There is anecdotal evidence of firms that do no preparation at all in fixed fee 
cases.  I’ve not seen any direct evidence of it, but I’ve been told of firms that 
simply submit the legal aid application and leave the file completely until the 
intermediate diet and do nothing, in which case obviously they make a fair 
amount of money because they’re doing no admin preparatory work whatsoever.” 
[[face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
 
Pleading behaviour 
D60. Defence solicitors suggested that the system could be said to encourage pleas at 
the intermediate diet. 
“it depends what your… how you personally feel you should do the work.  I could 
say to a lot of them, yeah plead guilty at the intermediate diet, I’ve got my legal 
aid certificate and I’ll get the money so that’s not a problem, I wouldn’t tell the 
client that but people you can see that people, you can see that people think 
that.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 1].   
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“at the moment if you’ve got a client who appears from custody charged with 
various offences… if he pleads guilty you’ll probably earn a maximum of £25, 
which is the minimum fee for appearing.  If he pleads not guilty, immediately 
you’ve got £500, there is no benefit to anybody in pleading guilty.  I mean he’s 
then effectively not being represented, or he’s being represented by amateurs 
because the guy’s representing him for fun ‘coz he’s not doing it for money.  If 
you want professional representation, you have to plead not guilty.” [face to face 
non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
“If you plead at the intermediate diet or you resolve the case one way or tother 
you get your £500.  If you continue for a further 2 weeks to the trial, it then 
resolves or pleads or whatever you get your £500.  If it goes to trial you get an 
extra £100 for the first day, £200 for the second and then £400 but that doesn’t 
happen very often.  So in reality what they’re saying is, you’ll get an extra £100 if 
you go to trial… so in my view it doesn’t pay to go trial.” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2].  
 
Overall Impact on the Quality of defence work 
D61. It was also maintained that as a result of having to take on more and more cases 
to sustain an income, and thus spend less time on each case, the quality of 
defence being given to clients had reduced. 
“You know these are real people whose lives are actually ruined if they’re not 
defended properly and if you’ve got the best lawyer in the world, if you give him 
too many cases, then eventually he’s gonna stop doing them as well.  There’s all 
sorts of things I could do extra for him, but I’ve got a 16year old on indictment 
tomorrow who needs my attention and I’ve got another 10 other people just like 
him.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
D62. It was also argued that the fixed payment system had detrimentally impacted on 
the quality of criminal defence proffered to clients. 
“I think it reduces it considerably, because people are just not going to put in a 
full day’s battling for 300 quid.  And that means that somebody could get 60 days 
in jail or a driving ban or something that drastically affects them… there can be 
some pretty drastic consequences.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview 
defence solicitor 1]  
D63. Indeed the financial incentive inherent in the system to plead not guilty at the 
outset and change the plea to one of guilty at either the intermediate or trial diet 
was argued to have a significantly negative impact on the client. 
“I can’t imagine that if anything cropped up that was obvious to them that they 
could secure a not guilty that they wouldn’t do it… I’m sure they would but I do 
think that it means they think that I’m only going to get paid a certain amount for 
this person so we’ll just go through the motions.” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 1] 
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“I think far more solicitors are ready to negotiate a plea rather than go to trial, I’m 
quite sure of it.  And I think that’s straight commerce… and it’s to the 
disadvantage of the client.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence 
solicitor 3] 
“the most efficient way of dealing with cases is not the proper way, and the 
difficulty is that you skip on the preparation…  What I see happening in practice 
is, people will be seen from custody, signed up, they’re not seen again until the 
intermediate diet, the solicitor will get an idea of the case from the fiscal on the 
day of the intermediate diet, then bend the punter’s arm to take a plea on the day 
of the intermediate diet.  Precious poor representation.  That is how it is being 
maximised.” [face-to-face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 3, original 
emphasis] 
“The most economic use of fixed fees is simply to plead everybody not guilty, 
apply for legal aid, get legal aid granted, then plead them all guilty in the 
intermediate diet.  The cynical view.  That’s it.  Do nothing.  Do no preparation 
between times, make sure your client turns up at the intermediate diet and plead 
them all guilty then… it’s the most economic way of doing it. The reality is, that 
under fixed fees what I would say the minimum standards… is write to the client 
after they’ve pled not guilty advising the date of trial of the intermediate diet, 
apply for legal aid.  When you have the legal aid certificate in, you write once to 
each of the civilian witnesses and to the Chief Constable for the police 
statements.  Once you receive the police statement, you write to the client asking 
the client to come in and you write the client a reminder to attend the 
intermediate diet.  If the civilians have been precognosed, fine.  If the civilians 
have not been precognosed, approach the Fiscal at or before the intermediate 
diet to find out what the outline of the evidence is.  And see if you can be fully 
prepared for the intermediate diet… Anything more than that and you’re being 
economically foolish.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
D64. Interviewees also expressed further concerns about the possibility of factually 
not guilty persons being convicted through their own guilty pleas. This was 
partly attributed to the impact of fixed payments 
“I have no doubt that there have been miscarriages of justice because of poor 
preparation, no doubt on that whatsoever.” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 3] 
“oh absolutely!  On a daily basis the innocent are being convicted.” [face to face 
non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
“people are being put in jail when they don’t need to be.” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 1] 
“The likelihood is that because corners are being cut, because the defence do 
not have the funding available to carry out full and thorough investigation, there 
may be a greater number of cases in which points are missed which result in 
advice being given to plead guilty where perhaps the better advice might have 
been to proceed to trial or that perhaps witnesses are not brought to trial… and 
there is likely to be a number of people convicted who would not otherwise have 
been convicted.”  [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
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D65. Interviewees averred that the prospect of an Anderson-type appeal was not a 
major concern. 
 
“I think in the last 5,6,7,8 years since Anderson people are far more aware of the 
likelihood of being taken to task or not been seen to have done the correct thing.  
And I think that that has to be a concern and I think that the Bonomy report is 
going to make a complete and utter farce of the intentions of it, which were to 
speed up things.  What they’re going to find is that there are going to be far more 
complaints, there’s going to be far more cases where people are saying, “that 
hasn’t been done properly” and trials having to stop, people being sacked, and 
having to start all over again because of this early disclosure… and highlighting 
problems with the Crown’s case which are then obviously remedied before the 
trial starts, making it easier for conviction which is the purpose of the whole thing 
or it looks as though that’s case although exclusively that wasn’t his intention.  
And you’re going to have the scenario where there’s going to be more of the 
Anderson type thing happening because I think clients are aware of it whether 
more of it will happen I don’t know.  I don’t think fixed fees in itself has led to that 
because I think once it settled down and people re-jigged the way they operated 
their business.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2] 
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Future of legal aided criminal defence work 
D66. A frequent topic of discussion was concern as to the future of criminal defence 
practice as a direct result of the impact of the introduction of fixed payments. 
“The consequences are obvious.  There are very few practitioners doing legal aid 
at the moment between the ages of 30 and 40.  There are youngsters who are in 
established firms doing their training and deciding whether they get a feel for it or 
not.  A lot of them over the years have gone and a lot more will go.  In five years 
time, there’ll be next to no legal aid practitioners under 45 apart from people in 
the first couple of years of their obtaining their practising certificate because why 
would anybody choose to go through the hassle of criminal defence work, all the 
problems that it entails, when you can have a far easier life in terms of client 
contact and get paid more money doing commercial work? Why do it?  Where is 
the attraction?” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6] 
“there are no longer any younger ones coming through, there are no trainees.  
You have Principals in firms now doing more because they don’t have the same 
levels of staff because who in their right mind could possibly say to someone that 
there’s a future in this job, because I just don’t think there is, which is a shame.  I 
think there is a place for an independent criminal bar within a sophisticated, 
mature society, which we purport to be, although I am not convinced that that is 
necessarily the case…  Quality of representation?  I think the quality of 
representation from the PDSO that we have had over the last few years has been 
very poor and I think that remains the case although there are a couple of 
exceptions.  I think that’s why they still retain an inordinate level of the duty in 
Edinburgh.  They still get 30% of the duty, yet they’ve been standing on their own 
2 feet now supposedly  for 5 years now.  They’ve incorporated a private firm but 
they still need 30% of the duty?  Astonishing!” [face to face non-stakeholder 
interview defence solicitor 2] 
“how can you possibly say to someone who has spent 4 years training, to come a 
do a job where you are constantly criticised, there’s no perception of your 
professionalism, you’re not paid properly and there’s no recognition that we do a 
worthwhile job because it’s not politically acceptable for any party to be seen to 
be paying lawyers who represent ‘scum’.  That is always the perception of the 
public, until of course they need one of these lawyers.” [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2] 
“when I was starting out and it was well paid and it was time an line, you could 
afford to take on trainees because they would make you quite a lot of money.  
You could get them to do time and line stuff and you’d get paid and you wouldn’t 
have to pay them very much and it would be profitable and they would learn how 
to do what they do.  Now, you couldn’t get a trainee to do what I do because it’s 
too complicated, you know.  It would be like saying we’ll get a trainee to do the air 
traffic control.  It’s just not… all the planes would crash you know.  It just wouldn’t 
happen.  So there’s no, you know.  We’re just a dying race of grey-haired old 
hacks.” [face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 4] 
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Telephone Survey of Defence Solicitors 
Section 1a 
 
Changes in the respondent’s activities following the introduction of 
fixed payments. 
 
‘Thinking about the introduction of fixed payments in 1999 and how it may or may not 
have had an impact on your own activities as an individual practitioner.’ 
 
(1) Has the introduction of fixed payments altered the balance between 
criminal and civil work undertaken by you? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
If yes then go to the next question. If not then go to question 3 
 
(2) You said the introduction of fixed payments altered the balance between 
criminal and civil representation undertaken by you. Has the 
introduction of fixed payments led you to undertake more or less criminal 
defence work? 
(1) More 
(2) Less 
 
(3) Has the introduction of fixed payments altered the balance in your legally 
aided work between summary and solemn criminal proceedings? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
If yes then go to next question. If no then go to question 5 
 
(4) You said that as an effect of the introduction of fixed payments the 
balance of summary and solemn criminal work you undertake has 
altered. Has it prompted you to do more or less summary legal aid work? 
(1) More 
(2) Less 
 
As an effect of the introduction of fixed payments, do you apply for more, 
less, or the same number of Advice and Assistance grants? 
(1) More 
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(2) Less 
(3) The same 
 
(6)  As an effect of the introduction of fixed payments, do you undertake 
more, less, or the same amount of work per Advice and Assistance grant? 
(4) More 
(5) Less 
(6) The same 
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Section 1b 
 
Changes in the respondent’s behaviour following the introduction of fixed payments. 
 
‘Thinking now about how the introduction of fixed payments may or may not have had 
an impact on how you now manage summary cases.’   
 
(1) First of all, thinking about your overall level of contact with clients – 
including for example letters, meetings, visits in custody, phone calls etc.  
Has the overall amount of your client-contact increased, decreased or 
remained the same as a result of the introduction of fixed payments? 
(1) Increased 
(2) Decreased 
(3) Remained the same 
 
(2) Thinking now about precognition of witnesses. Overall, has the 
introduction of fixed payments led to more precognitions, fewer 
precognitions or no change? 
(1) More precognitions 
(2) Fewer precognitions 
(3) No change  
 
If answered (1) or (2) go to next question if not go to question 4. 
 
(3) Could you explain why you think it has led to more/fewer precognitions 
 Free text response 
 
(4) Has the introduction of fixed payments had any impact on your dealings 
with Fiscals? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
If yes then go to next question. If no then go to question 6 
 
(5) You said your personal dealings with Fiscals had changed as a result of 
the 
introduction of fixed payments. How would you describe that change? 
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Free text response 
 
Thinking about your overall work-load, has the introduction of fixed 
payments had any impact on your pleading advice to clients? 
(1) Yes, overall it has had some impact 
(2) No, it has had no impact at all 
 
 If yes then go to next question. If no then go to next section. 
 
How has it impacted? 
Free text response 
 
 If the respondent does not understand the question rephrase it as: 
In your opinion, has the fixed payment system led to any changes in the timing and 
nature of pleas? 
Section 2 
 
Impact of the introduction of fixed payments on the respondent’s firm 
 
‘Thinking about the firm where you worked (your firm) when fixed payments for criminal 
legal aid were introduced in 1999… 
 
Did the switch to fixed payments alter the composition of the firm in the first year after 
their introduction, specifically… 
 
(1) Did the firm have more or fewer partners and associates as a result of the 
introduction of fixed payments? 
(1) More 
(2) Fewer 
(3) No change 
(4) Don't know 
 
(2) Did the firm take on more or fewer trainees as a result of the introduction 
of fixed payments? 
(1) More 
(2) Fewer 
(3) No change 
(4) Don't know 
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(3) Did the firm make more or less use of precognition agents as a result of 
the introduction of fixed payments? 
(1) More 
(2) Less 
(3) No change 
(4) Don't know 
 
(4) Did the firm’s method of employing/paying precognition agents change at 
all as a result of the introduction of fixed payments? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
 
If yes go to next question, if no/don't know go to question 6 
 
(5) You said the firm’s method of employing/paying precognition agents 
changed after the introduction of fixed payments.  In what ways did it 
change? 
Free text response 
 
(6) Thinking about the balance of work undertaken by the firm: did the firm 
undertake more or less criminal defence work as a result of the 
introduction of fixed payments? 
(1) More 
(2) Less 
(3) No change 
(4) Don't know 
 
(7) Did the balance between summary and solemn criminal legal aid change 
as a result of the introduction of fixed payments?  
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Don't know 
 
If yes then go to the next question, if no then go to the next section 
 
(8) You said the balance of work between summary and solemn criminal 
legal aid work changed. As a consequence of the introduction of fixed 
payments, did the firm you worked for undertake more or less summary 
legal aid funded work? 
(1) More 
(2) Less 
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 Section 3 
 
Respondent’s comments on the fixed payments system. 
 
‘Thinking now about the overall level of payment available for summary criminal legal 
aid work and considering your own experience over time.’  
 
 
(1) As a result of the introduction of fixed payments, would you say your overall level of 
income from summary criminal legal aid work has increased, decreased, not 
changed? 
(1) Increased 
(2) Decreased 
(3) No change 
 
(2) As a result of the introduction of fixed payments, would you say your firm’s overall 
level of income from summary criminal legal aid work has increased, decreased, not 
changed? 
(1) Increased 
(2) Decreased 
      (3) No change 
 
(3) Overall, is applying for payment from SLAB, more difficult, easier, no 
different than it was under the previous time and line system? 
(1) More difficult 
(2) Easier 
(3) No different 
 
If easier, then ask question (3) otherwise go to next section. 
 
(3) You said that you believe that payment from SLAB is now easier than it 
was under the previous system. Why would you say that is? 
 
Free text response 
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Section 4 
 
Respondent’s observations on the behaviour of other defence agents 
with whom they have contact. 
 
‘Thinking now about the practices of other defence solicitors in general.’ 
 
(1) In terms of the overall level of contact with clients – including for 
example letters, meetings, visits in custody, phone calls etc.  Is your 
impression that the overall amount of contact between clients and their 
solicitor has increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of the 
impact of fixed payments? 
(1) Increased 
(2) Decreased 
(3) Remained the same 
 
 
(2) As a result of the impact of fixed payments have other solicitors tended to 
reduce, tended to expand or not changed the number of courts in which 
they concentrate their work? 
(1) Tended to reduce the number of courts in which they concentrate their 
work 
(2) Tended to expand the number of courts in which they concentrate their 
work 
(3) They have not changed the number of courts in which they concentrate 
their work 
 
(3) In terms of the use of precognitions: has the introduction of fixed 
payments led to other defence solicitors, in general, making more overall 
use, less overall use or the same use of precognitions? 
(1) More use 
(2) Less use 
(3) No change 
 
 
(4) As an effect of the introduction of fixed payments, do you think there has 
been a tendency among other defence solicitors, in general, to modify 
their use of Advice and Assistance as compared with practice under time 
and line?  
(1) Overall More use of A&A  
(2) Overall Less use of A&A  
(3) Overall No change 
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(5) In general, do you think the introduction of fixed payments had or is 
having any impact on how other defence solicitors tend to deal with 
Fiscals? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
If yes answer next question.  Otherwise go to question 7. 
 
(6) You said that you think that the introduction of fixed payments had or is 
having an impact on how other defence solicitors tend to deal with 
Fiscals. How would you describe that impact? 
Free text response 
 
(7) Thinking about the overall work-load of other defence solicitors, has the 
introduction of fixed payments had any impact on their pleading 
practices? 
(1) Yes, overall it has had some impact 
(2) No, it has had no impact at all 
 
If answered yes, then ask next question, if answered no then go to question 9 
   
(8) Can you explain why you think why the introduction of fixed payments 
has impacted on defence solicitors’ pleading practices? 
  Free text response 
 
 
(9) Thinking finally about the impact of fixed payments on the overall 
effectiveness of criminal defence work. Do you think the introduction of 
fixed payments has had any impact on the overall effectiveness of defence 
work? 
(1) Yes, it has had an impact on the overall effectiveness 
(2) No it has had no impact  
(3) Can’t say 
 
If answered yes, then ask question 10, if answered no then go to question 11  
  
(10) You said that it has had an impact on the overall effectiveness of 
criminal defence work. How would describe this impact? 
Free text 
 
 
 Only to be asked if answered no to question 9  
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(11) You said that it has had no impact on the overall effectiveness of criminal 
defence work. Could you explain why you think that it has had no 
impact? 
   Free text 
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Appendix E 
Survey of Depute Fiscals on their perceptions of the impact of 
the introduction of fixed payments in the provision of criminal 
legal aid. 
 
Outline 
 
E1. The Crown Office provided the research team with a list of depute fiscals willing to 
be interviewed as part of the research programme. From this list a sample of twenty 
depute fiscals was drawn in such a way as to give a reasonable representation from 
as many parts of Scotland as possible. One selected respondent was no longer 
working as a depute fiscal and was replaced with a colleague from the same area and 
it was impossible to contact another three selected interviewees due to sickness or 
being repeatedly unavailable when contacted for interview. The final sample size 
was therefore seventeen.  
E2. Unlike the survey of criminal legal aid practitioners, this survey was sufficiently 
short to allow all questions to be asked as part of a telephone survey. The survey 
consisted of a mixture of closed and open questions (a copy of the survey can be 
found at the end of this Appendix E). This method was favoured as it allowed the 
survey to be completed quickly (seldom more than five minutes) while still allowing 
respondents scope to expand their answers to important parts of the survey. 
E3. The data returned from the telephone survey allowed descriptive statistical analysis 
to be conducted. In addition, a small subset, consisting of seven, respondents was 
selected and approached to take part in face-to-face interviews with a member of the 
research team. These interviews were more wide-ranging in focus and the questions 
more in-depth in nature. 
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Telephone Survey Results 
E4. Of the seventeen depute fiscals approached, fifteen had been involved in the criminal 
law system, either as defence agents or as depute fiscals, prior to the introduction of 
fixed payments. We had not expected many if any respondents to be new to criminal 
defence or prosecution, but had included a number of ‘don’t know’ options for 
respondents so as not to force them to agree or disagree with the statements or 
questions put to them. Some respondents chose this option to subsequent questions. 
E5. Respondents were asked whether or not they thought that solicitors had altered the 
number of courts in which they practised. Chart 1 shows their responses, 
Chart 1 
 
E6. Seven respondents believed that solicitors had not changed their practices, six that 
they had tended to reduce the number of courts they operated in, one believed the 
number had expanded and three did not know. This tended to confirm the opinion 
that the introduction of fixed payments would make the costs of travelling to more 
Change in Number of Courts Worked
Reduce 
35%
Expand 
6%
Not changed 
41%
Don't know 
18%
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distant courts less attractive and encourage solicitors to focus their activities in a 
smaller geographical area. 
E7. There was near unanimity amongst respondents that fixed payments had led to less 
precognosing. No one thought that it had led to an increase in precognitions, three 
believed the level was the same as before, thirteen believed it was less and one 
respondent did not know. It would appear that solicitors have reduced precognitions 
to save costs under the new system. 
E8. The vast majority of respondents (14) believed that the introduction of fixed 
payments had altered the way in which solicitors tended to deal with depute fiscals; 
only three did not. Respondents were given a free text response to allow them to say 
why they believed this to be the case. It is difficult to concretely analyse such 
responses, but the frequency with which themes and keywords are mentioned allows 
their relative importance to be determined. By far the most frequently mentioned 
issue was precognition. In the opinion of those giving responses solicitors now 
employ the services of precognition agents much less and rely on statements taken 
for the Crown. In addition, a few respondents mentioned the potential increase in 
costs, particularly time, that this could have for the Crown, though no one 
highlighted it as a serious consideration or problem. 
E9. Interviewees were asked whether they thought the introduction of fixed payments 
had impacted on defence agents’ pleading practices. Ten believed that it had, five 
that it had not and two did not know. Those who believed that it had an impact were 
asked a free-text question as to why they believed that to be the case. A few key 
changes were revealed. Respondents believed that the system provided an incentive 
to plead not guilty at the pleading diet, but to change that at the intermediate diet. 
This was due to the nature of the fixed fee: that it encourages cases to be continued 
to the intermediate diet, but not to trial diet as there was little financial incentive to 
the solicitor for that to happen.  
E10. The final closed question asked those interviewed whether they believed the 
introduction of fixed payments had impacted on the overall effectiveness of criminal 
defence work. Chart 2 shows responses. 
E11. Eleven respondents believed it had impacted, five that it had not and one did not 
know. Free text responses were offered to both those who believed that it had and 
those who believed it had not.  
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Chart 2 
 
 
E12. Those who believed that the introduction of fixed payments had impacted negatively 
often mentioned under-preparation as a reason for a decrease in the effectiveness of 
the system. Due to the reduction in precognitions, solicitors were perceived to rely 
much more heavily on Crown statements, and therefore do less of their own 
investigating to maximise the benefit to their client. Some respondents also 
mentioned that there were more delays because diets were being adjourned due to 
defence solicitors claiming that they were not sufficiently prepared. One depute 
fiscal felt this could also add to inefficiency since accused may now plead on the day 
of the trial rather than at preceding diets and that it must have an impact on the 
financial efficiency of the criminal justice system. Although it may be argued that 
any criminal justice system will lead defence solicitors to respond to the incentives 
given to them, some depute fiscals held the opinion that the fixed payment system 
created financial incentives that may not be co-terminus to the delivery of justice. 
E13. This was not, however, the universal opinion. Five of the seventeen respondents 
believed that the introduction of fixed payments had no impact on the effectiveness 
Impact on Effectiveness of Criminal Defence Work?
Yes, 11
No, 5
Don't know   , 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Yes No Don't know   
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of criminal defence work. All but one respondent felt that solicitors were now doing 
things differently, not any worse, and that the new system merely provided a 
different incentive for the process rather than the output. One respondent believed 
that if solicitors implemented the system properly then it would lead to a less 
effective process and output. Only because they had not was there no impact. 
 
Face to Face Interviews 
E14. Of the sample of seventeen depute fiscals, seven were approached by posted letter 
for a subsequent face-to-face interview with a member of the Research Team.  The 
letters were followed-up by telephone call in order that arrangements could be made 
to conduct the interviews.  However of the seven, one intimated that he would not be 
able to participate; three no longer worked within the same division and forwarding 
contact details were unavailable; one was due to go off on annual leave; and one was 
consistently unobtainable.  Consequently, only one follow-up face to face interview 
with a depute fiscal was conducted. 
E15. From the face to face interview it was stated that the perceived aim for the 
introduction of fixed payments was financial and “to prevent an abuse of the legal 
aid system”.  When further probed as to who had been perceived to be abusing the 
system a procurator fiscal responded 
“defence solicitors… they would run a case out as long as they 
possibly could because obviously the longer they were in court or the 
longer the case carried on then the more money they were going to 
get and they just saw it as a business.” 
E16. When questioned regarding any observed changes in the practices of defence 
solicitors the issue of precognitions was highlighted, a procurator fiscal opined 
“I do notice now… that defence agents are not as prepared as they 
used to be and they’re relying heavily on the Crown to provide them 
with the information they need to defend their client’s case and 
because we don’t want cases to be adjourned continuously, we on 
most occasions would agree to give them what they’re looking for, so 
that we can get the case to court.  Because obviously we’ve got 
witnesses who are languishing about waiting on these cases going to 
trial. “ 
E17. When discussing the motive behind the observed changes in practice a procurator 
fiscal suggested that it was 
“ [to make the ‘business’] the most profitable I think that was their 
main consideration.  If they’re trying to get the most profit, they can’t 
precognosce witnesses so they just don’t.” 
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E18. In line with responses to the telephone survey, a procurator fiscal commented on the 
changes in defence solicitors’ willingness to plead; 
“there’s more pleas at the intermediate diet or at the trial diet… I mean 
it used to be the sky was the limit for them wasn’t it?...  They’d have 
been quite happy to sit about in court until half past three, four o’clock 
because they were getting paid for it.  Now they’re not, they want to 
be out doing other things, so they’re more inclined to plead now.” 
E19. Finally, when asked regarding the impact, if any, on the overall effectiveness of 
defence work as a direct result of the introduction of fixed payments, depute fiscal 1 
responded: 
Because defence agents are not as prepared… yes, I think it 
probably has gone down actually, I think it probably has... I 
personally don’t think there’s anything to stop them providing the 
same quality service as they were before they still have the money to 
do it but they’re deciding ‘no, I’m not going to use that money… I’m 
going to keep that in my tail.” 
  199
Depute Procurators Fiscal Questionnaire 
 
Introduction:  
 
‘We are carrying out research into the impact of the introduction of fixed payments for 
summary criminal legal aid. We have already spoken to a number of actors in the Scottish 
criminal justice system at length and also a larger number of defence agents to ascertain 
their views as to the impact of fixed payments. Your name has been provided by the 
Crown Office as a member of the Fiscal Service who is willing to be interviewed. 
 
 
‘Thank you for taking part in this project. 
 
‘As a member of the Procurator Fiscal service you are in an good position to observe how 
defence solicitors with whom you come into contact manage their cases. We are therefore 
interested in any observations you may have about the way defence agents have handled 
their cases since the introduction of fixed payments for summary legal aid.’  
 
‘I would like to remind you that all data gathered are confidential and are not accessible 
to anyone outwith the research team. We may refer to answers given by individual 
respondents, but these will be anonymised.’ 
 
[……] 
 
(5) Were you a court practitioner at any point prior to 1999 – either as a 
Procurator Fiscal or as a defence agent? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
 
(6) Since the introduction of fixed payments, in general would you say that 
solicitors have tended to reduce, tended to expand or not changed the 
number of courts in which they concentrate their work? 
(1) Tended to reduce the number of courts in which they concentrate their 
work 
(2) Tended to expand the number of courts in which they concentrate their 
work 
(7) They have not changed the number of courts in which they concentrate 
their work 
(8) Don’t know 
 
(9) In terms of the use of precognitions: would you say that  the introduction 
of fixed payments led to defence solicitors, in general, making more 
overall use, less overall use or the same use of precognitions? 
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(1) More use 
(2) Less use 
(3) No change 
(4) Don’t know 
 
 
(8) In general, do you think the introduction of fixed payments had or is 
having any impact on how defence solicitors tend to deal with you or 
other Fiscals? 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
 
If yes answer next question.  Otherwise go to question 6. 
 
(9) You said that you think that the introduction of fixed payments had or is 
having an impact on how defence solicitors tend to deal with Fiscals. How 
would you describe that impact? 
Free text response 
 
(10) Has the introduction of fixed payments had any impact on the 
pleading practices of defence solicitors? 
(3) Yes, overall it has had some impact 
(4) No, it has had no impact at all 
 
 
If answered yes, then ask next question, if answered no then go to question 8 
   
(9) Can you explain why you think why the introduction of fixed payments 
has impacted on defence solicitors’ pleading practices? 
  Free text response 
 
 
(11) Thinking finally about the impact of fixed payments on the overall 
effectiveness of criminal defence work. Do you think the introduction of 
fixed payments has had any impact on the overall effectiveness of defence 
work? 
(1) Yes, it has had an impact on the overall effectiveness 
(2) No it has had no impact  
(3) Don’t know 
 
If answered yes, then ask question 9, if answered no then go to question 10  
  
(12) You said that it has had an impact on the overall effectiveness of criminal 
defence work. How would describe this impact? 
Free text 
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 Only to be asked if answered no to question 9  
 
(10) You said that it has had no impact on the overall effectiveness of 
criminal defence work. Could you explain why you think that it has had 
no impact? 
   Free text 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your co-operation in this study 
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Appendix F 
 
Summary of the Fixed Payment Structure  
at Implementation 
 
Under section 33 and 41 (A) of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986, as amended by the 
Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997 the Secretary of State implemented a system 
of fixed payments for summary criminal legal aid.  Subsequently, the full provisions were 
laid down in the Criminal Legal Aid (Fixed Payments) (Scotland) Regulations 1999 
which came into force on 1st April 1999. 
 
Proceedings to which the fixed payment regulations apply 
 
The fixed payment regulations apply to all summary criminal legal aid work done by a 
solicitor, except excluded proceedings.  The excluded proceedings, which are still subject 
to time and line, are: 
 
 Summary proceedings arising following a reduction from solemn proceedings. 
 Proceedings in relation to which legal aid is only available by virtue of section 
22(1)(a) of the Act i.e. identification parades held by or on behalf of the 
prosecutor in contemplation of criminal proceedings. 
 Proceedings in relation to which legal aid is only available by virtue of section 
22(1)(c) of the Act i.e.  assisted person in custody or liberated by police on 
undertaking to appear. 
 Proceedings in relation to which legal aid is only available by virtue of section 
22(1)(da) of the Act i.e. plea of insanity in bar of trial 
 Proceedings in relation to which legal aid is only available by virtue of section 
22(1)(db) of the Act i.e.  examination of facts 
 Proceedings in relation to which legal aid is only available by virtue of regulation 
15 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996 i.e. matters of special 
urgency 
 Any reference in connection with proceedings under Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty 
 
The effect of the introduction of Fixed Payments 
 
The Regulations came into effect in respect of all automatic criminal legal aid provided to 
a client from the morning of April 1st 1999.  The fixed payment regulations apply to all 
summary criminal legal aid certificates where the effective date marked on the certificate 
is 1st April 1999 or later. 
 
E.g. 1.    Legal Aid granted (basic Sheriff Court fee) 
 
Pre-1 April 1999 automatic work =      detailed account for automatic work + £500 
1 April 1999 automatic work  =      £25 + £475 
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E.g. 2.  Legal Aid refused 
Pre-1 April 1999 automatic work =      detailed account for automatic work 
1 April 1999 automatic work  =      £25 
The Structure of the Fixed Payment System (Schedule 1 of Regualtions) 
 
All work up to and 
including   
District court Sheriff/  
stipendiary courts
 Schedule 2 
courts 
1.(i) any diet at which a 
plea of guilty is made 
and accepted or plea in 
mitigation is made; 
£300 
 
(£275*) 
£500 
 
(£475*) 
£550 
 
(£525*) 
(ii) the first 30 minutes 
of conducting a proof in 
mitigation other than in 
the circumstances 
where paragraph (2) 
below applies; and 
   
(iii) the first 30 minutes 
of conducting any trial 
together with 
any subsequent or 
additional work other 
than that specified 
in paragraphs 2-9 
below. 
   
* Where automatic legal 
aid has been made 
available. 
   
2. All work done in 
connection with a grant 
of legal aid under 
section 23(1)(b) of the 
Act including the first 30 
minutes of conducting a 
proof in mitigation 
£25 £50 £50 
3. Conducting a trial or 
proof in mitigation for 
the first day (after the 
first 30 minutes). 
£50 £100 £100 
4. Conducting a trial or 
proof in mitigation for 
the second 
day. 
£50 £200 £200 
5. Conducting a trial or 
proof in mitigation for 
the third and 
subsequent days (per 
day). 
£100 £400 £400 
6. Representation in 
court at a diet of 
deferred sentence. 
£25 £50 £50 
7. All work done where 
the accused is in 
custody and has 
tendered a plea of not 
guilty until 
determination of the 
application for legal aid. 
£25 £25 £25 
8. All work done by £25 £25 £25 
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virtue of section 24(7) 
of the Act until 
determination of the 
application for legal aid 
9. All work done in 
connection with a bail 
appeal under section 
32 of the 1995 Act. 
£50 £50 £50 
 
 
There is what is referred to as a core fixed payment which is payable in respect of the 
case itself – no matter how little or how much work is done – from the date of availability 
of criminal legal aid to, and including, any diet at which a plea of guilty is made and 
accepted or plea in mitigation is made, or alternatively, the first 30 minutes of conducting 
a trial or proof in mitigation. 
 
Sheriff court cases and those set down for the stipendiary magistrates court attract a 
higher rate of payment than the district court because of the greater sentencing powers 
available and because such cases are considered likely to be more complex. 
 
The fixed payment is in respect of the professional services provided by a solicitor up to a 
certain stage of the proceedings, however the following outlays are deemed to be 
included: 
 
 The taking, drawing, framing and perusal of precognitions 
 Employment of a precognition agent 
 The undertaking by another solicitor of any part of the work 
 Photocopying 
 
The following outlays are not deemed to be included: 
 
 Employment of counsel 
 Witness expenses 
 Expert witnesses 
 Travelling expenses e.g. mileage in attending court (not being a court in the town 
or place where the solicitor has a place of business) 
 
 
Rural Courts: Enhanced Core Fixed Payment 
 
Schedule 2 of the Regulations lists those courts which attract an enhanced fixed payment, 
namely: 
 
 Campbeltown 
 Dunoon (where proceedings have taken place in Lochgilphead) 
 Kirkwall 
 Lerwick 
 Lochmaddy 
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 Oban 
 Portree 
 Rothesay 
 Stornoway 
 
 
‘Exceptional Cases’ 
 
Section 7 of the Convention Rights (Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001 allowed Scottish 
Ministers to prescribe regulations to enable SLAB in certain exceptional circumstances, 
and subject to certain conditions, to determine that a solicitor shall not receive fixed 
payments but shall instead receive payment based on the amount of time and work done 
in providing criminal legal aid i.e. time and line.  The Criminal Legal Aid (Fixed 
Payments) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2002 subsequently came into force on 
17th June 2002. 
 
The ‘test’ that SLAB is required to apply is whether an assisted person would be deprived 
of the right to a fair trial because of the amount of the fixed payment.  The factors taken 
into account by SLAB in applying this test include: 
 
 The number, nature and location of witnesses 
 The number and nature of productions 
 The complexity of the law (including procedural complexity) and 
 Whether the person or any witness may be unable to understand the proceedings 
because of age, inadequate knowledge of English, mental illness or other mental 
or physical disability or otherwise. 
 
Since its introduction there have been relatively few successful ‘exceptional case’ 
applications.  A number have been refused as the proposed work or number of witnesses 
did not fall outwith the acceptable range covered by the “swings and roundabouts” nature 
of the fixed payments scheme.  Other cases have been refused because it was not clear 
that any efforts had been made to obtain police statements or other information from the 
Procurator Fiscal to assist the preparation of the case.  Finally, lengthy cases or those 
involving expert witnesses are not usually considered to be exceptional as these can 
normally be accommodated within the additional fixed payments available as outlays. 
 
Of those applications which have been granted, the cases tend to involve: 
 
 Serious charges with complex medical evidence 
 Fraud or embezzlement charges with many productions and witnesses 
 Complicated cases with unusual charges such as under the Trade Descriptions Act 
or the Endangered Species Regulations 
 The investigation of complex legal issues 
 Significant number of witnesses covering a wide geographical area 
 Extensive crown evidence and productions  
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Interests Of Justice Factors Used  
In The Decision To Grant Criminal Legal Aid 
 
 
 The offence is such that if proved it is likely that the court would impose a 
sentence which would deprive the accused of his liberty or lead to loss of his 
livelihood; 
 The determination of the case may involve consideration of a substantial question 
of law, or of evidence of a complex or difficult nature; 
 The accused may be unable to understand the proceedings or to state his own case 
because of his age, inadequate knowledge of English, mental illness, other mental 
or physical disability or otherwise; 
 It is in the interests of someone other than the accused that the accused be legally 
represented; 
 The defence to be advanced by the accused does not appear to be frivolous; 
 The accused has been remanded in custody pending trial 
 
Source: Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 s24(3). For recent discussion of these tests see 
Scottish Legal Aid Board (2004) Proposals for the Review of Summary Legal Assistance 
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